Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian Territory, 1863-1865 by Rampp, Lary Charles
THE TWILIGHT OF THE. CONFEDERACY IN 
INDIAN TERRITORY, 1863-1865 
By 
LARY CHARLES RAMPP ,, 
Bachelor of Arts 




the faculty of the Graduate College of 
the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 




LARY CHARLES RAMPP 
All rights reserved. No part of this 
thesis may be reproduced or utilized in 
any form or by any means, electronic or 
mechanical, including photocopying, re-
cording, or by any informational storage 
and retrieval system, without permission 
in writing from the author~ 
THE TWILIGHT OF THE. CONFEDERACY IN 





OCT 4·1 1961 
,,,·,·, .. ,,,-,••, -,v~.·.-: .. , 
PREFACE 
This study bas a threefold purpose. First, it is the 
desire of the author to present a detailed, accurate, and 
interesting narrative of the military activities in Indian 
Territory during the latter. part of the Civil War, a pe];'iod 
of time from September, 1863, to June, 1865.· Due to the 
emphasis on military history, other materials are included 
only for reader.orientation and balance. A decided effort 
bas been made to present the red man as a soldier in Indian 
Territory •. Though not always appreciated, the Indian sol-
dier faithfully served the cause of his choice to the end" 
of the war. Second, the author hopes that this thesis will 
rectify the misconception that there were not important mil.-
itary activities in Indian Territory during the.latter part 
of the war. After the spectacular capture of a Federal 
wagon train at Cabin Creek in 1864, for example, the Confed .. 
erate Congress and President Jefferson Davis sent the con-
gratul~tions of the entire Confederacy to the leaders of the 
expedition. Third, the author hopes that the facts,.inform-
ation, sequence of events, and the interpretations add to 
the knowledge of the Civil War •. 
The author extends apprec~ation to the Library Staff of 
Oklahoma State University for its assistance in locating 
obscure sources essential to the writing of this thesis. 
iii 
It is also the desire of the writer to thank the staff of 
the Oklahoma Historical Society and the librarians of the 
Gilcrease Institute of.American History and Art. Their as-
sistance in.locating and making available a wide variety of 
sources was valuable in extending the scope of this study. 
My special and everlasting thanks and appreciation go 
to two people: Dr. LeRoy H. Fischer and Phillip D. White. 
It is impossible to adequately thank these two persons who 
have made this work possible. Professor Fischer suggested 
the.· tqpic and helped the author through its entire research 
and editorial process. His exactness has made it possible 
for the writer.to acquire a,firm foundation in scholarly 
writing techniques. This thesis is much a part of his 
thinking. 
To Phil White I owe a personal debt that can be given 
only to a long-time friend. He spent many hours in helping 
the author make this thesis an accomplished fact. His en-
couragement helped to overcome many of the exasperating 
moments that only a project of this type can present. 
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CONFEDERATE SUPREMACY AND DECLINE 
In mid-July, 1863, the Union and Confederate armies met 
in the pivotal Battle of Honey Springs, near present-day 
Muskogee; Oklahoma. For several hours fighting raged over 
both sides of Elk Creek and the surrounding countryside in a 
running battle for supremacy over Indian Territory. The· 
Union force pushed the Confederate units back to their nearby 
i:--
supply depot at Honey Springs, and by late afternoon the ,...----·----
fighting had faded to sporadic skirmishing. The Confederates 
had lost the contest for the possession of the area north of 
the Arkansas River, and the door was opened also to the 
region to the south. The Confederate position in Indian.Ter~ 
ritory had rapidly deteriorated since the war began in the 
spring of 1861, when the Southern forces in that area 
appeared to have the odds in their favor. 
With the states of the East and the South preparing for 
war, the people of the region west of the Mississippi were in 
a quandary. The peculiar geographic position of Indian Ter-
ritory caused it to be pressured from all sides. To the 
north lay the state of Kansas, overflowing with Union sympa-
thy; to the east were the states of Arkansas and Missouri, 
both of which displayed strong pro-Southern tendencies; to 
1 
.2 
the south was the· Confederate· state of Texas.. Thre·e commis·. 
sioners were selected by the Texas State·· Cori.vention ·to go to· 
. . 
Indian Territory carrying instructions to · invite the· "speedy ·. '. 
and prompt co-operation" of. the Choctaws, Chi1Ckasaws, Creeks~ .· 4 
Seminoles, · and the Cherokees, known as· .the· Five Civilized 
Tribes. 1 In its report, the findings of ·the Texas commis-
sioners were s.o favorable that by early April, 1861, the J 
Union forts in Indian Territory were in the hands. of the 
Confederates. 
The interest of. the Confederate· government ln Indian.· 
Territory had a practical side· •. · The Confederacy was inter.,;.· 
ested in the possibility of.the area becoming· a storehouse 
for provisions that could be.transported to the,Eastern the-
ater of .·War. Also it was planned that the southern part of 
Indian Territory would function as· a secure· highway to and · 
from.Texas;.where a part of the valuable Confederatecaval-· 
ry's horse. supply was located. The Confederacy hoped also 
thatif the·war. were prolonged, .Indian Territory could be 
used.as a pivotal point·in which invasion.forces.could swing· 
up into.the stateof Kansas and Colorado, Territory,} 
Pressure· from prominent Southerners was also being put. 
on. the chiefs· and sub .. chiefs of the· Five Civilized.·Tribes, 
lohland Mo'rton;> "The Confederate. States, Government and . 
the Five Civilized Tribes," Chronicles of Oklahoma~ .XXXI 
(Autumn, 1953), p. 299. . · · · 
" 2Annie· H. Abel, "The· Indians in .the Ciyil War," American 
Historical Review, XV, (January, 1910), pp. 283 .. 284; Morton,, . 
"The.Confederate States Government and the Five Civilized 
Tribes," Chronicles of Oklahoma,· XX.XI, pp.·. 299, ·315. 
and in particular on the Cherokees. The governor of the 
neighboring state of Arkansas, Henry M. Rector, and his 
cousin, Elias Rector, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for 
3 
the Southern Superintendency, put pressure on the chief of 
the Cherokee Nation, John Ross. The Cherokee Nation and 
Chief Ross were the most powerful.tribe and most influential 
individual in Indian Territory. Because Ross believed t;:hat 
the quarrel between the North and South was no concern of the 
Indians, he gave no sign of interest to the feelers put out 
by those who wanted the Cherokees in the camp of .the 
Confederacy.3 
The situation in Indian Territory was made worse by a 
drought in 1860 that was the most devastating experienced in 
thirty years. Corn crops were destroyed, and grass was non-
existant in areas that heretofore had ample supplies. All 
of the Five Civilized Tribes were faced with starvation and 
suffering unless the·United States Congress would appropriate 
enough money to take care of their needs until the weather 
improved.4 To add to the state of unrest of Indian Terri-
tory, 1860 was an election year in the United States. Feel-
ing in and around the border states ran unusually high. An 
atmosphere of doubt was prevalent among the tribes when they 
3Abel, "The Indians in the Civil War," American Histor-
ical Review, XV, pp. 282-283; Dean Trickett, 11The Civil War 
in Indian Territory,." Chronicles of Oklahoma, XVII (September, 
1939), p. 322. · 
4Joseph B. Thoburn and Muriel H. Wright, Oklahoma: A 
History of the State and Its People (4 vols., New York: 
Lewis Historical Publishing,-co., 1929), I, p. 306 •. 
4 
heard that one of the·presidential aspirants, William H. 
Seward, advocated the expulsion of the Five Civilized Tribes 
from Indian Territory. To some these words indicated the 
plans of·the incoming administration, and a point of view 
that the· Indians disliked and rejected. 
At the outset of the war, Indian Territory was left 
virtually de·fenseless,. and its location made permanent neu ... 
trality impossible. With war sweeping the United States,. it 
was u,p ·to the Union and the Confederacy to make the next 
moves to win Indian Territory. 
There were at that time, three military posts located 
within Indian Territory. They were Fort Washita, Fort 
Arbuckle, and Fort Cobb, all garrisoned by the United States 
Government for the purpose of protecting the Five Civilized 
Tribes. In addition, Fort Smith was situated on the eastern 
border of Indian Territory for the purpose of serving as the 
supply depot for the other three forts •. Lieutenant Colonel 
William H. Emory, the -commanding officer of the district, had 
a total aggregate force of only eleven companies of infantry 
and cavalry. He was ordered to concentrate all of his avail-
able troops at .Fort Cobb, the northern-most post. With the 
secession of Arkansas, the Arkansas River would be closed to 
Unior:i traffic and the outposts in Indian Territory would be 
at the mercy of the Confederate Texans who were threatening 
the region. A rumor circulated that the Federal stockade at 
Little Rock, Arkansas, would be reinforced; and on the basis 
of this groundless report, Arkansas forces seized the arsenal. 
5 
In quick succession Arkansas authorities sealed up the 
Arkansas River from Federal use, thereby isolating much of 
Indian Territory from Union forces. Threatened by an inva-
sion expedition, the post commander of Fort Smith, Captain 
Samuel D. Sturgis, ordered the city and the fort evacuated. 
Captain Sturgis moved his two troops of cavalry to a rendez-
vous with Colonel Emory near Fort Washita. An hour after 
Captain Sturgis vacated Fort Smith, 300 Confederate militia, 
with ten pieces of artillery, arrived by steamboat to take 
possession of the fort and town.5 
Finding Colonel Emory near Fort Washita, Sturgis joined 
the column as it proceeded into the fort. Colonel Emory, 
expecting an attack by a superior number of the enemy forces, 
abandoned Fort Washita and hurried to the relief of Fort 
Arbuckle further east. The Arbuckle garrison had already 
been overwhelmed and paroled by a force of Texas Confeder-
ates. The growing Federal column then turned north to 
relieve the soldiers at Fort Cobb, the northern-most post in 
Indian Territory. Colonel Emory, finding that his column was 
being hotly pursued by a large force of the enemy, wheeled 
and with a swift motion engulfed the Confederate advanced 
party. After a conference, the Confederates were paroled and 
5Ibid., pp. 309-310; Charles Richard Francis, "Confeder-
ate Ascendancy in Indian Territory 1860-1861," (Unpublished 
Master of Arts Thesis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, 
Oklahoma, 1963), pp. 17-30; W. B. Morrison, "Fort Washita," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, V (June, 1927), pp. 256-258; Stephen 
B. Oates, "Recruiting Confederate Cavalry in Texas," South-
western Historical Quarterly, LXVI (April, 1961), pp. 468-
4G9. 
6 
,gave up the chase. For the next three weeks the combined 
Union garrisons, numbering about 750 men from the four 
recently-abandoned forts, headed for Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
They arrived with a loss of only two men, and these had 
deserted. 6 
Previously, on May 13, 1861, Ben McCulloch of Texas had 
been conunissioned a brigadier general and given command of 
Confederate regiments from the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, 
and Texas. This force was supplemented by three regiments of 
Indian troops; one was composed of Choctaw-Chickasaw volun-
teers, another combined the troops of the Creeks and 
Seminoles, and still another consisted of Cherokees. These 
troops under McCulloch were given the mission of capturing 
the forts in Indian Territory and the garrisons they con-
tained.7 McCulloch hoped to establish his headquarters with-
in the borders of the Cherokee Nation, but was overruled by 
the objections of Chief Ross, who issued a proclamation on 
May 17, 1861, calling for a policy of strict neutrality.8 
Refused permission to establish a headquarters within 
the Cherokee country, McCulloch moved on to Fort Smith and 
there met, in the latter part of May, with Albert Pike, 
6Ibid., pp. 310-311. 
?Morton, ''The Confederate States Government and the Five 
Civilized Tribes," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XX.XI, p. 302; 
Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: !! History of the State and Its 
People, I, p. 311. 
8Abel, "The Indians in the Civil War," American Histor-
ical Review, XV, p. 284; J. D. Head, ''Albert Pike," The 
Southern Magazine, II (Winter, 1935-1936), pp. 16-19~7. 
7 
recently appointed special commissioner.for the Confederate 
Stateso From Fort Smith they proceeded to Tahlequah, and 
then on to Park Hill to meet with Chief Ross. Ross received 
them with courtesy, but stated that the Cherokee people had 
nothing to do with the quarrel between the two rival govern-
ments. He did, however, agree to call a session of the 
Cherokee executive council, where he would have to face the 
• 
large element within the tribe that favored secession.9 
When the executive council met at Tahlequah in August, 1861, 
attended by some 4,000 Cherokees, resolutions were adopted 
that seemed to commit the Cherokee people to the Confederacy. 
Ross showed further acceptance of the sentiments of the 
people by giving the authorization to John Drew to raise a 
regiment of 1,200 men. A messenger was sent to Pike, and a 
meeting was arranged for Ross and Pike to discuss a treaty. 
On October 7 the Confederate-Cherokee treaty was signed, an 
instrument quite similar to those agreed upon by the other 
tribes. Two days later Chief Ross explained to the National 
Council why he recommended ratification of the treaty with 
the Confederacy. In December, Chief Ross addressed Colonel 
9Edward E. Dale, "Arkansas and the Cherokees," Arkans.as 
Historical Quarterly, VIII (Spring, 1949), p. 106. 
Drew's regiment and again expressed his support regarding 
the Confederate-Cherokee Treaty.lo 
The treaty provided that the Cherokee Nation and the 
Confederate States enter into a bilateral offensive and 
8 
defensive alliance. The Confederacy assumed all debts of 
the signators, guaranteed the possession of their lands, and 
promised arms and anmrunition in order for them to protect 
themselves against invasion. A section of the treaty prom-
ised the Cherokees that they would never be called upon to 
fight outside of their own boundaries unless they volun-
teered; it was violated, nevertheless, several times during 
the war. 11 
The treaties made by Pike were promptly ratified by the 
Confederate Congress in December, 1861, and Indian Territory 
was designated as a military district with Brigadier General 
Pike in comma.nd.12 He selected a site for a military instal-
lation on the south side of the Arkansas River, across from 
Fort Gibson, and called it Cantonment Davis, soon to be 
renamed Fort Davis. Due to preparations for obtaining 
lOMorris L. Wardell, A Political History of the Cherokee 
Nation, 1838-1907 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, · 
1938), pp. 132-134; Joseph B. Thoburn, "The Cherokee Ques-
tion," Chronicles of Oklahoma, II (June, 1924), pp. 150-152; 
John Bartlett Meserve, "Chief Louis Downing and Chief Charles 
Thompson," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XVI (March, 1939), p. 318; 
Francis, "Confederate Ascendancy in Indian Territory 1860-· · 
1861, II pp• 33-41. 
11Edward E. Dale, "The Cherokees in the Confederacy," 
Journal of Southern History, XIII (May, 1947), pp. 165-167. 
12Dale, ''Arkansas and the Cherokees," Arkansas Histor-
ical ~arterly, VIII, p. 106; Dale, "The Cherokees in the 
Confeeracy, 11 Journal£! Southern History, XIII, p. 167. 
supplies for his men, General Pike did not arrive at Fort 
Davis until February 26, 1862.13 
9 
Between the time of Pikevs appointment to the command of 
Indian Territory and his arrival, bitter feeling had erupted 
between Union sympathizers, known as the "Pins," and Southern 
adherents of the Creek Tribe. These Pin Indians were most 
numerous among the Creeks and were led by the aged 
Opothleyahola who hoped to maintain Federal authority in 
Indian Territory and was willing to use the force of arms to 
do so. Late in 1861 he began to gather his followers,. and 
accompanied by a small group of Seminoles.who had also re .. 
fused to adhere to the treaty signed by their tribe with the 
Confederacy, he began the trek north to Kansas.14 On his 
way, Opothleyahola was attacked by the treaty faction of the 
Creeks. These Confederates consisted of a regiment connnanded 
by Colonel D. N. Mcintosh; a Creek-Seminole Battalion under 
Colonel Chilly Mcintosh; six companies of the First Choctaw 
and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles, led by Major John Jumper; and 
a part of the Ninth Texas Cavalry Regiment. In total the 
attacking force was made up of 1,400 men. The Northern 
13Ibid., p. 168; Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence 
Clough Buel eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (4 
Vols., Grant-Lee Edition, New York~ Tne Century Company, 
1888) 1 III p. 454; Grant Foreman, "Fort Davis," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, XVII (June, 1939), pp. 147-150. 
14Morton, "The Confederate States Government and the 
Five Civilized Tribes," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXXI, p. 308; 
Abel, "The Indians in the Civil War-;-" American Historical 
Review, XV, p. 289; John Bartlett Meserve,. "Chief 
Opotbleyohola," Chronicles of Oklahoma, IX (December, 1931), 
pp. 440-453. .~ 
10 
Creeks, in repelling the vigorous enemy assaults, ·were twice 
successful, but on December 26, 1861, they were routed in the 
engagement at Chustenahlah.15 
The defeated Creeks made their way northward to the 
border of Kansas and to safety. They found protection at the 
military camp of General David Hunter, the commander of Fort 
Leavenworth. General Hunter and William G.. Coffin, the 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, used what supplies were 
available at the fort to help the destitute Indians. Coffin 
even used his own private funds·and then his personal credit 
to purchase needed supplies.16 
General Pike was in Richmond, Virginia,. the Confederate 
capital, and was not present in Indian Territory during the 
pursuit of Opothleyahola. In March, 1862, Pike was ordered 
to take his command and join the army of.General Earl Van 
Dorn located just across the border in Arkansas. This offen-
sive force had the dual mission of making one grand attack 
upon the Union army in Missouri and defeating the advancing 
Federal force which was pushing south in western Arkansas.17 
15Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma~ A History of the State 
and Its People, I, pp. 325-328; Abel, 11The Indians in the 
Civil War," American Historical Review, XV, p. 289; Morton, 
"The Confederate States Government and the Five Civilized 
Tribes," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXI, p. 308; Dale, "The 
Cherokees. in the Confederacy, 11 Journal of Southern His tor:2:_,. 
XIII, pp. 167-168. 
16Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma~ A. History of the State 
and Its P~ople, I, pp. 328=329. 
17Abel, "The Indians in the Civil War," American His-
torical Review, XV,·p. 289; Morton, "The Confederate States 
Government and the Five Civilized Tribes, 1·1 Chronicles of 
Oklahoma, XXXI, p. 309. -
11 
Pike was joined by Stand Watie and his regiment of Cherokees 
and the regiment of Drew. In addition to two regiments of 
Cherokees, Pike had a regiment of Creeks and a combined regi-
ment of Choctaws and Chickasaws. Accompanying these troops 
were two detached battalions of Creeks and Seminoles plus 
several detached companies. 
The Confederate column met the Federal army at Pea 
Ridge, Arkansas, in a battle lasting from March 6 through 
March 8, 1862. The engagement was more like two armed mobs 
assaulting each other rather than combat by professional 
armies. Fighting was vicious and in some cases brutal; the 
Confederate Creeks, under Drew, were accused of scalping dead 
and wounded soldiers on the field. 18 The engagement at Pea 
Ridge resulted in the death of Confederate field commanders 
General McCulloch and General James Mcintosh and the abandon-
ment of the territory they had been ordered to hold and de-
fend.19 After the Pea Ridge repulse, Pike retreated south, 
18Dale, "The Cherokees in the Confederacy," Journal of 
Southern History; XIII, p. 168; Grant Foreman, A History or. 
Oklahoma (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), p. 
109; Abel, "The Indians in the Oivil War," American Histori .. 
cal Review, XV, p. 289; Dale, "Arkansas and the Cherokees," 
Arkansas Historical ~arterly, VIII, p •. 107; Mabel W. Anderson, 
"General Stand Watie, Chronicles of Oklahoma, X (December, 
1932), pp. 540-548; Maury to Pike,"t1arch 21, 1862, Pike to 
Maury, March 14, 1862, Curtis to Wade, May 21, 1862, U. S. · 
War Department, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the 
Official Records of the Union and Confeaerate Armies ·""{70 
vols., 128 books in U:-s. Serial.Set, Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1880-1901), i, VIII, pp. 286-292, 292, 796~ 
Hereinafter cited as Official Records~· series cited in small 
case Roman numeral; volume cited in large case Roman numeral; 
part of each volume cited as "Pt." 
19Robert L. Duncan, Reluctant General (New York: E. P. 
Dutton and Co. 3 1961) p. 232; van Dorn to Secretary of War 
Walker, March 18, 1862, Official Records, i, VIII, p. 282. 
12 
leaving Colonel. Watie, commanding the First ··Regiment .of 
Cherokee Mounted Volunteers, to·cover hi~ rear.and harass.the 
enemye Gathering what .forces he could.from. his·scattered 
command,Pike halted his retreat twenty miles from,the Red 
River, in present=day Bryan County~ He built Fort McCulloch,· 
named after his recently=fallen comrade, on the Texas Road, 
the main overland artery in Indian Territory.20 
In establishing his new headquarters, Pike assured his 
Indian allies that he had not abandoned them, explaining·that 
for logistical reasons, his present location was an advanta~· 
geous oneo 21 As a supply base, the.location of Fort 
McCulloch was d.esirable; the only drawback was tha.t Indian 
Territory was last on the Confederate priority list and never 
received even the minimal. supplies needed for carrying .on· 
military activitieso22 
Watie and Drew remained in the Cheroke~ country ancl en~ 
gaged in guerrilla warfare, establishing headquarters on 
Cowskin Prairie, located in the northern area of the Cherokee 
Nation .. Through extensive use of furloughs, Watie's force 
was reduced to less than.300 men, and a large segment of 
this number was scattered throughout the.region on scout 
20Edward E~ Dale and Gaston Litton, eds a, .d.lhe.r.okee Cav~ 
aliers (Norman~ University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), p., 114; 
Foreman, A Hi~s.t.0:ry: of O'kl<;l;bo;ma, ~ p.. 110'; Barney King Neal, Jr., 
"Federal. Ascendancy in. Indian Territory, 1862= 1863 wu (Unpub ..... 
lished Master of Arts· Thesis, Oklahoma State University, 
Stillwater, Oklahoma,. 1966), pp. 22=23~. 
21oale, "The Cherokees in the.Confederacy," Journal of 
Southern History, XIII, Po 1698 -
22Neal "Federal Ascendancy. in In. dian Territory, 1862= · · 
II 2' 1863,· Po 3. 
13 
dutyo23 With the coming of summer, 1862, military activity 
on both sides increased. Colonel Watie attacked a Union 
force at Neosho, Missouri, on April 26, 1862. Theug:h re"."·,.:·. 
I ...... 
pulsed and forced to return to his base at Gowskin Prairie, 
Watte made a good showing in his first ind~pendent action. 
In consideration of the fact that his primary mission was to 
harass the enemy, the engagement was a Confederate success.24 
During the next two months the Confederates scored several 
other coups in the Missouri-Arkansas area.25 
Early in the fall o.f 1861, Senator James H. Lane, the 
most influential man in Kansas politics, had petitioned 
President Abraham Lincoln for permission to invade Indian 
Territory. His intention was to separate Indian Territory 
from Texas, thus accomplishing a dual mission of isolating it 
from the rest of the Confederacy arid freeing the thousands of 
slaves within its borders.26 This expedition was approved by 
Lincoln but was decried as a political expedition by Federal 
military leaders since Lane had proposed himse1f as the expe-
dition conunandero27 The intervening months from January, 
23nale, . "Arkansas and the Cherokees," Arkansas Histori-
cal Quarterly, VIII, po 107; Worten Manson Hathaway, 
"Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," (Un-
published Master of Arts Thesis, Oklahoma State University, 
Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1966.), pp. 33-34. 
Z4Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
25Ibid., pp. 35-37; Francis, !'Confederate Ascendancy in 
Indian Territory 1860-1861," pp. 49~72. 
26Albert Castel, A Frontier State at War~ Kansas, 1861= 
1865 (Ithaca: Cornell-University Press-;=-1"9'51r), pp. 78=7V:--
27Neal "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862= 
1863," Po 26. 
14 
1862, to·June, 1862, were spent by the Federal high command 
in hot debate.28 
The commander of the Kansas District, Major General 
James G. Blunt, settled the dispute by appointing .Colonel 
William Weer as expedition leader.29 The appointment was 
made the first week in June, and until the expedition was 
launched on June 28, Colonel Weer spent innumerable hours 
gathering supplies, training his novice troops, and pouring. 
over strategy with his staff. A tribal war dance having been 
held, the expedition started its long columns south. Leaving 
Fort Scott, Kansas, the 6,000 man expedition lumbered down 
the Grand River at the rate of ten miles a day. 
Colonel Watie was the first to feel the sting of the 
invasion force. A 1,000 man vanguard under Colonel Charles 
Doubleday struck Watie a surprise blow at Cowskin Prairie, 
" 
reeling him back to Spavinaw Creek, where he encamped to 
await .for O'rders and regroup. It developed that the only·, 
forces opposing the Federal tide were the regiments of Drew 
and Watie augmented by a battalion of Missourians under 
Colonel J. J. Clarkson, stationed at Locust Grove.30 
28Abel, "The Indians in the Civil War," American Hist-
orical Review, XV, pp. 290-293; Neal, "Federal Ascenda'ii'cy 
in Indian Territory, 1862-1863," pp. 27-35. 
29 Ibid. , p. 35. 
30Doubleday to Weer, June 8, 1862, Official Records, i, 
XIII, p. 102; Hathaway, "Brigadier General StandWatie, Con-
federate Guerrilla," p. 37; Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in 
IJ1dian Territory, 1862-1863," pp. 35-38. 
1.5 
Major General Thomas C. Hindman, commander of the Con-
federate Trans-Mississippi Department, ordered General Pike 
to evacuate Fort McCulloch and move to the support of Watie 
to help him cop~ with the invasion forces. General Pike 
refused; instead he ordered Colonel Douglas H. Cooper to take 
comm.and of Indian troops in the field and proceed to the aid 
of Watie. Pressured by Hindman to take positive action, Pike 
in a series of reports to General Hindman deplored the condi-
tions of Indian Territory, placing the blame on his superior, 
d d d h · · · ,' . 31 an ten ere· .... 1.s .re,i:;1.gnat1.on. 
Colonel Weer sent a detachment down the east side of 
Grand River to engage Watie on Spavinaw Creek; with the re= 
mainder of the command, Weer moved to make contact with 
Colonel Clarkson, the Confederate at Locust Grove. Colonel 
Wa:tie and Colonel Drew were again surprised in camp and 
driven southward. Colonel Clarkson was captured when his 
command was overrun at Locust Grove. His force scattered to 
the south and was hotly pursued for the remainder of the 
day.32 Passing through the Cherokee capital, Tahlequah, on 
their wa¥ south, the white and Indian refugees of Clarkson 1 s 
31Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate 
Guerrilla," pp. 38~39; Pike to Hindman, July 15, 1862, Offi= 
cial Records, i, XIII, pp. 857=858; Florence E. Hollada~ 
'"Tne Powers of the Commander of the Confederate Trans-
Mississippi Department," Southwestern Historical Qllarterly, 
XXI (January, 1918), pp. 279-282. 
32weer to Moonlight, July 4 and 6, 1862, Official 
Records, i, XIII, pp. 137=138; Edwin c. McReynolds, The · 
Seminoles (Norman: University of Oklahoma. Press, 1957J, 
p. 305. . 
16 
connnand spread panic among the populace ·and convinced a num-
ber of them that they had made a grave blunder in the repu-
diation of the 1835 treaty with the United States.33 
With the defeat of the Confederate forces in Indian 
Territory, many of the Cherokees took this opportunity to 
desert to the Union ranks. A substantial number from Drew's 
regiment deserted to Federal lines en masse, nearly 1,000 in 
all. Those who did not enlist in the Union army disavowed 
their Confederate allegiance. 34 
With victories at Cowskin Prairie and Locust Grove, 
Colonel Weer pushed his columns farther south toward the 
Confederate-held post of Fort Gibson. While he was consoli-
dating his scattered command on the Grand River, ten miles 
above the Confederate fort, Colonel Weer sent scouting and 
reconnoitering parties to feel out the strength and disposi-
tion of enemy troops around the fort. Rumors of Confederate 
troops massing for a counter-attack unnerved many of Colonel 
Weer's subordinates. These false and unauthenticated reports 
disrupted rapport between Weer and his line officers. 
Depending on Fort Scott for all their supplies and war mate-
rial, these line officers were afraid they might be flanked 
33Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862-
1863," p. 42. 
34Wiley Britton, The Union India.n Brigade in the Civil 
War (Kansas City: Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, 1922), 
~73; Foreman, A History of Oklahoma, p. 111; Weer to Moon-
light, July 6, 1862, Watie--ro Cooper, October 28, 1862, 
Official Records, i, XIII, pp. 138, 336-337. 
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and isolated in hostile territory with no possible chance for 
relief. 35 
Moving on to capture Fort Gibson, Colonel Weer sent 
connnunications to Chief Ross of the Cherokees in hopes of 
breaking Cherokee attachment with the Confederacy. On the 
same day as the capitulation of Fort Gibson, Weer dispatched 
a small patrol to the Tahlequah region with.orders to open if 
possible peace negotiations with the Cherokees. On July 15, 
Captain H. s. Greeno, the patrol commander, moved his force 
to Park Hill, home of Chief Ross. A report of the presence 
of a detachment of Confederate Cherokee troops, 300 men 
strong, made for a tense moment as Greeno led his small and 
numerically inferior patrol into the yard of the palatial 
residence of Chief Ross, called Rose Cottage·. Ross and seg .. 
ments of the command of Colonel Drew, the First Cherokee 
Mounted Rifle Regiment, greeted Captain Greeno warmly and 
relieved any apprehension held by the Union force.36 
Chief Ross desired to repudiate the treaty alliance his 
nation had with the Confederacy, but being bound by his word, 
both oral and written, he could see no way to do this and 
keep his reputation as a gentleman. Ross was also being 
pressured by Colonel Cooper, who was demanding that the 
35Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862-
1863," p. 43; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in~ Civil 
War, p. 67. 
36weer to Moonlight, July 16, 1862, Greeno to Weer, July 
15 and 17, 1862, Official Records, i, XIII, pp. 160-161, 473, 
161-162. 
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Cherokees live up to their obligations and send men to assist 
him in repelling the invasion. Afraid to obey, yet reluctant 
not to because of likely reprisals, Ross looked to the Union 
patrol as his salvation. The arrival of Greeno destroyed the 
unwanted treaty and gave the old chief a chance to change his 
allegiance. Ross willingly accompanied the Union column as 
it retreated northward three weeks later, taking with him his 
family, Cherokee treasury funds, and the Cherokee national 
archives.37 
All opposition to the Indian Expedition had been re~oved 
by mid-July, 1862. Colonel Cooper was desperately trying to 
organize a counter-attack near Fort Davis, but he had waited 
too long: the latest split between the Cherokee factions had 
dashed hopes for any large scale resistance, and even his 
attempts to organize and encourage Confederate Indian units 
known to be loyal failed miserably~38 
By mid-July General Blunt, the commander of the District 
of Kansas, had become worried about the Indian Expedition 
because that expedition represented the majority of the 
forces in his district. Any attack and defeat would tarnish 
not only his military reputation, but that of his protege, 
Senator Lane, both of whom were supplementing their 
37wardell, A Political History of the Cherokee Nation, 
1838-1907, p, 155; Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian 
Territory, 1862-1863," p. 46. 
38cooper to Drew, July 18, 1862, Civil War Cherokee 
File, Grant Foreman Papers, Indian Archives Division, 
Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 
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government salaries by rebates from granting army contracts 
to local merchants and speculators. Blunt pleaded for more 
reinforcements from the Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, -• 
while trying to discourage Weer from continuing his campaign. 
General Blunt's warning to Weer that he might be cut off 
produced a fear in the command of Weer that soon erupted into 
action. On:July 18, 1862, Colonel Weer who had a reputation 
for intemperance and was foolhardy in isolating his command 
from its base of supplies deep in hostile territory, caused 
his subordinate officers, in particular his second-in-command 
Colonel Fredrick Salomon, to put him under arrest. The phys-
ical discomfort of the white troops and their disgust at be-
ing made to serve with Indian soldiers brought little 
resistance on the part of the white regiments in accepting 
the coup. Colonel Salomon issued a long list of reasons for 
his actions and called for a withdrawal that would begin the 
following morning at 2~00 a.m.39 
The sudden retrograde movement of the Union forces was 
a complete surprise to the Confederates. They were taken 
aback even more when reports came to them stating that only 
three Indian regiments would be left to hold the conquered 
area. 
Colonel R. W. Furnas, commander of one of those units, 
the First Indian Regiment, called together the other two 
39General Order, Indian Expedition, July 18, 1862, 
-Salomon to all Comman'11ers, July 18, 1862, Of f;i.cial Records, 
i'.,.:·x1I~, :PP·: 476, 475.:J."47'6, · ·· · · , , . - ... :,., 
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regimental commanders and laid out a plan of action~ they 
would form into a brigade, with Furnas commanding; they would 
stay to protect and hold the captured territory as best they 
could and protect themselves against reprisals, especially 
the Third Federal Indian Regiment, which was mostly composed 
of recent Confederate Indian deserters. Selecting a site on 
the Verdigris River, the new First Indian Brigade moved into 
camp. Numerous desertions and a complete absence of morale 
forced .Colonel Furnas to abandon the camp on the Verdigris 
and move toward the Kansas border. On: his way he overtook 
Salomon, who had finally halted his retreat and set up tem-
porary headquarters at Camp Quapaw in the northeast corner of 
the Cherokee Nation, closer to his supply depot at Fort Scott. 
Colonel Furnas persuaded Salomon to augment Furnas' force 
with a section of artillery, a small detachment of infantry, 
and much needed supplies. Taking up a station on Horse 
Creek, Colonel Furnas established Camp Wattles and began to 
regroup his command. With the bolstering of his brigade, 
Furnas was able to send out patrols far and wide. These 
patrols had the dual mission of protecting Indians friendly 
to the Union and keeping a close surveillance on enemy activ-
ity in the area. During the confusion and bewilderment 
caused by the sudden Federal withdrawal, the Confederates 
missed an opportunity to engage remaining forces which were 
considerably weaker than they, with a possibility of regain-
ing all territory lost in the recent week. Neither Cooper 
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nor Watie attempted to move forward to take advantage of the 
situation. 40 
The Indian Expedition was now split into two elements; 
the white regiments under Colonel Salomon were stationed on 
Hudson's Crossing on the Grand River, while the Indian por-
tion of the command was forty-five miles due south. The two 
command.s were connected in communications only by a series 
of outposts.41 
During July, 1862, there was only one brush between the 
two opposing forces. Major William A. Phillips, with 400 
men, was on a scouting expedition in the Tahlequah region 
when he met and defeated a smaller Confederate force which 
attacked at Bayou Menard, seven miles northeast of Fort 
Gibson. The Confederate commander of the attacking command, 
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Taylor, on patrol with part of 
the First Cherokee Regiment, blundered into the center ele-
ment of Phillips' divided patrol. The two flank columns of 
the Union force arrived at the engagement and engulfed and 
routed the Confederate patrol. Major Phillips, who would 
later prove to be the main opponent of Watie in Indian 
40Grace Steele Woodward, The Cherokees (Norman: Uni-
versity of··--Okla:homa P:,;~s§.., 196:n-;- pp.,. -280-2.81; Abel, "The 
Indians iri the· Civ!L War,,~· American' Historical Review,' XV, 
p. 293; Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate 
Guerrilla," p. 41; Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Ter~· .. 
ritory, 1862-1863,'' pp. 50-52. 
41 Ibid. , p. 52. 
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Territory, came out with an easy victory in his first action 
against a segment of Watie's regiment.42 
Colonel Salomon had put his men into column and crossed 
the border into Kansas and safety, having learned from intel-
ligence reports of scouts that an expedition was forming on 
his flank in Missouri. He stopped his weary command for the 
last time at Fort Scott. Thus the Indian Brigade again was 
left unsupported, isolated, and in danger of being engulfed 
by enemy troops massing in the area. Being in such a des-
perate position necessitated the moving of the Indian Brigade 
within supporting distance of the main body. Colonel Furnas 
encamped at Baxter Springs, Kansas, and reestablished his 
outposts up to Fort Scott.43 
Refugees numbering 1,500 had optimistically followed the 
expedition into Indian Territory with hopes of returning to 
their homes. Now they had to retreat with the army and spend 
the winter in their old camps, among privations, starvation, 
death, and hatred from their Indian host. The winter of 
1862-63 would bring as many hardships as the preceding one.44 
42Phillips to Furnas, July 27 and August 16, 1862, Offi-
cial Records, i, XIII, pp. 181-184; Hathaway, "Brigadier--rreii-
eral Stand Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," pp. 41-42; Sharon 
Dixon Wyant, "Colonel William A. Phillips and the Civil War 
in Indian Territory," (Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, 
Oklahoma State University, 1967), p. 15; Wiley Britton, "Some 
Reminiscences of the Cherokee People," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
V (June, 1927), pp. 180. -
43salomon to Blunt, August 9, 1862, Official Records, i, 
XIII, pp. 551-553. 
44nale, "The Cherokees in the Confederacy," Journal of 
Southern History, p. 171; Wiley Britton, The Civil War on-
the Border (2 vols., New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons-:-T8'9TI'-
T9'IT4), I, pp. 309-311. 
23 
During August, 1862, the Union forces underwent reorgan-
ization. General Blunt took personal command of all troops 
in the Kansas Department. Colonel Weer was restored to his 
rank, sent back to his command, and the whole matter of his 
alleged incompetence was quickly and conveniently forgotten 
by those involved.45 By orders from the War Department, the 
districts of Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and Indian Territory 
were fused together under the over-all command of General 
Samuel R. (i;hr_tis,, a slow and overcautious individual who won 
bis star for political connections, not for engaging an 
enemy.46 The two commands of John M. Schofield and Blunt 
were brought together and renamed the Army of the Frontier, 
with General Schofield in command by date of rank.47 
In October, 1862, General Schofield received reports 
that a Confederate _army in northwestern Arkansas was planning 
an attack on his force. Schofield sent General Blunt to deal 
with the detachment of Confederate troops reported. to be in 
the vicinity:of Maysville, just across the border in 
Arkansas.. Blunt moved bis command. to Bentonville, Arkansas, 
where he stopped for rest and let the supply train catch up. 
Receiving reports that Confederate forces under Cooper bad 
_45Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862-
1863," pp. 60-6L 
46General Order, War Department, September 19, 1862, 
Official Records,: i, XIII, p. 653. 
47wyant, "Colonel William A. Phillips and the Civil War 
in Indian Territory ,II p. 18; General Order, War . Department, 
October 12, 1862, Official Records, i, XIII, p. 730. 
24 
been pinpointed at Fort Wayne, a few miles above Maysville, 
Blunt issued orders for an c:1.ll"-night forced march to be fol-
lowed by a dawn attack on the enemy force. 
Despite impediments of. darkness c:1.nd rough, unfamiliar 
terrain,. General Blunt arrived near Fort Wayne one hour be-
fore dawn on October 22,. 1862. Led by a Negro guide. froil1 the 
area, Blunt was able to locate the exact Confederate position. 
Rejoining his c.ommand, he was chagrined to learn that the 
bulk of his force had not closed up on the lead element. He 
elected to put what available forces he had into the attack 
and move the remainder in as they arrived on the scene.. By 
this aggressive move,. a force of. 400 would engage a reputed 
7, 000 of the enemy .. 
The attack was launched by a slashing cavalry charge 
across a prairie in front of the enemy implacements. While 
the cavalry was·cuttingdown the half-asleep infantry of. the 
First Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment and the First Cherokee 
Regiment,. other Union forces were sent in as they came up, 
increasing pressure on Confederate resistance. The cavalry, 
augmented by two mountain howitzers and by the skill of the 
gun crews, beat down any semblance of a Confederate counter 
offensive •. The Confederates tried a flanking movement on the 
exposed ends of. the Federal lines, but were flanked them-
selves by troops of the Third Indian Regiment. A four-gun 
battery was the holding point of. the Confederate resistance. 
This battery had to be taken before the Federals could be 
successful. Seeing the importance of the enemy battery, five 
25 
companies of the Second. Kansas Cavalry were ordered to at-· 
tack. The assault was a complete success: the battery was 
overwhelmed by the onslaught. Seeing their center pierced 
and their artillery captured~ the Confederates fled. from the 
field and were not brought under control· until they reached. 
Fort Gibson, seventy miles to the south.48 The engagement at 
Fort Wayne was an unqualified victory for General.Blunt. It 
proved that this Federal genetal was a man of considerable 
military ability. Despite the rationalizing done by the 
Confederate commander in his reports to his superior, it.was 
evident that General Cooper was outclassed. 
Following the Fort Wayne defeat, General Cooper led his 
command further into the interior of, Confederate.-held terri-
tory and encamped near Skullyville, in the Choctaw Nation. 
Colonel Watie joined him there briefly, and for the winter 
located his command atBriartown, within supportingdistance 
of Cooper. 49 
The Army of the Frontier spent·the winter of 1862 in 
Arkansas trying to keep contact with the Confederate com-· 
mander of the region, General T. H. Holmes.. Most scouting 
carried on by the.First Division was done by Phillips, 
48Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie,. Confederate 
Guerrilla,'' pp. 43-46; Neal, ''Federal Ascendancy in Indian 
Territory, 1862-1863," pp. 62-67; Grant Foreman, Fort Gibson 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1936), p.---r!3". 
49cooper to Hindman, .January 8, 1863, Official Records, 
i, XIII, Pt. 2, p. 770; Frank Cunningham, General Stand 
Watie's Confederate Indians (San Antonio: The Naylor Com,-
p~ny, 1959), p. 87. 
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recently promoted to·the rank of Colonel. Since the Third 
Indian Regiment was composed. mostly of, de·fected Confederates,. 
Phillips wanted to stay as near as pos·sible to the homes of 
the men to insure their undivided cooper.a tion. ·· To improve 
the morale as well as for military reason, in December, 1862, 
Phillips led a combined force of white and Indian commands 
into hostile territory •. · This Union raiding party crossed the 
Arkansas and attacked Fort Davis, routing the smaller Confed-
erate garrison.· After a short pursuit,. Phillips returned to 
the. fort and. had it and all surrounding outbuildings burned.!?0 
The complexity of Federal activities in 1862 led to the: 
dismembering of· the cumbe·rsome Department of Missouri intQ 
administratively easier-to-handle segments. General :alunt 
was put in command of the. Kansas District, and General 
Schofield·wasassigned the district in southwest Missouri, 
both districts still being under General Curt1.s.: Schofield 
reorganized the First Division under the command.of Blunt,. 
and added a new brigade.,· the Third Brigade, better known as 
the Indian Brigade., Colonel Phillips was s.elected as the 
Indian Brigade commander because·of. his activities in organ-
izing and commanding the Third Indian Regiment. Accompanying 
this command was responsibility for the districts;of. Western 
50Foreman, A History of Oklahoma,, p, .114; C:U:rtis to 
Halleck, January 2,, 1863, Phillips .to Curtis, January 19, 
1863, Official Records,. i, XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 7, 6L 
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Arkansas and Indian Territory.51 From January to early 
April, 1863, Colonel Phillips pushed his way into Indian 
Territory, his 3,000 man brigade proving too strong·for any 
Confederate force in the area. Phillips moved into Fort 
Gibson early in April, 1863, and for the rest of the war it 
remained a Federal post. 52 Phillips renamed Fort Gibson Fort 
Blunt, in honor of the Union district commander. By mid-. 
April, the Union Indian Brigade had a firm hold on Fort Blunt 
and the surrounding territory.53 
With Federal domination soon to be realized,. the 
Cherokee Council called a meeting in February, 1863, and 
renounced.the Southern allegiance of the tribe. The council 
gave a vote of.confidence to Chief Ross. and repealed the 
Confederate treaty signed in 1861. 54 To counter the effect 
of this council, the Confederates called one of their own to 
be held commencing April 24 at Webber's Falls. Watie was 
51Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 
pp. 168, 187; Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 
1862-1863," pp. 72-74; Wyant, "Colonel William A. Phillips 
and the Civil War in Indian Territory," pp. 23-24. 
52Grant Foreman, "The Centennial of Fort Gibson," 
Chronicles of. Oklahoma, II (June, 1924), p. 126; Neal, 
"Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862-1863," pp. 82-
83. 
53wiley Britton, Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, 
1863. (Chicago: Cushing, ThomasanaCo., 1882),pp:-I"98, 205. 
54Phillips to Curtis, January 29 and February 4, 1863, 
Phillips to Curtis, February 15, 1863, Official Records, i, 
XXII, Pt. 2, pp .• 85, 96-97, 112; Woodward, The Cherokees, 
p. 284; Abel, "The Indians in the Civil War7American 
Historical Review, XV, p. 295; Carolyn Thomas Foreman, 
""Colonel Jesse Henry Leavenworth," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
XIII (March, 1935), p. 17. ~ 
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elected chairman and subsequently Chief of. the Cherokee.· 
Upon receiving reports of the meeting at Webber's Falls, 
Colonel Phillips went ther,e with a 600 man force and in a 
dawn attack routed Colonel Watie, who was caught by complete 
surpriseo The Federal.force destroyed the Confederate en-
campment.and returned to Fort Blunt. In the next month, ·the 
Confederates repaid the compliment and raided the Fort Blunt 
remuda pastured just outside the fort. Eight days later 
Watie harassed an incoming wagon train, but was driven off by 
a 1,000 man relief column led by Phillips. The increased 
activity necessitated the reinforcement of Fort Blunt by the. 
First Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment and an artillery sec- . 
tion of the Second Kansas Battery. Another skirmish was 
fought at Greenleaf Prairie, its result negligible to either 
side. 
On June 30 of that same year a wagon train, containing 
desperately-needed supplies, making its way from Fort Scott 
to Fort Blunt encountered part of, the Confederate command of 
Watie,. which was stationed near Cabin Creek as pickets.. The 
Federal commander, Maj or John A~ Foreman, secured his wagons 
·and moved to meet the Confederate force. The fighting became 
sporadic after a Federal attack was repulsed. On the follow':" 
ing day, the command of Watie was blanketed by a forty-minute 
artillery barrage of both solid shot and infantry-killing 
cannister. The Federal infantry charged with much vigor and 
routed the entrenched Confederates. In attempting to cross 
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the Arkansas- and Grand River in the. ensuing. retreat, several. 
men of the Confederate force-were drowned.~5 
Having received reports from-Phillips that Phillips' 
position was daily becoming more unstabl~ because of- the in- ·_ 
creased activity of Confederate troops in the Fort Blunt area,. 
General Blunt led a relief column in person·to the fort as 
soon as reports reached him of-the. engagement at Cabin Creek. 
On July 11 the Federal general. arrived unexpectedly at Fort 
Blunt, where he announced that he would lead an offensive 
campaign against Confederate forces that were quartered at· 
Honey Springs near Elk Creek, seventeen miles south of 
present-day Muskogee.56 
Reports from spies had stated that the Confederate arm .. 
ies of-Cooper and Brigadier General William L. Cabell were 
in the proces.s of combining, and from their rendezvous at 
Honey Springs. would move against· Fort Blunt and its supply_ line 
with the purpose of driving the Federals out of Indian Ter.-
ritory. If Cabell were allowed to join with Coope:r, the 
total force would be 7,000, an invincible number; but if an 
55Ha.thaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate·. 
Guerrilla," pp •. 51.:..59; Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian 
Territory~ 1862-1863, ' pp. 83-87, 95-103; Wyant, "Colonel 
William A. Phillips and the Civil War in Indian Territory," 
pp. 41-42,.46-53; Annie Rosser Cubage, "Engagement at Cabin 
Creek, Indian Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma,. X (~rch, 
1932), pp. 44-51. . -
56James G. Blunt; "General Blunt's Account of His Civil. 
War Experiences," Kansas Historical Quarterly, I {May, 1932), 
pp. 243-245; Britton, Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, 
1863, pp. 342-343; Charles R~ Freeman, 11The BatTie'""or Honey 
Springs," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XIII (June,. 1935), p. 154; 
Blunt to Curtis, July-'!3, 1863, Official Records, i, XXII, 
Pt. 2, p. 367. . 
attack were launched immediately, before the two commands 
could combine, Blunt felt that these forces could be de-
feated piecemeal. He started his forces on July 6, 1863. 
Crossing the Arkansas, they pushed forward throughout the 
night. At dawn advance elements of the Federal force en-
gaged a Confederate outpost.57· 
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Blunt, as was his habit, made a personal reconnaissance 
to evaluate the dispositions of the enemy. He found them 
entrenched in a timber line astride the Texas Road leading 
to Fort Blunt. 58 Returning to his fast-approaching column,. 
he stopped it for a two-hour rest-break which would allow 
the men time to eat. In answer to his officers' call came 
all regimental and company officers.· He explained to them 
in detail what he planned to accomplish in the proposed, 
assault.59 He would move his forces in a column formation 
for.a quarter of a mile; then it would execute flanking 
movements and form into an assault line parallel to the 
~ 
Confederate implacements and trenches, Artillery would 
wait on the flanks .and in the center until the infantry 
57cabell to Duvall, December 7, 1863, ibid., Pt.1, 
p. 604; Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, pp. 115-. 
116; Britton, The--uilion Ind'Iai:i Brigaae in the Civil War, 
p. 273. - - - -- -
58Phillips to Blunt, July, 1863, Official Records, i, 
XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 355-356; Cabell to Duvall, December 7, 
1863, Blunt to Schofield, July 26, 1863, Ibid., Pt. 1, 
pp. 604, 447; Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, 
pp. 116-117. ~ - - -
59Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862-· 
1863,"p. 106. 
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drew fire from.the Confederate battery. Blunt reiterated 
that once the attack started, it had to be kept moving to 
accomplish complete-success. 60 
At 10:00 a.m. -on July 17 the column moved forward and· 
the largest single engagement of the Civil War in Indian 
Territory connnenced·. After traveling the .proper distance, 
the column received.orders to deploy, and the units of Fed-, 
eral infantry and cavalry moved at ·· the doubl~q¢.c:k into. the 
desired formation.61 Pushing through.the underbrush, the· 
extended lines of infantry drew the-· fire of· the•· concealed 
Confederate artillery battery, revealing its position to the 
waiting sections of Federal artillery. Firing in quick suc-
cession, the Union guns quickly silenced the fire·of the 
four~gun battery of the Confederates. To this crippling loss 
was the added disadvantage of poor quality gunpowder: the 
morning dew had turned all exposed gunpowder of-the Confeder-
ate-forces to paste, which did.not produce enough force :to 
drive the ball from the piece.62 
The turning point in the engagement was reached when 
the Twenty-Ninth Texas Cavalry Regiment made an inopportune 
60Blunt to Schofield, July 26, 1863, Official Records; 
i, XXII, Pt. 1, pp. 447-448; Wyant, "Colonel William A.· 
Phillips and the Civil War in Indian Territory," p. 54; 
Britton, The Civil War 2!! the Border, II, pp. 118-119. 
61Blunt to Schofield, July 26, 1863, Official Records, 
i, XXII, Pt. 1, p. 447; Britton, The Civil War on the Border, - -- ........._. ......,._. -----II, p. 119. 
62Freeman 
' ' Oklahoma, XIII, 
II, p. ·· 119. · 
"The Battle of Honey Springs," Chronicles of 
p. 163; Britton, The Civil War .2!! the Border, 
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assault and was repulsed with heavy losses by the First 
Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment. The hasty retreat of the 
Texas regiment caused the Confederate center to buckle and 
break. 
The retreat of the Texans was noted by the other Con-· 
federate units, which quickly followed them to the rear and 
to safety. The· uncontrolled retreat evolved into a ·disorgan- ·· 
ized rout, and the Federals pursued them to their supply 
depot at Honey Springs and a mile beyond before the chase 
was stopped and the comm.and reorganized.63 
Later that afternoon Confederate reinforcements of 
Cabell arrived on the scene. He did not push forward with 
the combined forces to attack because of ·thedisorganization 
and feeling of dejection prevalent in Confederate ranks. 
During the night the Confederate regiments retreated further 
south toward the Red River. Cabell left Cooper enroute and· 
retraced his line of march back to Arkansas to protect Fort 
Smith from a probable Federal attack. In comparison to en-
gagements heretofore· fought in Indian Territory, the loeses-;, 
were unusually heavy with Federal. casualties nU,Jllbering 
seventy-five and Confederate losses totaling 186 killed, 
wounded, and missing in action.64 
63Bowels to Judson, July 20, 1863, Blunt to Schofield, 
July 26, 1863, Official.Records, i, XXII, Pt. 1, pp. 450, 
448. 
64Freeman, "The Battle of Honey Springs," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma, XIII, pp. 156, 158; Britton, The Civil War on the"' 
Border, II, pp. 121.,;.122, 125. -- - - -
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Not realizing the importance of·his victory, General 
Blunt waited until the next day for an expected counter at-
tack. Scouts, however, reported the enemy in headlong flight 
to the.south. Blunt put the Federal.columns in line and 
returned to Fort Blunt.65 
General. Blunt spent the next three weeks flooding his 
superiors with urgent requests for reinforcements. The cau-
tious Curtis and the jealous Schofield made no definite move 
to comply until the middle of August, when a 1,500 man regi-
ment, the Second Kansas Cavalry, was sent to the border area 
of Missouri and Kansas. Blunt, by direct order, moved the. 
unit to his position and combined them with his forces •. 
The Army of the Frontier was now 4;500 men strong and· 
ready for the second phase of the campaign. Blunt set his 
dual objectives for the immediate future: take.Fort Smith 
and capture or disseminate Confederate forces in Indian 
Territory and the immediate vicinity. 66 
By the autumn of ·1863, there was little hope for Con-
federate forces in Indian Territory. The Army of the Fron ..... 
tier under. General Blunt had driven them below the Arkansas 
River, where they held a tenacious grip on an area only half 
the size it had been two years before. 
The year of 1861 had ended with the Confederacy in un-
opposed control of Indian Territory, and the Five .Civilized 
65Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory; 1862-
1863," p. 110. 
66rbid., pp. 110-115. 
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Tribes won over to the Confederate camp by liberal promises 
of the Confederate government. Dissident factions had been 
either driven out of Indian Territory or quieted and pushed 
into the background. 
The overconfidence of easy victory had caused Confeder-
ate leaders to pass over some important weaknesses that were 
to bring unending trouble to the Confederate cause in Indian 
Territory and reopen the hushed internal strife of the Indian 
allies. The most glaring of those weaknesses had to do with 
leadership. Cooper, for instance, had demonstrated his lack 
of ability in field comm.and and a lack of the drive neces-
sary for a successful military campaign. Mcintosh, until his 
death at Pea Ridge, had proved he had too much imagination 
and aggressiveness. Both were lacking in the basics neces-
sary for leadership ability. Watie was the only Confederate 
officer that possessed desirable traits of leadership; he 
and Phillips would clash again and again in the fight for 
dominance in Indian Territory. 
By the beginning of 1862, Federal comm.anders had become 
aware of the importance of Indian Territory. In occupying 
this area, they could isolate Texas from the rest of the 
Confederacy, and pulling this valuable food-producing state 
out of the Confederate ranks would have a telling effect, not 
only in the East, but in the Trans-Mississippi. Though the 
first Federal attempt at liberating Indian Territory had 
ended in a fiasco, results had been attained. The Union had 
been shown that even a feeble and mismanaged invasion was 
able to overawe anything put into the field by the 
Confederates .. 
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With the Federal victories at Webber's Falls, the taking 
of Fort· Gibson, and the Confederate 9,e.feat at Honey Springs, 
no hope was in sight for the Confederates, either white or 
red, in Indian Territory. All that was left for the Confed-
erates to do was to fall back below the Arkansas River and 
harass the enemy at every opportunity, using Fabian tactics 
in the hope that a military blunder on the part of the Fed-· 
erals might let the Confederates recoup its.losses of terri-
tory and prestige. This the Confederate forces tried to do 
from the latter part of 1863 to the close of the war in the. 
spring of 1865. 
CHAPTER II 
CONFEDERATE GUERRILLA OPERATIONS BEGIN 
Being driven below the Arkansas River in defeat proved 
to be disastrous to the morale of the Confederate Indian 
troops. Many deserted their units and returnedhomei while 
some made their way through the·lines and enlisted in the 
Federal army. General Cooper tried several· times during the 
ensuing months to recoup his territorial losses and build up 
hope in his beleaguered Indian units, but he failed each time. 
The'hopelessness of the situation soon became evident to all 
of the Southern forces in Indian Territory when General 
William Steele, district commander of Indian Territory, re-
signed, effective December 11, 1863 •. Though he had been 
aggravated by the antagonism and sometimes openly hostile 
attitude .of his subordinate, General Cooper, the general 
futility of the situation in Indian Territory was the main 
factor for moving Steele to ask his superior for a relief 
from command and another assignment.1 
1steele to Anderson, February 15, 1864, Official 
Records, i, XXII, Pt. 1, pp. 28-36; Victor E. Harlow, Okla-
homa Its Origins and Development: A Histort (Oklahoma City: 
Harlow Publishing Corporation, 1949J, p. 19; Special Orders, 
No. 7, Adjutant and Inspector General's. Office., January 3, 
1864, Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 2, p. 848. 
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After the repulse of Confederate forces at Honey Springs 
and the subsequent bolstering of bis army by reinforcements, 
Blunt put the second phase of his strategy into play. Rein-
forced by the Second l<ansas Cavalry Regiment, a 1,500 man. 
unit under the command of Colonel W. F. Cloud, the Union com-
mander of the Army of the Frontier had a total aggregate 
force of 4,500 troops •. The bulk of these troops was assigned 
to the Third, or !ndian Brigade.2 Although be.was to·use his 
Indian Brigade, to good .. advantage in the concluding. phases of 
his Indian Territory campaign, Blunt did not like the perform-
ance of the Indian as a soldier. He told his department com-
mander,·General.Schofield, that be preferred Negro troops·to 
Indian soldiers by a ratio of ten to one.3 
On July 22, 1863, General Blunt again crossed the 
Arkansas River, taking his entire force of white and Indian 
regiments south. His immediate objective was to close with 
and defeat the concentrating forces of Cabell, Cooper; and 
Watie. The Confederate mass of troops was reported at 9,000 
men. In a forty-eight hour fot"ced march, the offensive• 
minded Union general arrived at the site of the Confederate 
camp, located sixty miles south of Fort Blunt, below the 
2cloud to McNeil, August 22, 1863, Blunt to Schofield, 
August 22, 1863, ibid., XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 466-467~ 465-466, 
General Report, Schofield, December 10, 1863, ibid., Pt~ 1, 
p. 15; Wiley Britton, "A Day with Colonel W. F. Cloud," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, V (September, 1927); pp. 311-312. 
3Blunt to Schofield, August 22, 1863, Offic;:ial Records, . 
i, XXII, Pt. 2, p. 465; Fairfax Downey, Indian.Wars of the 
U. s. Army 1776-1865 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
196'!), p. 192. 
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Canadian River. The encampment indicated the enemy force had 
divided and begun a retreat twenty-four hours before. General 
Blunt learned that the 3,000 man brigade. of Cabell had with-
drawn in the direction of Fort Smith. Mcintosh, in command 
of the Creek regiment, had pushed west deep into the Chicka-
saw Nation, while Cooper, Steele, and Watie with the remaind-
er continued their retreat south to the Red River and safety;'" 
In a pre,-dawn scout the Confederate force o{ Steele was 
located twenty miles south of the Texas Road, between Perry-
ville and North Fork Town. The scout reported a presence of 
nearly 5,000 enemy soldiers. This did not deter Blunt, who 
threw forward all of his cavalry and light &rtillery in an 
effort to make contact and slow the Confederate retreat. 
After seven hours' hard riding, the vanguard fired upon a 
company of Confederate Choctaws that had been sent to watch 
their progress. By aggressive action the Confederate compa-
ny commander.was captured and four of his men were killed. 
The captured Confederate officer reported the reinforcement 
of General Steele by an 800 man-strong Choctaw regiment sent 
up from the Red River district. Undeterred, the Union van-
guard pushed forward to keep contact with the retreating 
enemy. The advance element spread out as a line of cavalry 
skirmishers. When contact was made with a segment of. the 
Confederate command, the main body of the advance party 
. 4Blunt to Schofield, August 22, 1863, Steele to Snead, 
August 28, 1863, Official Records, i, XXII, Pt. 1, pp.' 597, 
599-600; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade !:g the Civil War, 
p. 288. 
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would move forward to test the enemy resistance. In this way, 
the direction and speed of the Confederate retreat could be 
accurately ascertained. During the night of July 25 the Con-
federates surprised the vanguard with an ambush which left 
four Union casualties on the Texas Road. Blunt, sensing a 
stiffening in the resistance, moved up and dismounted the 
Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment, having them deploy as skir-
mishers on both sides of the Texas Road. The Sixth Kansas 
Infantry Regiment, supported by artillery, maneuvered to 
within 300 yards of the enemy barricades. When the Federal 
howitzers loosed a twelve salvo barrage, the Confederates 
fled into the darkness of their nearby supply depot in 
Perryville. 5 
The holding action by the rear guard of Steele was the 
only part of the Confederate strategy that was successful. 
Moving into Perryville, the Union cavalry pursued the flee-
ing Confederates only a short distance due to exhausted 
mounts and the darkness. General Blunt found that most of 
the structures in Perryville were being used by the Confed-
erates to store their military supplies: munitions, shoes, 
boots, clothing, flour, and various pieces of camp equipage. 
5cloud to McNeil, August 27, 1863, Cloud to Schofield, 
September 8, 1863, Blunt to Schofield, August 27, 1863, Of-
ficial Records, i, XXII, Pt. 1, pp. 598, 598, 597; Genera!' 
Report, Steele, February 15, 1864, ibid., pp. 33; Clement A. 
Evans, ed. , Confederate Military History (12 Vols. , .. Atlanta: 
Confederate Publishing. Company, 1899), X, pp. 202-203; Britton, 
Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, 1863, p. 402; Muriel 
H. Wright";- '"Acfditional Notescnl Perryvilre:-choctaw Nation," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, VIII (June, 1930), pp. 145=148. 
He designated the town a military depot for Confederate 
forces in the area and ordered the whole place put to the 
torch.6 
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The Confederate plan was to pull the numerically superi-
or Union force deep into their own terr;itory. By separating 
and heading in different directions, General Steele hoped to 
force the Union commander to divide his expedition. A chance 
for Confederate victory might appear if the Federal force 
could be isolated and surrounded. By cutting Federal commu-
nications and stopping the supply lines, the smaller Confed-
erate command could defeat the Federal force piecemeal. 
Success of this plan depended on two thin hopes: the ability 
of the scattered Confederate cavalry units to concentrate for 
the felling blow, and the arrival of the much-needed and 
long-promised reinforcements of General S. P. Bankh~ad, who 
was bringing up his command from Texas.7 The failure of 
Creek caval:ryregiments and.Choctaw units to join Steele and 
a delay of Bankhead en route caused the plan to be dropped 
and the withdrawal south to continue. With large numbers of 
6Thoburn and.Wright, Oklahoma: A History of the State 
and Its People, I, .p. 346; Blunt to Schofield, August 27, 
T8'b3, OfficiaI Records, i, XX!!, Pt. 1, pp. 597-598; .General 
Report, Steele, February 15, 1864, ibid., p. 33; Neal, "Fed· 
eral Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862=1863," p. 116; 
Evans, ed., Confederate Military History, X, p. 203; Britton, 
The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil ~' pp. 290 00 291. 
?Neal, 'Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862 ... 
1863," pp. 114..,116; Steele to Snead, August 28, 1863, General 
Report, Steele~ February 15, 1864, Official Records, i, XXII, 
Pt. 1, pp. 599=600, 33; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in 
the Civil War, pp. 288-289. ~ ~ 
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de:sertions within the Confederate cormna.nd, the :Federal pres= 
sure proved to be overwhelmingo The burning of Perryville 
left the Confederate commander no alternative but to have the 
divergent segments of his force continue their withdrawal in 
their respective directions.8 .Steele sent orders to Bankhead 
instructing him to advance on the·Fort Towson Road to ·the 
vicinity of Fort.Smith, and there to support the command of 
Cabell, who was being hard pressed. Union scouting and .ad= 
vance parties were trying to penetrate bis defenses to take 
.Fort Smith.9 
After dispersing the forces of Cooper and Steele,.Blunt 
sent an Indian unit to garrison Webber's Falls and drive 
Watie out of the area. The balance of his force was ordered 
to return to Fort Blunt. The.Union general took the brigade 
of Cloud with all of his artillery, and moved forward to make 
contact with Cabell in the vicinity of Fort Smith.lo 
The brigade of Cabell, with an aggregate force of about 
3,000, was posted on the Poteau River, located nine miles 
southwest of Fort Smith:. and eight miles east of·. Skullyville. 
Arriving there on August 21, the Confederate brigade ,:::.1 L•. :: 
8rbid. 
9cabell to Duvall, December 7, 1863, OffLcial Records, 
i, XXII, Pt. 1, p. 608; Britton, The. Union .. Indian Brigade 
in·~ Civil War, p. 291. 
10c1oud to Schofield, .. September 8, 1863, Blunt to 
Schofield, August 27, 1863, Cloud to McNeil, September 20, 
1863, Official Records, i, XXII, Pt. l; pp. 509, 509, 602-; 
.Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862=1863, 11 
p. 117. 
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commander proceeded to block all river fords and roads allow-
ing access to the Fort Smith area. 
Cloud led his own command of the Si;xth Kansas Cavalry 
Regiment and the attached Sixth Missouri Cavalry Regiment, 
accompanied by two sections of artillery. With this unit he 
went in pursuit of the Confederate force. Cabell pulled his 
force back to Fort Smith, leaving a regiment to skirmish with 
the advancing, Federals. At Fort Smith the Confederate gen~.: 
eral ordered the post commander to load all public property 
on wagons and send it south toward Waldron, Arkansas. On 
August 31, Cloud pushed h,is advance to the outskirts of Fort 
Smith. Pressed back against the Arkansas River, Cabell 
ordered a unit forward to hold the Union forces; taking the 
balance of his command, he posted himself at the base of 
Devil's Backbone, a mountain located sixteen miles below Fort 
Smith in the Choctaw Nation. At 12:00 noon two battalions of 
the Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment under Captain Edward Lines. 
caught up with the.Confederate rear guard of Colonel Lee L. 
Thomson, commanding a regiment of J. c. Monroe's Cavalry. 
Pursuing the fleeing Confederates along the Waldron Road as 
they retreated to the south, Lines was caught in an ambush 
set up by Thomson at the base of Devil's Backbone. The ac-
curate fire of the Southern artillery and musketry dismounted 
all save two in the first two companies of the Federal ad-
vance party. Captain Lines was numbered among the dead. 
Falling back a safe distance, the remainder of the vanguard 
waited for the main body to arrive. 
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Colonel Cloud of the Union forces came up on the scene 
shortly thereafter and, on making a reconnaissance of the 
Confederate position, found a line of dismounted cavalry and 
several pieces of light artillery. Ordering up the entire 
conunand, Cloud steadily drove the Confederate regiments from 
their position at the base of Devil's Backbone. He pushed 
the Confederate line back up the mountain for a quarter mile. 
Reaching the summit of Devil's Backbone, Cloud found the 
main Confederate force entrenched, protecting their retreat-
ing trains. The Federal colonel threw his entire line for-
ward in an all-out assault, and for three hours the two 
opposing forces fought for possession of the position atop 
Devil's Backbone. During a lull in the fighting, the Con-
federate forces broke contact and retreated down the back 
side of the mountain. They left fifteen to twenty dead on 
the field. Returning to the captured Confederate position, 
Cloud secured the area and posted his pickets. Colonel 
Cloud lost fourteen men in the engagement. 
The Federal attack bad been so successful that several 
Confederate regiments broke and ran for safety. Cabell 
reported that his command would have captured all of the 
attacking Union force if his men had "fought as troops fight-
ing for liberty should. 1111 Only the exhausted condition of 
llcloud to McNeil, September 20, 1863, Official Records, 
i, XXII, Pt. 1, p. 603; Evans, ed., Confederate Military 
History, X, pp. 203~204; Hood, "Twilight of the Confederacy 
in Indian Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, p. 427; 
Britton, The Union Indian Brigade1n the Civil War, pp. 293-
295; Cabell to Duval, July 27, Official Records, i, XXII, 
Pt. 1, pp. 604-608. 
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the Federal cavalry mounts and the weariness of the infantry 
prevented extensive pursuit. They had marched and fought 
over 450 miles of rough terrain within sixteen days.12 
Securing the position on Devil's Backbone, Cloud re~ 
turned to Fort Smith. General Blunt, who had pushed into 
Fort Smith with his personal bodyguard and a newly formed 
regiment, the First Arkansas Infantry, was taken ill again 
and had to relinquish his command temporarily to Cloud, who 
was to supervise the securing of the post and surrounding 
area. This recurring malady that struck General Blunt from 
time to time, by its symptons, was malaria.13 Informing 
General Schofield that all of Indian Territory and a large 
portion of western Arkansas were secured by Federal armies, 
he went to bed.14 
With the capture of Fort Smith on September 1, 1863, 
and the retreat of the Confederate forces below the Arkansas 
River, the second Federal invasion .of Indian Territory came 
to an end. This expedition under the command of General 
Blunt was better planned than the first attempt by Colonel 
Weer early in 1862. The major result of this second 
12cloud to Schofield, September 8, 1863, Cloud to 
McNeil, September 20, 1863, Official Records, i, XXII, Pt. 1, 
pp. 598-599, 616; Britton, The Union Indian. Brigade!.£ the 
Civil~' p. 296. 
13cloud to Schofield, September 8, 1863, ibid., p. 599; 
Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Territory, 1862=1863, 11 
pp. 91, 117 0 
l4Blunt to Schofield, September 11, 1863, Official 
Records, i, XXII, Pt. 2, p. 525; Neal, "Federal Ascendancy in 
Indian Territory, 1862-1863," p. 117. 
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expedition was that it reduced all concentrated opposition 
put into the field by the Confederates to scattered arid qes= 
ultory hit and run raidso Confederate forces in Indian Ter= 
ritory would not be able to effectively resist Union advances. 
Only by guerrilla tactics could the Confederacy hinder the 
enemy enough to prevent further conquest of the region be= 
tween the Canadian River, the Arkansas River, and the Red 
River. 
Until the end of the war, military activities in Indian 
Territory were all directed at protecting or securing the 
Texas Road supply lineo Only in closing or keeping open this 
overland route could either side hope to further its plans of 
conquest in the areao The Texas Road. would be the artery in.· 
Union=dominated territory, with the encampment at Fort Blunt 
being the heart. If the supply lines to Fort Blunt were 
severed, the territory would come within Confederate grasp 
againo The rest of 1863 and all of the two subsequent years 
of the war were spent in continuing efforts toward that goal. 
The Federal successes of 1863 were not all due to Con= 
federate lack of military ability. Though a contributing 
factor, they could ·be ·attributed more to the low state of 
morale of the;Confederate Indian troops and. the lack of even 
a bare minimum of military suppliesa These troops were 
poorly clothed, underfed, abused by their white officers, 
and not paid for months at a time; when paid they received 
the near-worthless Confederate script which would buy almost 
nothing. General Steele blamed a portion of the 1863 set= 
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backs of the Confederates on the lack of proper military 
discipline, specifically the fact that all Union units com= 
posed of Indian troops were officered by white men, whereas 
the comparable Confederate conunands were not.15 
Though the active large~scale campaigning had come to 
an end with the taking of Fort Smith, the fighting was far 
from over. Patrols and scouts from both sides were contin-
uously brushing into each other. The infamous guerrilla of 
Missouri, William C. Quantrill, passed through Indian Terri-
tory many times going to and from his base camp .established 
at Bonham in upper Texas. 
With the Fort Smith area secured, General Blunt returned 
in the latter part of September, 1863, to his supply depot at 
Fort Scott, Kansas. On October 4 Blunt received dispatches 
stating that the post at Fort Smith was being endangered by 
a superior force of the enemy. Gathering together his staff, 
he prepared to move his headquarters to that post. His es-
cort consisted of one company of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry 
Regiment and a company of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry Regi-
ment, in total about one hundred fighting men. To this 
escort were added his clerks, orderlies, and the brigade 
band, which rode in a specially=built wagon. Leaving late 
15Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A History of the Sta.te 
and Its People, I, pp. 346=347; Steele-to Anderson, :May 1, 
TB'o3-;-steele to Boggs, June 8, 1863, Steele to Anderson, 
October 24, 1863, Steele to Cooper, November 8, 1863, Offi-
cial Records, i, XXII, Pt. 2, pp. 833-834, 862-863, 10~ 
Io"6'!; although renamed Fort Blunt in July, 1863, the old name 
of Fort Gibson quickly came back into common usage, while 
Fort Blunt remained the official name until the close of the 
Civil War. 
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in the afternoon, t);le train traveled only six miles the first 
day before going into Cqmp near Dry Woods, located on the 
Texas Road. The next morning the colunm headed south on the 
Texas Road. General Blunt planned to go to Fort Smith via 
Fort Blunt. After a thirty-four mile march, the Federal 
party set up camp again, this time at Cow Creek, so that by 
noon of October 6 the group arrived in the vicinity of Baxter 
Springs. 16 
Baxter Springs was situated as an intermediate point 
between the supply depot at Fort Scott and the forward post 
of Fort Blunt. It was there that supply trains bound for 
Indian Territory picked up detachments to bolster their es-
corts while in the hostile territory; by the same token, the 
extra guards were released at this point on the trip back. 
By maintaining this outpost, they could provide trains with 
an adequate escort to and from Fort Blunt, and also a strong 
force of troops could be held in readiness for use·in the 
surrounding area as needed. Lieutenant James Pond of the 
Third Wisconsin Cavalry Regiment was assigned to Baxter 
Springs in late September and upon the arrival of General 
16Blunt to Marsh, October 19, 1863, Blair to Greene, 
October 15, 1863, Henning to Greene, October 7, 1863, ibid., 
Pt~ 1, pp. 688, 690, 693; Britton, The _Union Indian Brigade 
in the Civil War, pp. 313, 314; John-P. Burch, Charles W. 
-ggant"rel!: A Tru.e llistory of his Guer_illa Warfare on die 
Missouri and-K.aiisas Border Dur'Ing the Civil War of !B"6Tto 
1865 (Vega~ no' .pµplisher~,-· 1923), pp.223-217:- - - -
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Blunt was in the process of enlarging the fortifications.17 
By October 6, 1863, Blunt had arrived at a point within 
400 yards of Baxter Springs; but due to an intervening ridge, 
the camp was still .. out of sight. Being in advance of his 
main body, the Federal general halted to wait for the wagons 
to close up. After the wagons had regained their interval 
and the column remounted, the order was given to resume the 
march. It was at this time that the attention of Blunt was 
called to a large body of men approaching from his left 
front. Since they were 500 yards distant and their identity 
was hard to ascertain, scouts were sent forward and the two 
escort companies were formed in lines of battle,. sixty 
strong. The rest were in reserve to protect the train.· 
Closing the distance to 300 yards, the unknown body halted .. 
General Blunt at first supposed them to be part of the com-
mand of. Lieutenant Pond as they were all dressed in Federal 
uniforms. Blunt became suspicious because of· the fast ap-
proach of several men from the east who joined the halted 
body and the lack of any semblance of organization or. disci-
pline in the group. 
With scouts reporting a fight at Baxter Springs, and 
designating these men as unidentified guerrillas, Blunt went 
17Pond to Blair, October 7, 1863, Official Records, i, 
XXII, Pt. 1, pp. 698-699; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade 
in the Civil War, p. 310; William E. Connelley, Quantrill 
and the Border Wars (Cedar Rapids: The Torch Press, 1910), 
pp. Zj:'Z'!;..425; Jay Monaghan,. Civil War on the Western Border 
1854-1865 (Boston: Little, Brown, andCompany, 1955}, 
pp. 291-295. 
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forward to make a personal reconnaissance. After advancing 
seventy-five yards, Bltint was halted by irregular pistol fire 
coming from the guerrilla command. Simultaneously he was 
able to hear the firing from the command of Pond at his im-
mediate left front. Returning to his escort, Blunt was cha-
grined to see his command scattering in all directions across 
the prairie, leaving the train and non-combatants to fend for 
themselves. Bluntaa-with a superior mount--rapidly overtook 
the fleeing escort and with his adjutant, Major H. Z. Curtis, 
attempted to rally his men. 18 
The guerrillas, seeing this rout, moved from a walk to 
a gallop and proceeded to overtake and wipe out the escort, 
killing all prisoners that fell into their hands. Blunt and 
Major Curtis managed to rally only fifteen men, of which six 
were sent to get relief from Fort Scott. With the remainder 
General Blunt turned and moved to make contact with the enemy 
force for the purpose of watching their movements and assemb~ 
ing as much of his dismantled command as possible.19 
~ile Blunt was attempting to rally part of his force, 
Major Benjamin S. Henning, commander of a company from the 
Third Wisconsin Cavalry, had become separated from his 
18Henning to Greene, October 7, 1863, Blunt to Marsh, 
October 19, 1863, Pond to Blair, October 7, 1863, Official 
Records, i, XXII, Pt. 1, pp. 693 ... 695, 688-689, 698 ... 699; 
Schofield to Halleck, October 9, 1863, ibid. , Pt. 2, p. 622; 
Richard S. Brownlee, Grey Ghosts of the Confederacy (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1958), pp. 128-132. 
19Blunt to Marsh, October 19, 1863, Official Records, 
i, XXII, Pt. 1, p. 689; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in 
the Civil War, pp. 320-321. 
50 
command and was isolated on the fringe of the fight. By the 
time he had shaken off his pursuers, he was closer to the 
Baxter Springs command than his own. He elected to cut in 
behind the enemy force and go to the Baxter Springs camp; 
where he hoped to get reinforcements to help Blunt beat off 
his attackers. Reaching the Baxter Springs fortifications, 
Major Henning found the meager command there being.hard 
pres s.ed by a guerrilla force of about 300 men. The arrival 
of Henning in his encampment was the first Lieutenant Pond 
knew of the fight over the ridge.· To his disappointment, 
Major. Henning learned that alL of the cavalry had left early 
that morning as escort for a forage train and was not ex-
pected back for several days .. 20 Hearing this, the major 
returned to the fight as it moved to the southeast across 
the prairie. Reaching the brow of, a hill, Henning was able 
to s·ee the remaining few men of, the train lose their lives, 
including the murdering of the entire brigade, band and o.tber 
non-combatants with the train •. All of the brigade band was 
shot. and then thrown unde,r the wagon, which was set afire.21 
In answer to a call for reinforcements,, Lieutenant 
Colonel Charles W. Blair arrived in the. afternoon of the 
ninth, three days after the attack. He brought with him 
three companies of the Twelfth Kansas Infantry Regiment and 
20Henning to Greene, October 7, 1863, Official Records,. 
i, XXII, Pt.· 1, pp.• 694-695~ 
21Blair to.Greene, October 15, 1863, Henning to Greene, 
October 7, 1863, ibid., pp. 692, 695-696; Britton, The 
Union Indian Brigade in~ Civil War, pp. 419-420. 
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two of. the Second Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment, having 
about one hundred cavalry troopers riding.in the vanguardo 
Colonel Blair arrived in time to escort the general back to 
Fort Scott and see to th~ burial of the dead and the treat-
ment of the woundedo 22 It was not until late evening that it 
was confirmed that the Confederate force was that of 
Quantrill, though he had been previously reported in the 
vicinity headed south.23 
From Baxter Springs 1 Quantrill moved his command south 
on the Texas Road until they crossed Cabin Creeko After 
crossing Cabin Creek the guerrilla force turned west, crossed 
the Verdigris River, and then forded the Arkansas River 
eighteen miles above Fort Blunto On October 8, Quantrill' s 
men captured a scout of twelve men belonging to the First· 
Indian Home Guard Regiment and murdered them all in cold 
blood.. On the night of October 11, they camped o,n the North 
Canadian River, forty=five miles south of the Arkansas River. 
The last report of them was that they had moved into north 
Texas and set up a winter camp at Bonhamo24 
The void in guerrilla activities left by Quantrill when 
he went to Bonham was filled by Colonel Watie in mid-October, 
22Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A History of the State 
and Its People, I, p. 349; Blunt to Marsh, October I'9,'" 1863, 
Blair to Greene, October 15, 1863, Henning to Greene, October 
7, 1863, Quantrill to Price, October 13, 1863, Pond to Blair, 
October 7, 1863, Official Records, i, XXII, Pto 1, pp. 689, 
691, 697, 700=701~ 698. 
23Blair to Greene, October 15, 1863, ibid., Po 69L 
24Blunt to Marsh, October 19, 1863, Quantri11 to Price, 
October 13, 1863, ibid., pp. 689, 700-7010 
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18630 The Cherokee guerrilla was sent back into Indian Ter-
ritory to harass the Federal supply line and spread havoc 
among rear elements of the Federal detachments and towns. 
On October 29 Watie rode into Tahlequah and nearby Park 
Hill. He killed a few Federal Cherokees and broke up a 
council meeting being held there by local leaders. Watie 
then rode to Park Hill and burned Rose Cottage, the home of 
Chief Ross. Some Federal troops from the First Kansas Col-
ored Infantry Regiment were found there, and two were killed 
in the skirmish that followedo Two white soldiers from the 
First Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment were also killed. 
Colonel Watie captured and sent south several of Ross's 
slaves and burned their houses and outbuildings. 25 
Never using a force larger than 500 men, Watie would 
carry the war to the Federals when all other means were :~:; 
exhausted and Confederate hopes were at their lowest. Fear 
gripped the Union sympathizers as his raids grew more daring. 
As his legend grew, it was reported that he was massing a 
force of over 3,000 troops and was planning to invade 
Kansas. 26 
25Edward E. Dale, "Some Letters of General Stand Watie," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, I (January, 1921), pp. 41=42; Dale 
and Litton, eds. , Cherokee Cavaliers, pp. 144-H1-5!; Foreman, 
A History of Oklahoma, po 124; Hathaway, "Brigadier General 
. Stand Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," p. 63; Carolyn Thomas 
Foreman, Park Hill (Muskogee: The Star Printery, Inc., 
1948), p.-r29.~ 
26Thompson to Blair, November 28, 1863, Burnett to 
Ewing, November 28, 1863, Official Records, i, XXII, Pt. 2, 
pp. 723=724, 722, 723. 
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The guerrilla activity of Watie brought on the last 
major engagement of 1863. On December 26, Watie, William 
Penn Adair, and Quantrill made a sortie against.Fort Blunt. 
The raid was of' a harassing nature because the Confederate 
guerrillas quit the fighting at first signs of stiff resist"'." 
ance .. The following morning Captain Alexander C. Spilman of 
the Third Indian Home Guard Regiment was sent out from Fort 
Gibson in pursuit. He took with him a 300 man infantry force 
drawn from the Indian Brigade. Taking the Park Hill Road 
north to Tahlequah, Spilman was informed thatWatie had 
plundered the Murriel house and burned the surrounding Negro 
quarters.. From residents of the area, the Union captain 
learned that Watie was accompanied by a force of 500 to 800 
men. Spilman was able to trace Watie to the Illinois River 
bottom. Moving to the Illinois River also, Spilman encamped, 
putting out a strong security to prevent a surprise attack 
by the Confederates. 27 The next morning Spilman still did 
not know the exact location of the Confederate camp, though 
he was sure it was somewhere near. Twice that morning the 
Federal column was approached by Confederates who had mis;.,,. 
takenly thought them to be friendly. 
27Hathaway, "Brigadier General S-tand Watie, Confederate 
Guerrilla," pp. 64=65; Spilman to Phillips, December 23, 
1863, Official Records, i, XXII, Pt. L, pp. 78L-183; Annie 
HeloiseAbel, The American Indian as Participant in the Civil 
War (Cleveland~The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1919),~ 312; 
Abstract from Record of· Events, December 16, 1863, Official. 
Records, i, XXII, Pt. 1, p. 779; Cherrie Adair Moore, 
"William Penn Adair," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXIX (Spring, 
1951), pp. 37=41. - . 
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Traveling up the Barren Fork River, Spilman- located the. 
Confederates in forcea · Forming his. men in line and pushing 
forward tbeir,single piece of· artillery, Spilman prepared for. 
battle.. Brought unde,r sporadic fire of the enemy force, the 
Federal captain orde.red the fire to be returned.,. The· Confed.· · · 
erate line broke and retreated unde-r the fire of the· Federal 
howitzer. Lieutenant L. F .- Pa.rsons, commanding the: Cherokee 
element of, the Union force, drove.them for a quarter of a 
mile;, and wheh the Confederate line formed again, he broke it 
and drove them from the field •. Spilman consolidated his 
force on a. hilltop, apd awaited the Confederates.· Sp1lman's 
position was no sooner secured than the Confederates attacked.·· 
A few discharges o.f, cannister drove the' Confederates out of· 
the valley and to the top, of an adjoining-hill. 
Since· they were firing at each other -from concealed 
positions, the fighting gave neither side any advantage •. 
Spilman decided to use a ruse: to get the Confederates into 
the open where he could de.feat them. He ordered his. command 
onto the road as if- quitting the fight. When the Co.nfederate 
Indians rushed forward to clinch the victory, Spilman ordered. 
his men back to, their forme:r positions,. where· they delivered 
a deadly fire that broke the Southern force and drove them 
back.' This. time the rout was complete; the Confederates 
made no attempt to.rally. Spilman lost one killed and one 
wounded., Several- of his artillery and supply train animals 
were-wounded and had to be abandoned.- The Confederate loss 
was estimated by Spilman at twelve killed-and twenty.;.five, 
wounded. Leaving his wounded at a nearby house, Spilman 
continued on to Rhea 1 s Mill, where he attached himself to 
the command of Major Foreman.28 
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With 1863 coming to a close, General Steele had lost all 
confidence in the ability of the Confederate Indians. The 
only Indian he held in high esteem was Watie.29 On December 
11, Steele was removed from command of Indian Territory at 
his own request and was replaced by Brigadier General Samuel 
Bell Maxey.30 
The appointment of Maxey over Cooper greatly antagonized 
and disappointed Cooper, who had fought for the position. He 
used all the influence he had in Richmond, Virginia, the Con-
federate capital, to get the position turned over to himself 
as being the best qualified. 31 General Cooper displayed 
28 rbid. 
29Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma~ A History of the State 
and Its People, I, p. 347; Steele to Anderson, February 15, 
I8'"6'4, Official Records, i, XXIIj Pt. 1, pp. 35-36; Hathaway, 
"Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," p. 67. 
30special Order, Headquarters Trans=Mississippi Depart= 
ment, December 11, 1863, Official Records, i, XXII, Pt. 2, 
p. 1094; Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confeder= 
ate Guerrilla," p. 67; Cunningham, General Stand Watie 0 s Con= 
federate Indians, p. 133; McNeil to Totten~ January 7, 18~ 
Official Records, XXXIV, i, Pt. 2, p. 42; Harlow, Oklahoma 
Its Origins and Develotment: A History, p. 191; Anderson to 
Maxey, December 11, 18 3, Samuel Bell Maxey Papers, Thomas 
Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art~ Tulsa, 
Oklahoma. 
31Hood, "Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian Terri-
tory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, p. 431; Cooper to Davis, 
December 11, 1863, Official Records, i, XXII, Pt. 2, p. 1038; 
Joseph B. Thoburn, A Standard History of Oklahoma (5 vols., 
Chicago: The American Historical Society, 1916), I, pp. 316= 
317; Muriel H. Wright, 11General Douglas H. Cooper, CoS.A.," 
Chronicles of Oklahomaj XX.XII (Summer, 1954), p. 171; · 
Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A History of the State and Its 
People, I, p. 347. 
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complete disregard for the chain of command by writing di~ 
rectly to the President of· the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, 
urging his appointment to the command of Indian Territory.32 
Maxey·not. only had trouble with his subordinate officers, 
but the territory he was to command had earned the reputation 
as being an impossible one. For a military man, this assign-> 
ment was career-killing. 
Faced with terrific odds, Maxey displayed a keen in-
sight into the situation as he described the importance of 
Indian Territory to his department commander, General Edmund 
Kirby-Smith. He proposed to divide the available forces into 
two brigades, with all Indian forces under Cooper and the 
remaining troops under Watie •. His low opinion of Indian 
troops became evident·when he stated he would have a small 
battalion of white troops attached to Cooper acting as scouts 
and couriers •. The Confederate commander also urged that 
experienced staff officers and cadre personnel be sent to him 
so he could make his command more efficient.33 General Maxey, 
in the belief that the Confederacy could win back the lost 
32cooper to Davis, February 29, 1864, Official Records, 
i, XXXIV, Pt. 2, p. 1007, Hood,. "Twilight of the Confederacy 
1.n Indian Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, p. 432; 
Wright, "General. Douglas H. Cooper, C. S.A., ,r Chronicles of 
Oklahoma, XXXII, p. 171; Maxey to Boggs, October 24, 1864' 
Maxey to Williamson, June 3, 1864, Samuel Bell Maxey Papers, 
Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, 
Tulsa, Oklahoma. 
33Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, Official Records, 
i, XXXIV, Pt. 2, pp. 856=857; Hood, "Twilight of, the Confed= 
eracy in Indian Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, p. 
432; Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate 
Guerrilla," ppo 68-69; Wright, "General Douglas H. Cooper, 
C.S.Aa," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXII, PPo 171, 178. 
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territory, decried the conditions in the Trans-Mississippi 
Department and some of the actions of his superiors, in par-
ticular their failure to supply him with adequate reinforce-
ments and quartermaster supplies. He urged universal. 
impressment of· all Indians capable of bearing. arms. 34 ·· 
The winter of 1863-64 was. not to be as quiet as the 
previous ones~ The Federals at Fort Blunt·. launched an expe ... 
ditiondeep into Confederate .. held territory. Under the.com-
mand of Phillips :i. the Union force penetrated almost· to Middle.· 
Boggy, deep in the Choctaw Nation. Like.his Confederate 
opponent, Phillips was anxious to bring the situation in 
Indian Territory to a successful climax. To help in the 
achievement of·this goal Phillips executed his.February 
expedition.35 
An advance party under the command of·Major Moses B. C. 
Wright, Second Indian Home Guard Regiment, opened the cam-· 
paign into Indian Territory. He moved to Rhea's Mill, 
located across the border in Arkansas, on January 29, 1864. 
Wright was to gather flour and forage for the main body which 
was to follow. Under his personal leadership, Phillips.left 
Fort Blunt with 1,500 men, the balance of the connnand, and 
moved southwest. This was early on the morning of February 1. 
34Ib"d · 858 432 l. .• ' pp. . ' • 
35Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma~ A.History of the State 
and Its People, I, p. 354; Hood, "TwilTght ·.of· theConfederacy 
Inindian Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, pp. 432~ 
433; Wyant,·· "Colonel William A. P'fiillips and the Civil. War in· 
Indian Territory, 11 p. 61; Muriel H. Wright, "Old Boggy Depot," 
Chronicles £f Oklahoma, V (March, 1927), pp. 4-6. 
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Going into the Creek and Seminole nations, then turning 
south on the Texas Road, he penetrated the defenses of the 
Choctaw Nation. The long Federal column--the,First.and Third 
Indian Home Guard regiments and a battalion of the Fourteenth 
Kansas CavalryRegiment--made its way to.their first.camp 
south of the Arkansas River. All of these troops were well· 
mounted and armed with the newest Sharp's rifles.36 
In a circular dated January 30, Phillips instructed his 
men to aim and shoot carefully, picking their. targets .. He 
informed them that only cowards would lag behind and only 
stragglers would be killed. Calling on them to unleash their 
vengance,on the authors of. the suffering in Indian Territory, 
he.asked them to make their footsteps severe. It was implied 
that prisoners were not.wanted. To ensure that no straggling 
or unnecessary destruction would take place, Phillips re-
quired a roll call three times a day. Only commissioned 
officers could kill meat-bearing animals while on the expe-
dition. If this order were violated, the perpetrator would 
be,brought to account immediately and the·amount of money· 
equal to the value of the animal would be deducted from his 
pay. 
Going with the.First and Third Indian Home Guard regi-
ments and the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry Regiment was a sec-
tion of howitzers commanded by.Captain Solomon Kaufman. 
36Thoburn, A Standard History of·Oklahoma, I, p. 315; 
Hood, "Twilight of the Confederacy Tii Indian Territory," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, p. 432;. Hathaway, "Brigac:Uer 
Genera!: Stana wat1.e, Confederate Guerrilla.," p. 69. · 
Foreman, ~ History of Oklahoma,. pp. 125, 126 •. 
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Colonel .. Thomas Moonlight and. the· remainder of the Fourteenth 
Kansas Cavalry Regiment were to join Phillips enroute or near. 
Boggy Depot. Anxious to penetrate as far as possible into 
Indian Territory before any resistance could be .organized 
against him, Phillips imposed heavy marching on his column. 
Using·segmertts of· the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry Regiment to 
sweep his front clear of Confederates, he moved toward North 
Fork River. 
By February 5, Phillips was encamped on the North Fork 
River in the Creek Nation. From this camp he dispatched 
small units to clear Confederates out of the Little River and 
upper Canadian valleys. Moving to the South Canadian River, 
Phillips left.a small detachment of the Fourteenth Kansas 
Cavalry Regiment at North Fork to guide Colonel Moonlight 
and the expected reinforcements. 
Scouts reported that in the skirmishes on the Upper 
Canadian River and Little River bottom,lands, the units dis~ 
patched by Phillips had beaten the Confederates encountered, 
and had left over one hundred dead as a warning to any Con-
federates remaining in the area. Phillips reported that the 
Confederates were retreating in haste toward the Red River 
and Fort Washita, and that Cooper had moved his '!Jeadquarters 
from Fort Towson to Fort Washita. Sending the F~rst Indian 
Home Guard Regiment on·. ahead to Boggy Depot; PhillipS" and 
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the main body remained at the South Canadian River one more 
day waiting for Moonlight.37 
With no word on the reinforcements, Phillips and the 
main column moved to Boggy Depot February 9. On February 13 
a scout under Major Charles Willetts skirmished at Middle 
Boggy with a small force of Confederate Indian troops. 
Willets was in command of a regiment of the Fourteenth Kansas 
Cavalry, an advance party put forward of the main colt1mn to 
prevent its being ambushed. Willetts came up on a rear ele-
ment of a party of Confederate cavalry and infantry. He 
immediately attacked and routed the Confederates, who fled. 
into the surrounding brush. Forty-seven Confederate dead 
were left on the field with no injuries in the Union party. 
It was on this scout that revenge was taken on the Confeder-
ates. Paying heed to the January circular that no prisoners 
be taken, the Confederate wounded were left on the field with 
their throats slashed from ear to ear. 
From the battleground at the Middle Boggy, Phillips 
moved his command twenty-one miles further south. On South 
Boggy he established Camp Kagi. With no hope for 
37wyant, "Colonel William. A. Phillips and the Civil War. 
in Indian Territory, " pp. 5 7-5 8; ·. Hood, "Twilight of the Con- · 
federacy in Indian Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, 
p. 432; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A H"fstory of the 
State and Its People, I, p. 354; Phillips to Command, 
January°"'!O:-T864, Thayer to Steele, February 22, 1864, Offi-
cial. Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 1, pp. 108, Gen~ra,l Order.,· : \: : : 
Headquarters of First Brigade, Army of the Frontier, January 
21, 1864, Thompson to Gallaher, February 5, 1864, Phillips 
to Thayer, February 8, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, pp. 191-192; 249, 
272; W. B, Morrison, "Fort Towson," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
VIII, (.;fun~·;: 1930), p. 227. . - . 
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reinforcements, Phillips.stripped himself of all unnecessary· 
baggage.and prepared to march.south to the outskirts of Fort· 
Washi-taand make contact with·theConfederate troops reported 
thet'e. He sent Colonel Stephen H. Wattles back to Little 
River with all the captured oxen and wagons. Retaining only 
the serviceable mountedmen of.the three companies .of the 
Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry Regiment and the regiments of the: 
First.and Thil,"d Indian. Home. Guard, regiII1ents, he moved to Fort 
.. :···.·:· ·' ... ·.· 
Washita~. He had a total force of;450 men and one howitzer; 
the rest ·were in retreat·to Little River. Phillips hoped to 
strike one more blow at the enemy before withdrawing, but he 
·- .. 
decided not to risk defeat and lose the moral effect of ,the 
victories won to date.38 · 
After destroying all organized resistance.in the·area, 
Phillips put forward the hand of·diplomacy to the Confederate 
Indians. He sent to the Choctaw, Chickasaw;, and Seminole 
chiefs .. an. offer of ·peace as set forth in Lincoln's Proclama- .· 
tion of Amnesty and Reconstruction of December 8, 1863. 
Phi.llips told each Indian. leader that the government he · 
represented wanted to give the Indians peace, mercy and.par~ 
don. He· did not want to be cruel, but: all that threatened 
the "glorious American Republic" must be destroyed. Phillips 
' 
38Phillips to Curtis, February·l6, 1864; and February 
24; 1864, Thayer to Steele, February 22,- 1864; Wright to 
Gallaher, February 27; 1864, Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 
1-, pp. 106 ... 111, !Q8,:'I1r~-113.;,:':P;:hL11:ip:s to Cur,ti.s:, 
February 14; 1864, Circular, Headquarters of First Brigade, 
Army of the Frontier, January 30, 1864, Maxey to Kirby-Smith, 
February 26, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, pp. 329-330, 109, 994. 
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instructed them to make peace and decide quickly because 
their days of grace would end soon.· All of these letters and 
proclamations were drawn up in the respective Indian tongues 
and distributed throughout Indian Territory south of the 
Arkansas River. 
Pointing his column north, he retraced his steps back to 
Fort Blunt, picking Colonel Wattles up on the way. Phillips 
expressed satisfaction with his expedition, for it achieved 
most of its objectives. Though not able to enter Texas as 
he had planned, he had succeeded in penetrating 165 miles 
into Confederate territory, and in spreading death and de:-
struction over 400 square miles of hostile country. Although 
only four of his command were slightly wounded, he.left 250 
dead Confederates in Indian Territory. The Confederates 
claimed that the raid bad not succeeded in any of its objec-
tives and that the Federal invaders had fled the territory 
to avoid contact with the Confederate force marching in 
their direction. Maxey reported that the raid had made.the 
Indians more resolute in their hatred for the Federal troops 
stationed in Indian Territoryp 39 He blamed his failure to 
defeat the Federals on the lack of arms in his command •. He 
39Phillips to Curtis, February 29, 1864, Phillips to 
Curtis, February 14, 1864, Maxey to Kirby-Smith, February 26, 
1864, Phillips . to Curtis, February 24,. 1864, ibid. , pp. 
4677468, 329-330, 994-996, 109-111; Thoburn and Wright, 
Oklahoma: A History of the State and Its People, I, p. 354; 
Phillips to-Colbert, February 15, 11so4~hillips to Jumper, 
February 15, 1864, Phillips to Choctaw Council, February 15, 
1864;· Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 1, pp. 109-110, 111, 
110; Wyant, "Colonel William A. Phillips and the Civil War 
in Indian Territory," pp. 58-59. 
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had a 250 man reserve at Bonham, Texas, under Quantrill; but 
since none were armed, they were useless to him in trying to 
repel the Federal invaders.40 
At the time of the Phillips expedition, a Confederate 
Indian council composed of Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Seminole 
representatives met at Armstrong Academy, in present-day 
Bryan County, on February 26, 1864. The council had been 
called to discuss the Plains Indians who had been raiding in 
the area and causing much destruction. The discussion quick-
ly evolved into the Indians' position in the war. General 
Maxey attended the meeting in order to meet the Indian allies 
of his new assignment. On request he gave an eloquent speech 
promising victory in the coming year and apologizing for the 
Confederacy's not meeting all of their treaty obligations to 
the Indians. General Cooper, the old Choctaw agent, worked 
behind the scenes of the council and was largely responsible 
for the continuing support of that nation. 
However, a timely message from President Davis was a 
helpful factor in keeping the tribe loyal to the Confederacy. 
President Davis assured the Confederate Indians that their 
welfare was uppermost in his mind and every consideration 
would be given to their requests as well as to any complaint 
they might have. He guaranteed that the request of the 
Indian allies concerning the making of Indian Territory a 
separate military district would be honored, and General 
40Maxey to Kirby-Smith, February 26, 1864, Official 
Records, i, XX.XIV, Pt. 2, pp. 994-997. 
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Cooper, as their choice for commander, would be appointed. 
Davis told the Confederate allies that arrangements were be-
ing made at that moment for the forwarding of a number of 
desperately-needed arms to the Indian units. In reassuring 
the Indian soldiers, he said that "the soldiers and people 
of the ••. [IndianJ Nations in treaty and amity with us are 
regarded by this Government with the same tender care and 
solicitude as are the soldiers and people of all the Confed-
erate States." Calling for a united effort, the Confederate 
President said, "Our cause is one, and our hearts are united . 
... with the providence of God to guide and to shield us, 
victory will perch on our banners and bless us with peace, 
independence, and prosperity. 1141 
Though the President's message did placate fears of the 
Indian allies, some were not convinced. Another council was 
called to meet on March 16, 1864, further north at Skully-
ville to prevent Southern pressure on the delegates. Cooper 
used all the diplomacy he possessed in an effort to win a 
favorable decision at this meeting, but he failed. A small 
group of Choctaws attempted to extend peace feelers to 
Colonel Phillips, but the Federal commander refused to agree, 
41oavis to Folsom, February 22, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, 
pp. 824-825; Maxey to Anderson, February 7, 1864, Maxey to 
Kirby~Smith, November 12, 1864, Maxey to his wife, November 
6, 1864, Samuel Bell Maxey Papers, Thomas Gilcrease Insti-
tute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Special 
Orders Number 171, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, 
July 21, 1864, Official Records, i, XLI, Pt. 2, p. 1019. 
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asserting that the group did not represent the entire nation 
because the Choctaw nation Wcl.S still de facto rebei.42 
Phillips launched into a program of improving discipline 
and acquiring supplies when he returned from his February 
expedition. He explained in detail his lack of adequate 
transportation facilities. He informed his superior that he 
had stopped hauling pork and salted bacon because the weight 
was too heavy and bulky for .his limited supply of wagons. 
Instead, he would substitute light condensed food such as 
sugar, coffee, and molasses. Meat would have to be acquired 
locally. Phillips urged the use of oxen over mules because 
of the ability of the ox to subsist entirely on grass, where-
as the mule could not. Phillips urged the Federal government 
to buy the oxen from loyal Indians so they could use the 
money to support their families.43 
Phillips described in detail his plan for improving 
discipline in the Indian units of his command. The Federal 
commander urged his superior to allow him to have at least 
42Hood, "Twilight of.the Confederacy in Indian Terri-
tory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XL!, pp. 433-434; Wyant, 
"Colonel William A. Phillips and the Civil War in Indian Ter-
ritory," pp. 59-60, 62-63; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A 
History of the State and Its People, I, 1?· 358; U. S. D7part-
ment of the Interior, Re~ort of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs for the Year 18 4 (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office;-l'Bo5)"-;-p:- !ZS; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade 
in the Civil War, PP•. 342-344; Phillips to Curtis, April 5, 
TB'6~0fficia'T""Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 3, p. 53; Edwin C. 
McReynolds, Oklahoma: A History of the Sooner State (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 195~, p. 221. 
43Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 
pp. 375, 379; Wyant, ncolonel William A. Phillips and the 
Civil War in Indian Territory," pp. 65-66; Phillips to Curtis, 
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two white officers in each company and a requisite number of 
white orderly sergeants to keep up the paper work. Indians 
were totally inefficient in trying to cope with the paper 
work required by army regulations. To.increase the perform-
ance of his units and enlarge their usefulness, he urged the 
remounting of his Third Indian Home Guard Regiment at govern-
ment expense. To prevent further strife caused by the over-
lapping of authority with two district commanders, Curtis and 
Blunt, Phillips proposed that his command be. made independent 
and responsible only to General Curtis, who Phillips believed 
had a deeper understanding of the li:ld:ians and their problems. 44 
Phillips next exposed his true contempt for Blunt: he 
stated that he should not be left under the command of a 
sup~rior that was openly trying to abolish his command and 
had on several occasions been judged insane by his fellow 
officerso Such charges did not hide Phillips' real objection 
to serving under General Blunt. Blunt was a political gener-
al who had received his promotions in part by political means, 
whereas Colonel Phillips had earned all of his on the battle-
field and was angry when his chances for advancement were 
stopped for political reasons.45 
44Phillips to Curtis, March 7, 1864, ibid., pp. 525-
527; Oates, Confederate Cavalry West of the River, p. 74, 
77, 75. - - -
45Phillips to Curtis, March 13, 1864, Curtis to 
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. Though Blunt did not think highly of Indian fighting 
ability, he did feel that if reorganized, the Indian Brigade 
could be of some usefulness to the Union. By mounting them 
on ponies and using the .Indian units on scout duty, Blunt 
believed they would reach the ultimate efficiency capable of 
such units.46 
In the earJ:.y part of April, 1864, an unusual quiet set= 
tled over Indian Territory. As a precaution, Blunt made his 
troop dispositions to the south more secure in event of a 
sudden attack. Taking advantage of the breathing spell, 
Blunt and Phillips gathered in more corn and forage, at the 
same time sending forward to headquarters more requests for 
transportation. Phillips had nothing to fear because the 
Confederate general, Maxey, had received orders to gather as 
many of his forces as possible and join General Stirling 
Price in Arkansas. Price was moving to oppose the maneuver 
of the Federal general, Frederick Steele.47 
The Union strategy of Steele consisted of three cooper= 
ative columns which would converge upon Shr~veport, Louisiana, 
46Blunt to Curtis, March 27, 1864, Official Records, i, 
XXXIV, Pt. 2, pp. 754-755; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade 
in the Civil War, p. 380. ·· -- --
47Blunt to Curtis, March 30, 1864, Maxey to Anderson, 
March 20, 1864, Wa.tie to Heiston, March 20, 1864, Cooper to 
Scott, March 21, 1864, Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 2, 
pp. 791, 1070=1071, 1071=1072, 1073=1074; Maxey to Kirby= 
Smith, April 3, 1864, Maxey to Boggs~ April 2 and April 7, 
1864, Boggs to Maxey, April 12:i 1864, ibido, Pto 3, PPo 725, 
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in the Civil War, PPo 344=345, 378; Hood~ iiTwilight oft e 
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XLI, p. 4340 
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located deep within Confederate territory. The three columns 
would meet in a move designed to capture that important sup-
ply depoto General Nathaniel Banks was the overall commander 
of the Union forces with Ste.e1e .in command of Federal troops 
sent from Indian Territory. The Confederate Indian troops 
were under the direct command of Maxey. The Second Indian 
Brigade held the units of Colonel Tandy Walker, the First and 
Second Indian r..egiments. The First Brigade of Maxey' s Divi-
sion was made up entirely of Texas Troops. 
The troops of Maxey took an active part in the engage-
ment at Poison Spring, Arkansas, on April 18, 1864. Federal 
General Steele, located at Camden, Arkansas, was short of 
forage and had sent a train of over 200 wagons to gather hay 
and fodder at nearby Prairie D'Ane.48 Securing a position 
between the Federal train and Camden, the Confederates under 
Maxey blocked the road and waited. 
Taking position on the extreme left of the Confederate 
line were Colonel Walker and his Choctaw brigade: the First 
Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel James Riley, a 300 man 
unit; and the Second Regiment under Colonel S. N. Folsom, a 
48curtis to Blunt, April 17, 1864, Maxey to Kirby=Smith, 
April 3, 1864, Kirby-Smith to Price, April 7, 1864, Boggs to 
Maxey, April 12, 1864, Anderson to Price, April 12, 1864, 
Scott to McCulloch, April 12, 1864, Magruder to Boggs, April 
20, 1864, Sanborn to Greene, April 25, 1864, Official ·· 
Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 3, pp. 199-200, 728-729, 744, 760-761, 
761, 774, 779, 288; Banks to Sherman, February 19, 1864, 
ibid., Pt. 2, p. 368; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in 
the Civil War, pp. 345=347. 
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380 man force.49 The Choctaw brigade was delayed in getting 
into place because of the changes being made in the disposi-
tions of the other troops about him. Immediately on aligning 
his Indian soldiers, Walker ordered them forward against the 
Federal right. Halting briefly at the edge of an old field, 
Walker realigned his command and then hurled his entire bri-
gade at the Union troops positioned in a heavily wooded 
ravine to their immediate front.SO The Federals were driven 
from the ravine and forced to seek a new position behind the 
forage wagons. Colonel Walker's brigade charged them again 
and forced the Union troops to flee in the direction of 
Camden. Walker was fearful that his hungry, half-clothed 
Indians would break off the pursuit in order to plunder the 
commissary wagons of the Union train, but he was able to 
49 Ibid., pp. 346-352; Price to Boggs, May, 1864, Organi-
zation of the Confederate Forces in Arkansas, April 20, 1864, 
Maxey to Belton, April 23, 1864, DeMorse to Ochiltree, April 
21, 1864, Walker to Ochiltree, April 19, 1864, Official 
Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 1, pp. 779-784, 784-786, 841-845, . 
846-847, 849; Anderson to Price, April 12, 1864, Cunningham 
to Price, April 14, 1864, Price to Kirby-Smith, April 14, 
1864, Cunningham to Price, April 15, 1864, Abstract from 
returns of the Department of Arkansas, Steele, U. S. Army, 
commanding, for the month of April, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, pp. 
761, 766, 767, 370~ . 
SOEvans, ed., Confederate Military History, XI, p. 269; 
Ibid., X, pp. 248=250; Britton, The Union Indian Bri!ade in 
the Civil War, pp. 359-373; Price to Boggs, May, 186, Maxey 
to Belton,"""'April 23, 1864, General Order No. 38, Headquarters 
District of Indian Territory, May 9, 1864, DeMorse to 
Ochiltree, April 21, 1864, Walker to Ochiltree, April 19, 
1864, Organization of the Confederate forces in Arkansas, 
Kirby-Smith, commanding, April 20, 1864, Maxey to Belton, 
April 23, 1864, Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 1, pp. 779-
784, 841-844, 844=845, 846-848, 849, 784-785, 841=845. 
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press them on without effort. The Choctaws were caught up in 
the excitement of battle and victory and could not think of 
anything but destroying the retreating Federal force. The 
Choctaw brigade was later commended for its heroic actions 
during the battle, in particular its capture of a battery of 
four Union cannon. Walker had four men killed, seven wounde~ 
and none missing~ 
The substantial fruits of the Confederate victory at 
Poison Spring was the four-gun battery of Union artillery, 
and about 170 wagons and teams, all heavily loaded. Thirty 
wagons had become disabled during the battle and were left 
burning on the field. The Federal loss in killed and wounded 
was about 700 men. The Confederate casualties numbered 
thirty killed,_ eigpty:-eight wounded and ten missing. The 
Union forces engaged totaled about 1,770 men, while the Con-
federate number was 1,800 men.51 
The engagement at Poison Springs indicated to Maxey how 
much resistance a smaller force of Federal troops could dis-
play. On returning to his own district after the cessation 
of activities in Arkansas and the successful blocking of 
General Steele, Maxey knew that he would be facing these 
same troops and probably more. Planning a campaign to 
51Evans, ed., Confederate Military History:, X, pp. 250-
251. Maxey to Belton, April 23, 1864, Officia Records, i, 
XXXIV, Pt. 1, pp. 842, 844. 
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capture Fort Smith, the Confederate general realized that he 
would have to move with extreme caution.52 
Returning to lndian Territory, Maxey undertook active 
campaigning. Colonel Phillips realized the importance of 
the Arkansas River as a buffer between the two hostile forces 
and sought to keep it under close surveillance by putting 
strong guard posts at all principal fords. Particularly im-
portant was the stretch of river between Fort Blunt and Fort 
Smith. With the help of his lndian scouts and relatives of 
individuals in his command, Phillips was able to pinpoint 
most of the partisan activity that occurred in his district 
and could warn his neighboring districts of Kansas and 
Missouri if danger threatened. 
ln the first week of April, Confederate Colonel Adair 
and a force of 500 men received orders to prepare for a move 
north. Adair bad one hundred Cherokees and some Creeks, 
Chickasaws, and Seminoles who were grouped into two large 
regiments. General Cooper believed that the sending of Adair 
north of the Arkansas River would result in the weakening of 
Watie's force. Watie was then located near Boggy Depot, 
keeping watch for any Federal activity at Fort Smith. Cooper 
was convinced by his staff that Adair and bis command could 
be back from the raid by May 1. General Henry E. McCulloch, 
52Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil~' 
p. 393; Special Order No. 1, Headquarters, Army of Arkansas, 
April 28, 1864, Maxey to Boggs, May 11, 1864, Official 
Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 3, pp. 845~846, 819-820; Ralph R. Rea, 
Sterling Price: The Lee of the West, (Little Rock: Pioneer 
Press, 1959), pp.99-Ior.- - -
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the Confederate commander of upper Texas, requested that 
Quantrill be taken along. Cooper sent for Quantrill, plan-
ning to send him west of Fort Blunt to push the Plains 
Indians into Kansas, where they would stir up trouble and 
havoc.53 
Colonel Adair launched his raid on April 17, 1864. 
Posted near Fort Blunt, he sent scouts to pinpoint all of the 
Union forces in the irmnediate vicinity. Since Quantrill was 
reported to have passed by Adair's camp on the night of 
April 17, Adair then sent a party of Seminoles to find him 
and try to work out an agreement with that guerrilla leader. 
Adair had a force of 325 fighting men, and Quantrill had only 
about 150 men. When the party returned from its search with~ 
out having made contact, Adair cormnenced his raid without 
him. 
Quantrill tried to cross the Arkansas River above Fort 
Blunt. He skirmished with the guatd there and forced them 
to retreat. Upon breaking contact with the guerrilla forces, 
the sentries hurried to Fort Blunt to report to Colonel 
Phillips. Phillips sent out a strong mounted force that 
moved to· renew contact with the Confederates. Finding them 
a few miles above where they had crossed the river, the Fed-
eral cavalry charged and forced them back across the Arkansas 
River. 
53Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 
pp. 381-382; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A History of the 
State and Its People, I, pp. 359-360. 
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Adair, in the meantime, had dropped further down the 
Arkansas and given Fort Blunt a wide berth. The Confederate 
colonel was detected when he attempted to cross the Illinois 
River near Tahlequah. That ford barred, Adair turned east 
and proceeded to raid the Union district near the Indian Ter-
ritory and Arkansas boundary. 
Colonel Phillips sent two regiments of the Indian Home 
Guard to intercept Adair, but he did not feel that his force 
would be effective because they were infantry and the Confed-
erates were all mounted. Keeping a constant vigil on all the 
fords, the Federal commander sent messages of warning to his 
neighboring districts telling them to watch for signs of 
increased partisan activity. While Adair raided in eastern 
Indian Territory and western Arkansas, Quantrill moved into 
southwest Missouri. He operated in the area for about a 
month, robbing, stealing, and killing all prisoners that fell 
into his hands. By May 7 Quantrill had started on the return 
trip to Bonham, Texas, and his base camp located near there. 
Colonel Adair had returned to his command near Boggy Depot 
three days previous. With these two guerrillas and their 
bands returned below the Arkansas River, the Federal dis-
tricts of Arkansas and Missouri were able to report all was 
quiet.54 
54cooper to Maxey, April 2, 1864, Adair to Watie, April 
17, 1864, Gallaher to Kaufman, April 23, 1864, Sanborn to 
Jordon, April 23, 1864, Sanborn to Greene, April 25, 1864, 
Curtis to Halleck, April 25, 1864, Curtis to Townsend, April 
25, 1864, Curtis to McKean, April 25, 1864, McKean to Curtis, 
April 25, 1864, Hampton to Blair, April 25, 1864, Curtis to 
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One of the most vexing problems faced by Phillips at 
Fort Blunt was his inability to get action on the request to 
mount his command. His men provided their own mounts when 
they were organized as units, but as their horses gave out, 
the Federal government failed to replace them. With the help 
of General Curtis, Phillips continued to plague higher head-
quarters with requests for remounts. He even recorrnnended 
the purchase of Indian ponies inste.ad of regular cavalry 
mounts as being more suitable for his use. Because of re-
newed Confederate activity in his area in the spring of 1864, 
Phillips again broached General Henry W. Halleck, Chief of 
Staff, on the subject of remounts. Not receiving adequate 
action there, Phillips wrote to General U. S. Grant, who by 
this time was general of the army, and secured his approval. 
Needing 1,000 mounts irrnnediately, Phillips had to corrnnandeer 
many and try to purchase the rest from the Osage tribe. 
Colonel Phillips never succeeded in getting his entire com-
mand mounted on ponies or horses.SS 
Rosecrans, May 4, 1864, Sanborn to Greene, May 7, 1864, 
Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 3, pp. 746-747, 776-777, 279, 
273, 288, 288, 289, 289, 290, 290, 301, 302, 303, 312, 313, 
328, 328-329, 440 ... 441, 443, 502; Britton, The Union Indian 
Brigade in the Civil War, pp. 381-382; Thoburn and Wright, 
Oklahoma: A History of the State and Its People, I, p. 360. 
55wyant, ''Colonel William A. Phillips and the Civil War 
in Indian Territory," p. 69; Britton, The Union.Indian Bri:-
~.in. the Civil War, pp. 381-382; Curtis to Halleck, -
April-Z6-;--_r864, HaIIeck to Grant, April 27, 1864, Grant to 
Halleck, April 27, 1864, Phillips to Curtis, May 10, 1864, 
Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 3, pp. 302·, 312, 313, 540; 
Phillips to Halleck, June 8, 1864, ibid., Pt. 4, pp. 266-267; 
Phillips to Steele, July 11, 1864, ibid., XLI, Pt. 2, pp. 
123-124. 
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Colonel Phillips was the most able administrator in 
Indian Territory. Fighting every odd, he secured an area 
that heretofore was a Confederate stronghold. By his sense 
of justice, he earned the respect and loyalty of his Indian 
troops. Only a minimal amount of supplies were available to: 
him and his comma.nd. His efficient administration and re-
gional campa~gns against the Confederates were completely 
successful. He received much criticism from .his superiors, 
however, was the victim of plots, and had his bids for pro~ 
motion stopped at every turn. It became evident to him that 
General Lane of Kansas was the leader of these plots. Lane 
feared the successes of Phillips. If Phillips was too suc-
cessful, it might make his protege, General Blunt, look bad; 
and Blunt was easier to control than Phillips.56 
Of the plots against· Phillips, two in particular were 
almost successful. One was aimed at him in an indi.rect IIia.n,.. 
ner, and the other was his direct removal from command.. With 
his capture 0£ Fort Blunt and participation in the campaigns 
which lead to the.fall of Fort Smith, Lane instigated the 
move to remove the Indian Brigade from active servic.e.. His 
mouthpiece was General.Blunt,. who urged.the.disbanding of, the 
brigade. on the g:round of· being wor,thless .•. _ This was spoiled· 
56Btitton, The. Union Indian Brigade !!! the Civil W~r, 
pp •. 430,. 380, 381; ,Abel, The American J::ndian _ Unde.r · Reconstruc..; 
tion,. pp. 38,. 112-·115; Curtis to Phillips,. February 11, 1864, 
Curtis to Stanton, February 28, 1864;,. Curtis to Blunt, March --
8 ,. 1864;,. Ph':i,llips to Curtis,. March 7, 1864, Curti's. t·O 
Phillips,. March 9, 186'4, Phillips to Curtis,. Mar.ch 13,. 1864, 
Curtis to Phillips,. March 23, 1864, Official Records·,. i, 




by art- inspection tour of· the coIIIIIlB.nding general, Curtis •. 
S~eing the high state of efficiency kept by the organization 
with the equipment available,. he quickly squelched arty at~ . 
tempt to r.emove the brigade from active service. General 
Curtis became a suppor.te:r of. the Indian Brigade on· that tour 
and was to take· up its causes several: times~57 
The s'econd attempt. to d,isc,redit and remove Phillips was 
successful. As; coIIIIIlB.nder of, Indian Territory,. he had under 
his supervision some of the -finest grazing land west of, the 
Mississippi.. It was around this land. and the thousands of 
cattle that grazed on it that the second plot was spawned.-
In prewar years,, Indian Territory abounded in cattle and 
other meat animals.: Many of the Indians raised cattle for: 
a living, and-several individuals had large herds.- The war 
and t_he flexible lines of battle that extended into Indian 
Territory had long removed the original owners·;. groups of 
cattle wandered,over the area claimed by whoever could- catch 
themo The temptation was too g·reat in many cas·es. for army 
contractors and private speculators to resi.st. By 1864, 
.bands of men had formed in Kansas and sw:ept into Indian Ter-
ritory,. picking it clean of cattle and making no compensa-
tions to the owners. 
57Ibid.-, pp. 378~380; Curtis to Phillips, March 9, 1864, 
Phillips to Curtis, March 13 ,· 1864, Curtis to Phillips,. March 
23, ·1864, · Pas-Co-Va, Seminole Chief, to Phillips,. March 19, 
1864, Blunt to Curtis,. March 27, 1864, Blunt to Curtis,. 
March 30, 1864, Official- Records,. i, XXXIV, Pt. 2,. pp. 531-
539", - 590-591, 711-712, 663-664, 754-755, · 789-790; Abel, The 
American Indian Under Reconstruction, pp. 116-118. -
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Army contractors· were obligated to pay for cattle taken 
from a loyal Indian, but· mos·t. of these ·contrac·tors simply 
took the cattle,·caring not if theowner.was loyal or rebel. 
With his. high sense. of duty,. Phillips could not clos'.e· his 
eyes to this dishonesty. Complaining in vain to neighboring 
military departments;· Phillip·s asked f.or, active as·sistance 
in righting the corruption. Many staff officers in head-
quarters had personal- interest in the granting of army con-
tracts and p-revented any action by their headquarters.,. The 
rest were too involved·in their own departmental affairs or 
did not care-if the Indians were having their cattle 
stolen.SB Using the forc·es·and the authority he had at his 
disp-osa1, Phillips tried to apprehend those herds- which he 
believed had been taken illegally. But not having an ade-
quate cavalry force,. his attempts were futile. Lack ofc of.-
ficial cooperation was evident when Phillips tried to prove 
that many of the cattle removed illegally from Indian Ter-
ritory were taken to Fort Scott.- With no witnesses,, he 
could do. nothing.. By investigation it was learned· that many 
of the cattle were owned. by the contracting firm of-McDonald 
and Fuller of Fort Smith,. Arkansas.. This firm was endors·ed . 
58Britton,·1!:!:, Union Indian Brigade in the.Civil War, 
pp. 430-431; Wyant,· 11Colonel William A. -Phillips and tne 
Civil War in Indian Territory," pp. 69-70; Thoburn and 
Wright, Oklahoma: A, Hist.ory of the Stat~ ~ Its Peopl~, I, 
p. 305; Curt1.s to Cox, June- 6, 1~,- Off1.c1.al Records,. 1., 
XXXIV, Pt'.>·4,,pp. 250-252; Phillips to Thayer, July 10, 1864, 
Anderson to Pl'-lllips,. July 19,· 1864, ibid.-, XLI, Pt. 2, pp. 
107-108, 265; Abel, The American Indian Under Reconstruction, 
pp. 85-87. -
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by Blunt, and this endorsement convinced Phillips· that 
McDonald and Fuller were the main perpe·trators c,f cattle 
stealing in Indian Territory.. Phillips urged that their 
agent, Henry McKee,, be expelled from the t,erritory and his. 
company have their license cancelled.59 
Expecting some support from· his Kansas superiors,. 
Phillips was surprised when he· received orders on July 3:0, 
18"64.,- to turn over his command and report to Fort· Smith for. 
reass;ignment. In retaliation, he preferred formal charge'.s 
against the firm and a p:seudo invest.igation was launched to 
please: him.. He grew ao. disgruntled · at the turn of events 
that he o.ffered his resignation to Gene-ral Curtis,. who re~·": 
fused to accept it.60. After a delay of, a month, Phillips 
was: ass.ig:ned courts-martial. duty at. Fort Smith .. 61 
During the period of. Phillips' removal, Colonel. Wattles· 
was· put in charge of the Indian Brigade., Not, an efficient 
soldier, Wattles could not handle- the. problems which even 
daily routine presented.. Fort Blunt and its military pe·rson-. 
nel quickly fell into a bad state of. disrepair and unprepared-
ness •. 'l'his state of affairs was brought to light by General 
F. J •. Herron, the Inspector. General, while on a duty tour o·f 
59rbid.·, pp. 70- 71; Anderson to· Phillips,; July 19, 1864, 
Official Records,. i,. XLI, Pt.· 2,. p. 265. 
60wyant,· "Colonel William A, Phillips and the Civil War 
in Indian Territory,11 pp. 71-72; Britton, The Union Indian 
Brigade !.!!: the Civil ~' p. 430; Abel., The American Indian 
Under Reconstruction, pp. 97,. 89; Speciar1>rder No., 117, 
July 30, 1864, Official Records,. i, XLI, Pt. 2, p. 476. · 
61Thoburn, A. Standard History £f Oklahoma,. I, p. 319. · 
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the Department. of. Arkansas and Indian Territory. Appalled 
at the condition of· Fort. Blunt, he made an official report 
stating t.hat the 1,800 military personnel and the 6,000 ci-
vilian refuge.es had been on short rat.ions for ove:r three 
months., Naming the firm of McDonald and Fuller as· the con-
trac.tor. responsible, Herron r,eminded his superior that. it was. 
they who had Phillips remov.ed.· Herro"Q. claimed that. it was 
this: fi:i:m and their representatives that were doing the 
wrongs in. Indian Territory.. Herron re·comm.ended that Phillips 
be returned without delay., and he expanded his recommendad .. on 
by saying Phillips was the best officer for the Indian Bri-
gade. and bad always managed its affairs with efficiency and 
honesty.62 
On December. 29, · 1864·, Phillips was officially reinst.ated 
in command and returned to Fort Blunt. He was pleased with 
his return to command,, but he was disappointed. at his fail:ure· 
to conclude a showdown with McDonald and Fuller, for, as he 
stated,, the stealing would continue as long as they were 
associated with the Federal. government. 
The main reason. for the sudden reinstatement of Phillips 
to his Ipdian command was the widespread corruption that. pre-. 
vailed in the Indian. Territory and Fort Smith area •. Phillips' 
return was part of an ov.erall housecleaning on the order of 
the department commander, General E. R. s. Canby, who later 
removed both General. Steele and General John M. Thayer,, 
62rbid .• , p. 72; Herron to Christensen, November 18, 
1864, Official Record:s,. i, XLI, Pt.· 4, pp. 605-606. · 
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replacing them with more honest and competent officers. 
Herron's report ensured that Phillips would be the choice as. 
the replacement of. Colonel Wattles ... 63 Phillips may have been 
disappointed with his failure to get the firm of McDonald and 
Fuller removed from Indian Territory, but on his return to 
the Fort Blunt connnand he set about curtailing most of. the 
overt cattle stealing. 
In the year intervening since the fall of Fort Smith, 
Phillips had done very well for himself. Inefficiently sup-
plied and manned,.hehad not only secured the Fort Blunt 
area, but had taken offensive action several times. When 
other theaters of the war called for a temporary depleting of. 
his meager·forces, he found it necessary to spread his men 
even thinner. His efficiency and honesty in connnand became 
known over most. of, the area west. of the Mississippi River and 
earned him the respect of several officers •. But because of 
his lack of. interest in politics and graft,·his chance for 
advancement was constantly blocked by Lane, who feared he 
might gain too much popularity and attention, making General 
Blunt appear bad •. 
The Confederate situation in 1864 went from bad to 
worse. Innnediately after their defeat at Fort Smith and the 
subsequent retreat below the Arkansas, the Confederate high 
conunand spent months in reorganization, having the faint 
63Phillips to Herron, January 16,. 1865, ibid., XLVIII, 
Pt. 1, pp. 542~543. Britton, The Union Indian Bri$ade in 
the Civil :!ie!:, pp. 452=453. -- -
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hope that they could drive the Federals out of Indian Terri-
tory and.regain the lost areaq· The. futility of. the situation 
was evidenced by the resignation of General Steele and the 
petty internal bickerings present in the appointment of his 
successor, General Maxey. 
Successful in repelling an invasion attempt in the 
neighboring state of. Arkansas,. Maxey returned to I11dian Ter-
ritory and immediately planned to launch an offensive cam;. . 
paign against Fort Blunt and Fort Smith. The lack of 
necessary resources caused this plan to be put aside •. Maxey 
realized that the Confederacy would have to continµe its 
policy of. guerrilla warfare until the situation began to 
improve in the other theaters of.war. Under the able leader-
ship of Watie, the.Confederat~s would remain a formidable 
force in the year ahead,. when his ability ··as a guerrilla 
leader would be evident to all. In Watie rested the hope of 
the Confederacy in Indian Territory. 
CHAPTER III 
CONFEDERATE GUERRILLA OPERATIONS INTENSIFY· 
The summer of. 1864 brought a glimmer of hope to the Con= 
federate forces in Indian Territoryo The March raid of Adair 
and Quantrill had been quite successful; it had harrassed the 
the Federals and put fear into the Indian pop,ulace in the 
area. But General Maxey knew the seriousness of the situa= 
tion in Indian Territoryo Although .. be was short of every 
type of equipment necessary in conducting active campaign 
operations,. he was determined·to remain on the offensive and 
increase the number of scouts and raids into Federal=held 
areas. The Confederate commander had a lot of trust in 
Watie, his Indian Brigade commanderol This confidence in. 
Watie was demonstrated by the Indian Colonel 1 s promotion to 
brigadier general upon Maxey 1 s recommendation •. For the dura= 
tion of 1864, Maxey depended on. him more than any other. Co.n"" 
federate officero But even though Maxey did have one man 
( .·'• 
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with exemplary military ability, the odds were against him 
and his connnand. 
One problem faced by both Federal and Confederate mili-
tary administrators was the care and protection of the Indian. 
refugees. The effect of· the Civil War on non~combatants and 
families was devastating. The refugees were at. the mercy of· 
the fortunes of war, forced to move again and again as the. 
battle lines shifted and encroached on their homesteads.2 
The policy of the Confederacy toward the Indian. tribes· 
in regard to .refugees was one of assuming responsibility for· 
their care and protection. On March 16, 1861, the Confeder-
ate States Government had created a Bureau of Indian Affairs 
and appointed a commissioner to see to its proper function-
ing.3 The Confederate government.had made valiant efforts 
from early in 1862 to 1863 to fulfill its obligations to the 
signatory tribes.· Because of military setbacks and disorgan-
ization in the Indian tribes as to who had the authority to 
receive money that was forthcoming, most of the annuity pay-
ments had never reached their owners and what money had been 
2nean Banks, "Civil War Refugees from Indian. Territory, 
in the North, 1861-1864; '' Chronicles £f Oklahoma, XLI 
(Autumn, 1963), p. 286; Angie Debo, "Southern Refugees of the 
Cherokee Nation," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXXV 
(April, 1932), p. 255; U.S. Department of the Interio{, 
Retort of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year: 
18 4 (Washington: Government Printing Office-;-I8o5),~30. 
3wardell, A Political History of.the Cherokee Nation. 
1838ml907, pp. T42-143; Dale, "The clierokees in the Confed-
eracy," Journal of.Southern History, XIII, pp. 164~165; Dale, 
"Arkansas.and theCherokees," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, 
VIII, Pfi• 106-107; Debo, ."Southern Refugees of the Cherokee 
Nation,' Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXXV, p. 256. 
paid to the Five Civilized Tribes by the Con;ederacy was 
almost worthless because of depreciaton.4 
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When the Federal forces began sporadic raiding below the 
Arkansas River, the Southern families fled their homesteads,· 
and took refuge in the Creek Nation and the northern counties 
of the Choctaw Nation. The refugees were fed by the army 
commissariat, and as the number of refugees grew, General 
Maxeyuset up an extra-legal organization to take care of 
them. The Southern Cherokee government helped Maxey by call-
ing a c.onvention which undertook the task of caring for the 
refugees. It appointed J. L. Martin as its administrator. 
Martin set to work immediately, gathering food supplies, 
establishing refugee camps in hygienic locations and solicit-
ing cooperation from the Confederate military post in the 
area.5 The lack of money was the hardest obstacle that 
Martin tried to overcome. The Cherokee Nation was trying to 
help, but its only source of income was the annuities due 
them from the Confederate government. Watie, as principle 
chief of the Cherokees, with the disposal of Ross, wrote to 
s. S. Scott, Confederate Commissioner of Indian.Affairs, and 
urged him to pay the long overdue annuities. He ended his 
4Ibid. 
5scott to Seddon, December 1, 1864, Official Records, 
i, XLI, Pt. 4, pp. 1086-1087; Watie to Cherokee National 
Council, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 1047. 
plea with a question: would he have to tell his people of 
their.actual plight--that of hopelessness?6 
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To better care for Indian interest, Elias C~ Boudinot. 
was relieved of his position as a major in the Indian Bri-
gade and sent to Richmond as a representative for the 
Cherokee Nation. In Richmond,,Boudinot inunediately set to 
work securing. loans for his destitute brothers. ·· It was not 
· until January, 1864, that the Confederate Congress appropri-
ated a sizeable amount of money for the care of the Indians 
in Indian Territory, and that sum was only a pittance in 
comparison to what was needed.7 The supplies grew so scarce 
that. in the winter of 1864, Watie and parts of his conunand 
escorted a large number -of refugee families to northern 
Texas. The weather was b~d all the way to Texas, but not a 
life was lost due to Watie's careful planning. Refugee 
camps were established in Bonham; Sherman, and other north-
ern Texas towns. Still other and larger refugee camps were 
settled in the river bottom area of the Kiamichi, Blue:, Boggy, 
and Washita rivers in the southern parts of the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw nations. With the movement of a large part of the 
Southern refugees to these more secure regions, the refugees 
were,easier to take care of than before the Texas move. They 
6nebo, "Southern Refugees of the Cherokee Nation," 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXXV, pp. 257-258; Wardel~ 
A Political History of the Cherokee Nation 1838-1907, p. 160; 
Watie to Scott, August -S:-1863, Official Records, i, XXII, 
Pt. 2, pp. 1104-1105. 
7nebo, "Southern Refugees of the Cherokee Nation,":· 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXXV, pp. 258-259. 
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now could draw grain rations from the wheat fields of north-
ern Texas. With the money appropriated by the Confederate 
Congress arriving, Martin and Lucien Bell were sent east of 
the Mississippi to purchase large quantities of cotton and 
wool cards. l3ell and Martin were to obtain these priceless 
cards, but met with very little success.8 The Southern 
forces in Indian Territory were still trying to cope with 
the refugee problem when the war endeq in the East. 
The Indians that chose to remain loyal to the North were 
forced to undergo a series of migrations entailing suffering 
and death. These refugees were shuttled about as so many 
sticks of wood. Most of the Indians loyal to the Federal 
government fled to Kansas on the outbreak of fighting. The 
first large group moving to Kansas was composed of Creeks 
and a small number of Seminoles. A neighboring reservation 
offered part of its area forrgovernment use in resettling the 
destitute Indians, and the Indian agents accepted without 
consulting their charges.9 Having been moved for the third 
80a1e, ''The Cherokees in the Confederacy," Journal of 
Southern History, XIII, pp. 182-183; McReynolds, Oklahoma: 
A History of the Sooner State, p. 222. 
9Banks, "Civil War Refugees from Indian Territory, in. 
the North, 1861=1864," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, pp. 286 .. 
287; Abel, The American Indian Under Reconstruction, pp. 35-
36, 45-46; Abel, The American Indian as Partici~ant in the 
Civil War, pp. 86:-s1f; Trickett, 11The Civil War in thelndian 
Territory," Chronicles of.Oklahoma, XIX, p. 68; U. S. Depart-
ment.of the Interior, a,ort of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs for the Year 186, p. 145; Cooper to Benjamin, 
January '2o7 I'B"o2-;-o!ficial Records, i, VIII, Pt. 1, pp. 4-5; 
Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: A Histor¥ of the State and 
Its People, pp. 327-328; Cutler-to Coffin-,-. September 3u-;--
T8'62, Campbell to Barnes, February 5, 1862, Coffin to Dole, 
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and last time while in Kansas, the Federal Indian refugees 
set up camp. Settled on a reservation with adequate trans-
portation facilities, the Indians could not understand why 
they were still on short and inferior rations. When winter 
once more swept over Kansas, the suffering and starvation was 
again prevalent in the refugee camp. Having no other cover-
ing available, these people resorted to using rejected mili-
tary equipment for shelter.10 
The Union victories in the summer of 1863 in Indian 
Territory presented the Union authorities, particularly the 
Federal Indian agents, with an opportunity to move their 
charges back to their former homes.11 With a gathering of 
over 300 teams and accompanied by a military escort, the 
refugees happily departed for Indian Territory on May 2, 
1864. Only a small body of Seminoles were left behind, and 
this only until a smallpox epidemic among them had spent it-
self. Over 5,000 individuals, mostly women, children and the 
February 13, 1862, Collamore to Dole, April 21, 1862, U. S. 
Department of the Interior, Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs for the Year 1862, pp. 139, 151=152, 145, 156. -----------
lOAbel, The American Indian as Participant in the Civil 
War, pp. 35=3b;Banks, "Civil War Refugees from Indian Ter ... 
ritory, in the North, 1861-1864," Chronicles of. Oklahoma, 
XLI, p. 291=293; Collamore to Dole, April 21,""'"T862, Coffin 
to Dole, November 10, 1862, U. S. Department of the Inter-
ior, Re~ort of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the 
Year 18 2, pp':" ffi'~157, 169. - - -. -... 
llu. S. Department of the Interior, Re;ort of the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 18 2, p-.-130, ~V. 
Coffin to W:- G. Coffin, Augu~2S:-1864, ibid., 1864, p. 307; 
Banks, "Civil War Refugees from Indian Territory, in the 
North, 1861=1864," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, pp. 293-295; 
Halleck to Steele, May 25, 1864"';" Official Records, i, XXXIV, 
Pt. 4, p. 30. 
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infirm, made the treck back to their war-ravaged lands in 
Indian Territory. Because Confederate forces still were in 
control over the land owned by IllOSt of the refugees, General 
Thayer ordered that they .be temporarily located around Fort 
Blunt.12 With the order;requiring the refugees to stay at 
Fort Blunt, the purpose of the migration was defeated. Now 
it would be more expensive than ever to feed and clothe the 
refugee Indians. Fort Blunt was far from any convenient sup-
ply line.13 The refugee assembled near Fort Blunt would be 
a point of problems and embarrassment to the Union authori ... 
ties, civil and military, for the duration of the war. 
It was on the same day the Union refugees arrived at 
Fort Blunt, June 15, 1864, that the Confederate guerrilla 
Watie executed one of his most brilliant exploits. He sur-
prised and captured a Federal steamboat that was churning its 
way up the Arkansas River to re-supply Fort Blunt. Since 
early 1861, when Fort Smith had fallen to the Union, the Fed-
erals had used stern=wheelers to supply local areas and to 
bring up supplies from Little Rock, Arkansas. As early as 
February, 1864, General Curtis had planned to use the 
Arkansas River as a supply routeo The advantage of the river 
12u. S. Department of the Interior, Report of the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1864, p. 30. 
13coffin to Dole, September 24, 1864, Harlan to Coffin, 
September 30, 1864, Coleman to Coffin, September 1, 1864, 
Snow to Coffin, September 15, 1864, U. S. Department of the 
Interior, Rezort of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 
the Year 186 , pp-.-3cTI="304, 309, 317-TI8; Banks, "Civil War 
Refugees from Indian Territory, in the North, 1861~1864," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, pp. 297-298. 
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route was obviouso It would mean a quicker supply route and 
give Fort Blunt release from dependence on the Texas Roadol4 
If it were possible to use the Arkansas River as a supply 
route, enough rations could be stockpiled to allow Fort Blunt 
to last for a month under siege-like conditionso However, 
not everyone was in favor of using the Arkansas River as a 
supply routeo ·· Colonel Phillips stated a preference of ox 
drawn vehicles to Curtis. He believed that the river could 
not be depended upon; its flood season, when alone it was 
navigable by larger river craft, was too short and would not 
allow enough time to reap its benefits.15 
In June the rise in the Arkansas River was measured at 
enough to float shallow draft vessels.· Preparations were 
immediately made to send a stern-wheeler up the Arkansas 
River to Fort Blunto Though river steamers had been making 
the run between Little Rock and Fort Smith for a long time 
and were a familiar· occurrance, a steamer going to Fort Blunt 
would be purely experimental because it would need to cross 
hostile territoryo The Jo R. Williams, a steamer used at 
.14wilham To Windham, "The Problem of Supply in the 
Trans-Mississippi Confederacy," .'J o;u rna 1 of Southern 
History, XXVII (May, 1961), pp. 153-154; Uo ""S7 Department of 
the Interior, Re~ort of the Commissioner 2f Indian Affairs 
for the Year 186 , p. 32; Foreman, A Histor1 of Oklahoma,. ~l'ZS; Thayerto Curtis,· June 11, I864, Of ic'Ial Records, 
i, XXXIV, Pt.· 4, PPo 317-3180 
15Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 
pp. 400-401; Curtis- to Insley, February 2"9°; !B'b4, Phillips 
to Curtis, March 7, 1864, Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 2, 
PPo 468-525. 
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Fort Smith as a troop ferry, was selected to make the trip.16 
The craft was loaded with connnissary and quartermaster goods 
valued at $120,000. The merchandise included thousands of 
yards of cloth, many pounds of cotton yarn, blankets, shawls, 
skirts,.harnesses; boots of varying types and sizes, 1,000 
barrels of flour, fifteen tons of bacon shoulders, and 
thousands of yards of linen--~a priceless cargo for the per~ 
sonnel of Fort Blunt.17 
A mistake made by the Fort Smith authorities was the 
assignment of its escort, which was too small to fight off 
any serious attempt on the part of Confederate guerrillas to 
seize the J. R. Williams. The proposed trip of the J. R. 
Williams was. certainly no secret.· Fort Smith and the sur-
rounding area were full of Southern sympathizers who would 
not hesitate to relay such valuable information to interested 
parties at Fort Towson. 18 The escort for·the J. R. Williams 
was; one officer and twenty-five enlisted men, hardly adequate 
protection for such a valuable prize. Lieutenant Horace A.· 
Bi.. C0ok of Company K of the Twelfth Kansas Volunteer Infantry 
16Maxey to Kirby-Smith, January· 15~ 18:64, Samuel Bell 
Maxey Papers., · Thomas Gilcrease . .Institute of American History· 
and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma; 'Phillips to Curtis, March 7, 1864, 
Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 2, pp • .524"".525. 
17James D .. }furrison, "Cap:tur;e of J. R. Williams," ... 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLII (Sununer, l96Zi'.'), pp. 107;.,108; 
Britton, The Union Indian Brifade in the . Civil ~' p. 401;. 
Thayer to-st'eele, May 23, 186, Thayer. to Rosecrans, May 26, 
1864·, Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt .. 4, pp. 11, 50 .. 
18civil War Claims, Foreman Papers., Indian Archives 
Division, Oklahoma. Historical Soc:i,ety, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma. 
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Regiment was the o.f fi.cer in chargeo Accompanying Cook was 
Lieutenant George W., Hu:stoni, :of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry 
Regiment, who was charged with the responsibility of getting 
.the Jo Ro Williams properly unloaded a.nd s-eeing to it that 
she brought back-a needed loa.d of lime and-salt .. 
With no Union cavalry force .to reconnoiter the sho.re on 
either s;ide of the Arkansas River, Colonel W.atie had no ,p,ro.b-
liem in se.tting tip an ambusho He selected Pleasant Bluff as 
the point of a-ttacko Located five miles below the mouth of 
the Canadian Ri.ve-r, it was an~exice.llen~ ·spot·o:. The>Arka:r.isas 
River curved at this point to the south ·s.i.de of a meander 
belt, bringing it almost against the southe-rn shoreo 19 
Colonel Watie took with him three p,ieces of field arti.l=. 
lery connnanded by :Lieutenant Henry Forrestero The guns were 
p,laced 100 yards apart on the .bluff overlooking .the river. 
Being concealed by brush, these guns could not be detected by 
the Federal esco.rt until they ·opened fi.rieo When the J.. R. 
Willi.ams was reported near, Watie ordered his men to ,covero 
Steaming .to the cent:er of the ambush, tbe'.center gun of the 
hidden·· artille:ry opened up and proceeded to ravage the Jo Ro 
Willi.ams o Under -the shock of surpris'.e., the crew ·.w-:a:s help-... 
less to do· anything hut re.turn a sporadic fire ·.of musketry o 
The Confederate salvos damaged the J., R. Willia.ms tc> the 
'. p·oint of he1p1esfs.ness, hi tti.ng the smoke stack, pi.lot . hous·e., 
. l9Thoburn, A Standard. Hi.story of Oklahoma, I, .ppo 326< 
327; Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: .A Hi.story of the State 
and Its People., r', PPo 361~362; Mor.rl"son, "Capture of Jo Ro 
Wi"fliaiiis," Chronicles o,f Oklahoma, XLII, Po 107. - -
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arid finally the boile·r, spewing steam over the decks. Since 
the vessel had become unmanageable and appeared to be sinking 
or about to explode, the pilot grounded· her on the· nor'th bank 
of the Arkansas River opposite .the Confederates,. Lieutenant 
Cook o.rde.red his men to shore. Reaching land, they took 
cove·r behind sand bars and returned the musket fire of the 
Confede,rates.. Cook hoped to keep .the Southe,rn forc·e away 
. . . 
from the J. R. Williams .until reinforcements could arrive. 
To .his surprise he saw· Lieutenant Huston and the captain of 
the d· R. Williams going over to the south shore in a yawl. 
This action gave the Confederate force a means of reaching 
the J. R. Williams. With no chance of saving the boat, Cook 
started his men toward Fort Smith. 20 
The retreat of Cook and his small connnand allowed Watie 
and his men to cross over -to the north side of the Arkansas 
Rive·r using the ·.captured yawl. They secured the J. R. 
Williams, and attaching r9pes to her, they pulled the loaded 
·craft fo the ·south side of the river, where it was grounded 
on a sand bar close to shore. 
The Creek and Seminole portions of the Watie connnand 
soon left car;rying as much booty as the·ir horses c.ould stand. 
A Cherokee· .. Confe:derate related that he and s.i:xty of his .com-
rades found on the steamer an enormous supply of tinware, a 
commodity unusually scarce in the area. They loaded their 
.. 20Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 
pp. 400-401; 403:::7i'.'0'4; Durbin to Heiston, JuneT4, 1864~ 
Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt .. 4, p. 687. 
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·mounts~ and .the little company sce·t out with .the horse o.f 
every man in the party concealed by wa:sh tubs, stew ket.tle:s, 
coffee po.ts, wash pans, tin plate:s ~ cups~ and dipperso 
Crossing a strip of prairie, they were :set upon by a strong 
force of Union cavalry~ which charged them from·a patch of 
woods on their flankso The surprised Confederate party fled 
to the shelter of the forest on the opposite side of the 
prairieo In their haste to get away, the Confederate Chero= 
kees started to throw the tinware away to lighten their loado 
They reached the safety of the forest, but they left a broad 
strip of prairie :strewn with various types of tinwareo 21 
Desertion in elements of Watie 0 s command at this time 
left him in a precarious positiono He had a valuable prize, 
but he did not have enough men left to defrend it if attackedo 
Although a force under Colonel Adair was across the Arkansas 
River on the north side, all the available fords were impas= 
s:ible due to a recent rise in the rivero The reinfqrcements 
Watie was fearing were not long in comingo A party of the 
Cook command which had become separated from .the main body 
made its way to Mackey 1 s Salt Works, about ten milers dis= 
tant,22 where Colonel John Ritchie, commandeer of the Second 
2lcooper to Scott, June 17, 1864:i Watie to Cooper, June 
17, 1864, Watie to Cooper, June 27:i 1864, ibido, Pto 1, PPo 
1011=1012, 1012., 1013; Britton~ ~ Union Ind.ian Brigade in 
the Civil War, PPo 403=406; Morrison, ,vCapture of Jo R. 
Wi!li.ams, ''Cfironicles of Oklahoma, XLII~ pp .• 107=1U8o= 
22Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma.~ A Hi:st:ory of the State 
and Its People, I, pp. 361=362; Britton, The Union Triaian 
BrI~ac!e in the Oivil War, p •. 405; Dale, "The Cherokees in the 
Con~ederacy7Journal of Southern History~ .pp. 179=1800 
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Union Indian Regiment, was located with a force of 800 meno 
Ritchie :sent 200 men to the site of the ambusho On their 
arrival they found the Confederates sacking the grounded 
steame·r. Still within musket range, the command of Watie 
was brought under fire by the Indian troops of Ritchie. 
Watie, following previous orders, set the steamer afire .to 
keep it from falling into enemy hands. Both parties were 
unable to advance: Watie could not move the supplies he had 
piled on the sand bar, and Ritchie could not cross the ·river 
and drive Watie off without heavy losso Then because of a 
sudden rise in the Arkansas River, most of the captured sup ... 
plies were lost; the river carried off most of the stockpile, 
and for days barr·els were observed floating past Fort Smith. 
By the evening of June 16, Watie had been informed that 
a large force of Union troops, with artillery, was coming up 
from the direction of Fort Smith. This was the Second Kansas 
Colored Infantry Regiment and a portion of the Eleventh 
United States Colored Infantry Regiment, about 700 men, under 
the command of Colonel S. J. Crawford. Arriving in .the 
Pleasant Blu-ff vicinity, Crawford located the Confederate 
force!a short distance from the rivero Sending out skirm-
ishers, he moved to make contact with the Confederate force 
to as·certain their numbers. 23 
23watie to Cooper, June 27, 1864, Watie to Cooper, June 
17, 1&64, Official Records, i, XXXIV, Pt. 1, pp. 1013, 1012; 
Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate Guer ... 
rilla," p. 74. 
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Colonel Watie, in the meantime, had received a regimen-t-
sized force of Chickasaws under the command of Lieutenant 
Colonel Thomas c. Reynonds. Watie met this Chickasaw unit 
twelve miles southwest of the Arkansas River. The Indian 
colonel quickly detached 150 men of their cavalry force from 
the main -body and directed their commanding officer, Major 
J, K. P. Campbell, to proceed to the Iron Bridge .on the San 
Bois River, two and one-half miles from present-day Keota. 
Traveling throughout the night, Major Campbell arrived at the 
Iron Bridge j u·st after dawn. Scouts were set out, and 
Campbell set his men to work building entrenchments along the 
river bank beside the bridge. Colonel Crawford anc;l his Fed-
eral column were reported by the Confederate scouts as being 
to Campbell's front and moving toward them. 
Crawford did not know how many Con-federates were en-
trenched at the bridge and so proceeded with utmost ·caution. 
His .troops were put into a battle formation of double ·lines 
of ·infantry with the artillery and accompanying escort in the 
-rear. So aligned, the Federal command moved forward toward 
the bridgeo When the Confederates opened fire on the .advanc-
ing Union lines, Colonel Crawford ordered the -fire returned 
and s.e.nt for: the · section of field artillery then positioned 
in the Federal rear. The center of the blue line broke open 
momentarily as the artillery caissons raced forward to its 
position in front of the Union formation. Once in place, the 
Federal howitzers pounded the Confederate trenches. After a 
few rounds of shot and cannister, the Confederates broke 
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ranks and fled to the ,rear for their horseso The exhausted 
condition of the Federal infantry prevented any prolonged 
pursuit of the retreating Southerners" Colonel Crawford 
knew that infantry could not effectively pursue cavalry. 
Colonel Watie, informed of the attack at the Iron 
Bridge, burned most of the supplies he had been able to take 
off the J. Ro Williams. Returning to his camp at Limestone 
Prairie, he reorganized his regiments and settled down to a 
routine of scout duty. It was at Limestone Prairie that 
Watie received his promotion.to brigadier general, dated 
retroactive to May 10, 18640 In the same order, Watie was 
to assume connnand of the Indian Brigade. Since he had re-
ceived responsibility for the brigade long ago, the order 
officially brought no change.24 
The morale boosting effect of the J. R. Williams epi-
sode was quickly evident among the Indian units, for on June 
27 the Cherokee regiments re-affirmed their loyalty to the 
Confederate cause and unanimously elected to re-enlist for 
the duration of the war. The Choctaw regiment under Colonel 
Walker had done the same on June 23 at Camp Green in the 
Choctaw Nation. General Maxey had these re-enlistment reso-
lutions printed and circulated to his connnand as examples of 
true loyalty. 25 
24cooper to Steele, June 17, 1864, Official Records, i, 
XXXIV, Pt. 1, p. 1012; Thayer to Steele, June 22, 1864, Maxey 
to Boggs, June 20, 1864, ibid., Pt. 4 9 pp. 504, 686; Special 
Orders Number 171, Adjutant ·and Inspector General's Office, 
July 21, 1864, ibid~, XL!, Pt. 2, p. 1019Q 
25watie to Cooper, June 27, 1864, ibid., Pt. 1, p. 1013; 
Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, pp. 407-
408. - - -- -
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The re-enlistment of Watie 1 s command was ample evidence 
of its confidence in its commander. Watie, aware of the 
trust, was careful to protect their interests whenever neces= 
saryo Such a time came in July, 18640 The Indian troops had 
not been paid in months; their arms were old: and in many . : · 
cases defective and unsafe for useo Families of the Confed= 
erate Indians were destitute and starving on the Red River. 
Watie,contacted General Kirby-Smith, not in complaint, but 
to offer suggestions to relieve the situation. Watie told 
Kirby-Smith of the trust he held in him as the connnander of 
the Trans~Mississippi Department and offered a means to in= 
crease the fighting potential of Confederate Indian TerritorYe 
He urged the adoption of universal conscription in Indian 
Territoryo He spoke on this to the National Connnittee and 
Council meeting of the Confederate Indian allies on July 11, 
1864, at Fort Towson, deep in the Choctaw Nation.26 
The sinking of the Federal J. R. Williams gave the 
Southern cause a breath of renewed spirit. From June to the 
last of August, 1864, Confederate scout activity became quite 
activeo Two incidents were important: the raid on Massard 
Prairie by General Gano and the capture of remounts at 
Gunter's Prairie in a raid led by General Watieo 
General Thayer, the Federal commander of Fort Smith)) had 
established an outpost five miles south of Fort Smith at 
Massard Prairieo This outpcist was manned by four companies 
26walker to Maxey, June 25, 1864, Official Records, i, 
XXXIV, Pt. 4, PPo 694=6950 
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of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment, with Major David 
Mefford in charge. He had been instructed to scout and re-
port the finding every two days.27 
Southwest of Fort Smith, at an encampment on James 
Creek, Choctaw Nation, General Cooper received reports that 
a force of Federal cavalry was operating in the vicinity of 
Massard Prairie. When he discovered that another Federal 
force was stationed several miles above Massard Prairie at a 
place called Caldwell's, he called on General Gano to attack 
and clear them out. On July 26, 1864, Gano ordered that a 
500 man force from his brigade, along with segments of the 
Second Indian Brigade under Colonel Folsom and a battalion 
under Lieutenant.,Colonel J. W. Wells, be made ready for im-
mediate use. The entire expedition had 1,500 men, all well= 
mounted and in fighting trim. Included in the attack plan 
was a trap. Lieutenant··Colonel Jack McCurtain was directed 
to take a position at Devil's Backbone Mountain, south of 
Fort Smith between that place and Cooper on James Creek. 
McCurtain was to allow any Federal pursuer of Gano 1 s to pass 
his position and then strike them in the rear, while Gano 
would turn and hit them from the front. 
The rendezvous was to take place on the Poteau River on 
the evening of July 26. Colonel Folsom moved out in advance 
of the main body. He was to attack the outpost at Caldwell us 
27watie to National Conunittee, July 11, 1864, ibid., 
XL!, Pt. 1, pp. 1046-1048; Hathaway, "Brigadier General 
Stand Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," p. 74. 
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and he wanted to reach there at dawn. 28 Upon the arrival of 
the·different detachments, the discovery that the force was 
lar.ie.r:c than. expected necessitated a change in plan. General 
G,ano in person.would.lead the main body in the attack on 
Massard Prairie. 
At 6:00 a.m. on July 27 Gano launched his attack. Mov-
ing in two columns along parallel roads, the columns of Wells 
and Watie, ro.de down the Federal pickets and headed for the 
ma.in camp. Captain Mefford heard the picket's fire and 
ordered the nearby grazing cavalry herd brought in and se-
cured.. Before the herd c·ould be '.secure-a. and .a prqper ·defense 
line set up, the Confederates outflanked Mefford and ·pro..; 
ceeded to encircle his c·amp. Mefford had formed his men be-
tween the approaching Confederates and his horses. 
At-the same time, First Lieutenant Jacob Moorehead of 
Mefford's Sixth Kansas Cavalry Regiment moved his men forward 
to a position on the right of the Mas:sard Prairie -ca:mp. · The 
remainder of the connnand moved into line on Lieutenant 
Moorehead'' s left·.· The Confederate assault was temporarily 
halted by the brisk fire of Moorehead's men. The lull in 
the fighting ,allowed Major Mefford time to reconsolidate his 
perimeter. When the Confederates succeeded in taking the 
Federal command's horses, Major Mefford began to fall back 
toward the prairie, across which lay the safe entrenchments 
of Fort Smith. Company B of Moorehead's connnand held the 
'28Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 
·p.· 424; Cooper to Scott, August 10, 1864, Ofricial Records, 
i, XLI, Pt. 1, p. 31. 
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extreme right of the new Federal lineo Companies E and H 
were on the left, with Company Don Moorehead's immediate 
left holding the center portion of the position. Massard 
Prairie was located to their rear. Three cavalry charges 
were made on the Federal right, but it held each timeo The 
left, with companies E and H, were outflanked and forced out 
of their positions and onto the prairie. On seeing the re-
treat, .Lieutenant Mooreheaci moved immediately to Join his 
superior officer. The Confederates of Watie's conunand 
pressed the advantage and captured several of Moorehead's 
men as the Federals tried to escape into t:he timber surround-
ing the camps and the prairie. 
To reach the safety of the Federal fort, Captain Mefford 
and his men had tO fight their wa.y a.cross barren Massard 
Prairie. For a half-mile they fought the Confederates off in 
good order, but out on the open prairie, Mefford was soon 
surrounded by the larger Confederate command 0 Surrounded and 
outnumbered, the Federal commander had no alternative but to 
surrender his command or see it uselessly wiped out. Gather-
ing up the captured prisoners and their mounts, Ga.no turned 
his column south and hurried to safety across the Arkansas 
River. The prisoners were made to run quite a distance to 
prevent their release by any Federal column coming to their 
rescue. General Thayer, the Fort Smith commander, sent out 
a relief column, but it did not arrive in time to participate 
in the engagement or hinder the Confederate retreat. He 
reported that his lack of sufficient cavalry prevented him 
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from stopping the retreating Con;fed~rates.29 The Federal 
loss in the·action at Massard Prairie was eleven men killed, 
twenty wounded, and 127 captured, including their commander, 
Major Mefford. General Gano lost only nine men killed and 
· twenty-six wounded.30 
The Confederates remained active, and Watie was sent 
back across the Arkansas River on July 28. With 200 men he 
' . 
· at;a¢l<ed)ind ;ciispersed ·a. party ·of federal infantr:y p,t1ttJng ·. 
up hay in large ricks on Blackburn's Pra-irie. The hay was 
burned and the mowing machine disabled beyond use. On his 
return across the Arkansas River, Watie helped refugee fam-
ilies move into Confederate territory. 
. . 
To ascertain the strength of the Union force at Fort 
Smith, another crossing of the Arkansas River was planned. 
On July 29, 1864; Colonel McCurtain was directed to hold his· 
battalion in readiness at Double Springs and prepare to 
march with General Gano on July 30. Brigadier General Watie 
was ordered to bring all of his available effective men and 
move to the vicinity of Skullyville. Also ordered to 
Skullyville Prairie were the Choctaw Brigade under Colonel 
Folsom, Well's battalion, and a section of Howell's battery. 
29Th~yer to Steele, July 30, 1864, Cooper to.Scott, 
August 10, 1864, Moorehead to Judson, July 29, 1864, ibid., 
pp. 31, 23-24, 25. 
30Hatha:way, "Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate 
Guerrilla," pp. 74-75; Britton, The Union Indian Briflade in. 
the Civil War, pp .. 424-427; Thayer to Steele, July3, 18oZ:', 
Moorehead to Judson, July 29, -1-864, Official Records, i, 
XLI, Pt. 1, pp. 23-24, 25. 
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When the Confederate column reached Poteau Bottom, opposite 
Fort Smith, Gano, cormnanding segments of McCurtain:' s battal~ 
ion, was detached and proceeded to Massard Prairie, where 
.. 'Gano was ·to make a diversion. The main column under the per-
sonal command of Cooper and Watie moved to Fort Smith using 
the main road, sometimes called the Fort Smith Road. Watie 
was sent forward with a party to push in the Federal pickets. 
·Other units, the .First Creek Regiment, Well's battalion, and 
Howell's battery, were sent to cover the road leading into 
Fort Smith from the north. Watie sent Colonel James M. Bell 
with the First Cherokee Regiment to the Fort Smith Road lead-
ing into Fort Smith. Colonel Adair and his regiment, the 
Second Cherokee, were dispatched to the Line Road, located 
to the left of the Fort Smith Road. Watie, using his usual 
dash and gallantry, routed the pickets from their camps, 
chasing them right up to their entrenchments outside of Fort 
Smith. Then he returned to the deserted Union camp, where 
he and bis men helped themselves to the plentiful dinner that 
had been prepared for the Union pickets.31 
After the initial surprise had worn off, the Federal 
garrison at Fort Smith began to put up resistance. Skir-
mishing ensued on the Fort Smith Road. The advance of a 
large Union force under the command of Colonel William R. 
Judson of the Third Brigade on the Fort Smith Road necessi-
tated the concentration of the Confederate forces to meet 
31cooper to Scott, August 10, 1864, ibid., pp. 32-33; 
Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Oivil War, pp. 427-
·-4·280 - --. . . - ·-
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them. General Gano was ordered to move from Massard Prairie 
to Watie's position in front of Fort Smith; also part of 
Folsom's command Was shifted to that position·from his asi-
signinent as a reserve force. 
Taking position on a hill near the Confederate line, 
General Cooper sent Captain John T. Humphrey and his battery 
in advance of the Confederate position to within 600 yards 
of the Federal line. · General Gano detached.part·of his Texas 
brigade and stationed them on the ends of the Confederate 
line as flankers.·. Companies of the First and Second Cherokee 
Regiments were dismounted and moved within supporting dis-
tance of Gap.o's flankers. The aggressiveness of the flank 
p·arties caused the Union troops to move to a position on a 
nearby ridge •. While the Federals were maneuvering to their 
new position on the ridge, Captain Humphrey moved forward 
and put his artillery astride the main road facing the Fed· 
eral line. In that position Humphrey's battery proceeded to 
maul .the Union cavalry Stationed there. While Humphrey was 
forward~ the Federals brought up the battery of Captain J .. W. 
Rabb. Outnumbered by the Federal artillery, Humphrey pro-
ceeded to limber up his cannon in preparation for a movement 
to the rear. 
For some time the fire passed harmlessly over the heads 
of the Confederate gun crews. As the Confederate battery 
was limbering up to go to the rear, a shell exploded in the 
middle of one section~ Three horses were killed, another 
wounded, and a leg was taken·from one of the gun crew. 
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Another shot took the bead off a nearby infantryman from 
Gano's command. The dead horses were cut loose and the Con-
federate battery moved to the rear without further loss.32 
The approaching darkness made General Cooper more cau~ 
tious. The surrounding timber was thick with scrub brush, 
hindering the movements of bis cavalry. The Federal infantri 
located on a nearby ridge, bad out a strong force of skir- · 
misbers who prevented Cooper's scouts from determining their 
strength and numbers.· The maze of roads· that blanketed the 
area convinc.ed Cooper that bis positio·n was becoming too 
precarious to maintain. Orders were given to fall back on 
the reserve force several miles to the southwest. General 
Gano was assigned as rear -guard, and be was instructed to 
delay a.ny Federal pursuit and destroy the captured Union 
picket camp. Gano put: a wall of mounted ·skirmishers between 
the withdrawing Confederates and the probing Federal pickets. 
The Texas general's skirmishing activity was so effective 
that the Federal force under General Thayer retreated to Fort 
Smith •. Thayer was under the illusion that the Confederates 
were.still in position on bis front. The remainder of Gano 1 s 
rear guard moved to the picket camp. At the Union camp the 
ragged Confederates took everything of any usefulness and 
destroyed the rest. The sup~lies and coilliilissary stores de-
stroyed were valued at $130,000 in Confederate money~ 
32cooper to Scott, August 10, 1864, Official Records, 
i; XLI, Pt. 1, pp. 34-35~ 
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Orte riear mishap· marred the orderly withdrawaL A por-
tion of the Cherokee regiments, previously dismounted in 
support of Gano,! s flankers on the Confederate left~ had be-
come separated in the heavy brush from the main bodyo Major 
Eo J. Howland was dispatched to the left to make contact with 
the lo-st Cherokee element. When Major Howland located them, 
he served as a guide and led the Cherokees to the rendezvous 
across the Arkansas River. It was later learned that the 
Cherokees had retired in good order and crossed the Arkansas 
River below the ·main Confederate element~33 
General Cooper made camp at Cedar Prairie, nine miles 
southwest of Fort Smith. On August 1., 1864, he sent a small 
scouting party back to Fort Smith to watch for any Federal 
activity that might indicate a move in his directiono Then 
he mounted his command ~nd put it :on the road to Skullyville. 
Gano·, Wells, and Howell were to join him at Buck Creek, 
located near the town of Skullyville~ 
Soon after Cooper left Cedar Prairie, he .heard-heavy 
cannonading from the direction of Fort Smitho It proved to 
be Confederate Captain Samuel H. Gunter and a few Cherokees 
with a battery of Howell's artillery. They were amusing 
themselves by shooting at the Federals across the Poteau 
River~ When the Federals would answer, Captain Gunter would 
limber up and move quietly to a new position. Thereupon they 
would watch the Federals shell their supposed hiding place. 
33 ''d · !bi • , p. 34. 
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When the Union artillerymen grew tired of bombarding that 
position and stopped, Gunter would open up from his new posi-
tion. This would bring out the big guns again, and the game 
would be repeated, and so it went for most of the day. For 
most of August 1, the sound of this unique game could be 
heard rumbling as far away as twenty-five miles.34 
Captain Gunter reported to General Cooper, now at Buck 
Creek, that a party of Federals had crossed the Arkansas 
River.- Cooper almost- passed it off as a party of refugees 
trying to find a Union wagon train going to Fort Scott, but 
General Watie advised his commander that his pickets had 
heard the drum roll of infantry units in that area. To se-
cure definite information on the Federal movements, Cooper 
sent Watie to the Poteau River bottom and Gano back to 
Massard Prairie. If in their reconnaissanpe it was found 
that the Federals were evacuating Fort Smith, Watie was to 
attack and hurry them along~ By evening it was confirmed 
that the movement on the river was a caravan of Union civil· 
ians. With that General Cooper ordered his command to Fort 
Towson ... 
While resting at Buck Creek, Captain Gunter and five 
other men swam across the Arkansas River to make a personal 
reconnaissance of the Fed-eral defense on the north side~ 
While on the Federal:side of the rivet'; Gunter confirmed the 
recent movement as civilian and captured two Federals, one 
. -·----· --- -----···- -- -- --- ---- -- .. 
34Ma:key to Boggs, August 6, 1864, Cooper to Scott, 
August 10, 1864, ibid'.,· pp~ 29':s'30, 35. 
107 
of whom was wounded. They paroled the wounded prisoner and 
brought the other one back with them as they recrossed the· 
Arkansas River.35 
General Cooper was satisfied with the performance of his 
Indian troops and praised many by name in his reports to his 
superiors. But when Watie wanted to attack Fort Smith and 
capture it, Cooper asserted that it wou.ld result in heavy 
losses of his forces •. With excessive consideration for the 
physical comfort of his men and horses as an excuse, Cooper 
lamented his inability to do nothing further than drive the 
civilians within the confines of Fort Smith.36 
The Cooper demonstrations before Fort Smith ended mili-
tary activity on the part of the Confederate forces until the 
last week in August of 1864. General Cooper reported that 
Colonel Cloud and his Second Kansas Cavalry Regiment had 
returned to Fort Smith. Cloud was believed. to be there for 
the purpose of bolstering the garrison at Fort Smith and 
acting as a reserve for Fort Blunt.~7 -
0ne of the most difficult pieces of equipment to be 
obtained in the summer of 1864, for either side, was a horse. 
Horses were a necessary commodity if a military commander 
were to carry on offensive campaigning. On August 16, 1864, 
35cooper to Scott, August 10, 1864, ibid., p~ 35.-
36rbid., p. 36. 
37Maxey to Kirby-Smith, August 18, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, 
p. 1072;.Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 
pp. 422-423. 
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Captain W. Ho Shannon from Cooper's Indian Division was sent 
across the Arkansas River into southwest Missouri to recruit 
an adequate s.upply of horseso While in Missouri, Shannon 
received word that a large Union refugee train was coming in 
his direction from Van Buren, Arkansaso Captain Shannon 
gathered up 100 men and moved to intercepto He made contact 
with the train on Lee's Creek, which was located on the east-
ern boundary of the lower Cherokee Nation. The Confederate 
captain used all of. the men equipped with rifles as. infantry 
· and all of the men carrying pistols as cavalryo The infan~·· 
try, with Shannon leading, charged through the advanced 
guard of the Federal train. Proceeding to the train, the 
Confederates advanced through the column, burning all govern-
ment wagonso· As the Confederate cavalry moved to the rear 
in order to let the. infantry work, one of Shannon's men got 
excited and ordered the men to their horses. Shannon was. 
1.ef t with only twelve men acting as infantry. Since this· 
small force was. too weak to advance further, Shannon ordered 
a retreat, returning to Wire Road by Lee's Creek. Captain 
Shannon killed ten Federals while losing none of. his men. 
Proceeding south on the Wire Road, Captain Shannon was. 
informed by Confederate informers that a Federal mail party 
with several wagons had recently passed that point. The 
estimated number of the party was s.ixty, all cavalryo 
Shannon overtook them on August 25 ,- 1864, six miles south of· 
Lee's Greek •. He divided his.party into two squads of fifty 
men each. Taking one group, Shannon made a wide circle and 
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moved- in front of. the Federals o· The balance continued, trail~ 
ingthe party, and would hit from. the rear when they heard 
firing. Securing a good position on the road to the Federal 
party'·s front, Shannon dismounted his men and blocked. the 
Federal path. The Union, troopers formed into line to fight. 
the dismounted.·Confederates.. Being- larger than. the Confeder-
ate party to thei.r front, . the Federals cursed them· and yelled 
at Shannon that. they had him r.ight where they wanted; him .. 
Charging .. three. times,. the Federals were repulsed. each time. 
The balance of the Confederate party then struck the Federal. 
rear and played havoc with their· ranks-. Out of sixty, only 
seventeen escaped .. alive., The Confederates _captured. the mail 
and . two wagons. loaded .. with cigars , . tobacco,· and various 
types of arms.and annnunition. From Leevs Creek, Shannon 
gathered what. horses he had found in-Missouri and returned 
to Camp Corser in the Choctaw Nation.38. 
One day previous,. on August. 24, 1864, at. Gunter's· 
Prairie, located southwest of Fort Smith, General Watie: 
struck a Federal haying party. Watie crossed, the Arkansas; 
River on the night of· August 23 with his command of 500 men •. 
At daybreak he launched.a·cavalry- attack on· a party o-f,420 
Federals from Cloud's Second Kansas Cavalry Regiment and: the. 
Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry Regiment, .. who were putting- up hay. 
Since the principal objec.tive of the raid was to destroy· the 
hay and capture or kill the stock,. Watie. did not maintain 
38shannon to Cooper, August. 26,. 1864, Official Records,, 
i, XLI, Pt •. 2, -PP• l086-108T. 
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contact any longer than necessary. He killed twenty Feder ... 
als,, 150 horses and mules, and took away fourteen prisoners .. 
He lost one man killed,·while several of.his.men and horses· 
were wounded.39 · 
The summer months of 1864 had. brought the Confederates 
victory after victory. The refugees at Fort Blunt had been 
forced to encalllp around its walls and by so doing had drained 
the Federal post of hard=to~obta'in rations and commissary 
supplies. The sinking of· the Federal stern=wheeler, the J •. 
R. Williams, in the middle of.June had increased the desper= 
ate plight of the Federal soldiers and refugees stationed at 
Fort B1unto 
General Maxey hoped that the increased.demonstrations 
in front of Fort Smith would convince General Thayer,. the 
Federal district commander, of the hopelessness of. the Feder= 
al situation in Indian Territory. With.this objeqtive in 
mind, Maxey had rallied every effective unit in his.district 
to increase.the raids around Fort Smith. Maxey had correct-
ly evaluated the personality of the Federal commander of. 
Fort Smith as being timid. Maxey also had every intention 
of.continuing his·raids into Indian Territory north of the 
Arkansas River. The Confederate commander knew that. the 
only way the Southern authorities ,could keep their Indian 
allies loyal and regain the lost territory to the north 
would be t.o harass the Federal supply lines and stockades 
until the Union· forces were forced to move out of·. the areao. 
p. 27 ~~Maxey to Anderson, September 3, 1864, ibido, Pt. 1, 
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Maxey believed that the raids and demonstrations around 
Fort Smith by General Cooper, General Gano, and General Watie 
would force the Federal garrison to withdraw from Fort Blunt 
in order to strengthen Fort Smith. Cooper's sorties during 
August, 1864, were designed to bring about this long-desired 
evacuation of Fort Blunt and ultimately of.Fort Smith. Maxey 
hoped that the Federals would retire in the direction of· 
Little Rock, Arkansas, to the southeast. The post at Little 
Rock was considered by the Federals as more secure and.Gen-
eral Thayer had been contemplating about moving to that 
location. 
The entire month of August, 1864, was consumed by the 
Confederates probing the Federal defenses of Fort Smith 
looking.for weaknesses,. but none were found. The failure to· 
find a lack of strength in the Federal post made Maxey 
anxious •. He would have to move rapidly or increasing Feder-
al numbers would overpower his numerically inferior forces. 
This.condition that Maxey anticipated would soon bring about 
one of. the Civil War 1 s·greatest military accomplishments •. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONFEDERATE' GUERRILLA OPERATIONS.· END 
The highly success.ful demonstrations of Confederate. 
raiding parties in the vicinity of Fort Smith during August; 
1864, made General Maxey confident of the growing fighting 
trim of his Indian unitso It. also made him more approachable 
on ·the subject of giving his consent to a m.oit'e daring sortie 
against the Federal forces. north .of the Arkansas. River., in 
September, 1864. There was.even talk, for example, of. ex-
panding.the concepts.of the raid to inciudeareas. outside.of 
Indian Territory, such as Kansas. For several months Gen-
.era! Cooper and. General Watie had been urging.their command-
er to permit.them to take a large mounted.expedition north of· 
the Arkansas Riverol 
General Maxey, impressed with the recent accomplishments. 
of, his two subordinates, listened to their request and.said 
he would relay the proposed plan to General Kirby-Smith with 
lM.axey to Cooper, June 28, 1864, Official Records,, i, 
XXXIV·, Pt .• 4, · pp. 697-698; Adair. to Maxey, February 5 ;. 1864, 
ibid., Pt. 2,. PPo 945-946; Maxey to Kirby-Smith, .. August 18, 
1864, ibid., XLI, Pt •. 2, p. 1072; Hathaway, "Brigadier. 
Gener.al Stand Watie,. Confederate Guerrilla; 11 p. 76; Marvin 
J. Hancock, "The Second Battle of Cabin Creek,.1864," . 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXIX (Winter; 1961-1962), p. 414. 
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his approval attachedo2 He sent the request to Trans= 
Mississippi Department headquarters at Shreveport,.Louisiana, 
and was not long in receiving a favorable reply. The general 
was also informed of the proposed raid of. General Price into 
Missouri. 
General Cooper instructed Watie and Colonel Walker to 
send out runners to bring in all absentees and have them re-
port to their respective regiments before September 20. The.· 
Indian troops knew something was in the making at headquar.;.; 
ters and most reported irrnnediately on receiving word. Though 
all of Watie's command was widely scattered, there was no 
problem calling in the troops .for a proposed forward move-
ment that would lead to a fighto 
Earlier in July, General Price had presented a plan of 
invasion to General Kirby-Smith. If liberally supported by 
a large mounted force and comparable artillery, he could in-
vade northern Arkansas and southern Missouri, capturing 
Federal-held St. Louiso General Kirby-Smith was very recep-
tive to the proposed plan because St. Louis was a central 
depot for the Federal armies in the Department of the Missis-
sippi. Those supplies could be used by Confederate forces 
in Kirby-Smith's department. Price gave a secondary objec-
tive, the gathering together of the large number of Southern 
sympathizers .who populated the area. If forced to fall back 
before taking St. Louis, Price said he could destroy all 
2Maxey to Boggs, September 5, 1864, Official Records, i, 
XLI, Pt. 3, p,. 911; Maxey to Kirby-Smith, .. August 18, 1864, 
Boggs to Mi9:xeyj August 25, 1864, ibid., Pt. 2, pp. 1072, 1082. 
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Federal property that fell across his path on the return 
route. Price demonstrated his point that the time was right 
for·suchan expedition by sending Brigadier General Joseph O. 
Shelby and his brigade.of Missourians into northeast Arkansas. 
Shelby's unhampered movement and the inability of Federal 
General Steele to bring him to battle won Kirby~Smith over 
in favor of Price's plan. 
The arrival of Maxey's request to allow a similar expe-
dition to go into Federally-occupied Indian Territory and 
then on into Kansas impressed Kirby-Smith as a gqod diver-
sion. This would draw attention from Price and make his 
chance for success much better. The plan submitted by Gen-
eral Maxey was approved with modifications by General Kirby-
Smith on August 25, 1864. Kirby-Smith ordered that the raid 
take place before.October 1, so the two Confederate forces 
would be working in Federal territory at· the same time.3 
General Watie received word of the plan's approval on 
September 12. He was informed that he would get additional 
fresh troops from Texas. General Gano with the Fifth Texas 
Brigade was ordered to join and cooperate with Watie on the 
expeditio.n.4 The next day, September 13, General Gano and 
3Britton; '!'he Union Indian Brigade in t.h.e Civil War,. pp. 
428-429, 434-435; Maxey to Boggs, SeptemoerT 1864, Orricial 
Records, i, XLI, Pt. 3, p. 911; Maxey to Boggs,. September 16, 
1864, ibid., Pt. 1, p. 777; Norman P. Morrow, "Price's Mis-
souri Expedition,. 1864;" (Unpublished. Master of Arts· Thesis, . 
University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1949), pp. 138-158. 
4watie to Heiston, October 3,. 1864, Official Records, i, 
XLI,; Pt. 1, p. 784; Organization of the Army of the Trans ... 
Mississippi Department, Kirby ... Smith, C. S. Army, connnanding, 
September 30, 1864, ibid., i, Pt. 3, p. 967. 
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and General Watie met together for the first time at Camp 
Pike to work out the details of the expedition. General Gano 
by date of rank was senior and, as such, the commander of the -
expeditiono General Watie displayed his patriotism to the 
Southern cause by not making an issue as to who was to be the 
expedition leader. The original plan had been conceived by 
Watie, and he had every right to command a venture he had 
originated._ This selfless,,act of ·tcourJ:es.)Z'~:was an indication 
of the make-up of this Confederate soldier.5 
During the conference, an agreement was reached that 
each general would command his own troops, but they would act 
~ogether with perfect harmony to insure the success of the 
campaigno General Cooper instructed them to cross the 
Arkansas River, strike at a hay camp located at a William 
Alberty's, twenty miles above Fort Blunt on the Grand River, 
interrupt a wagon train that was rumored to be in the area 
and return.by way of Mackey's Salt Works. They were to cross 
the Arkansas River at Webberws Falls. Cooper modified the 
plan still further by making this expedition separate from 
the proposed Kansas raid. Watie's itinerary was so arranged 
that he would be back in time to reorganize for his deeper 
penetration into Kansas.6 On the night of September 14, Gano 
5Maxey to Boggs,. October 7, 1864, Watie to Heiston, 
October 3, 1864, Maxey to Boggs, September 16, 1864, ibid., 
Pt. 1, pp. 780, 785, 777; Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand 
Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," p. 77; Thoburn, A Standard 
History of Oklahoma, I, pp. 324-325. -
6Maxey to Boggs, September 16, 1864, Cooper to Scott, 
September 14, 1864, Official Records, i, XL!, Pt. 1, pp. 777, 
78.1. 
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and·Watie took their combined commands,· 2,000 men with a 
six=gun battery, and encamped for the night at Prairie 
Springs, located near.the Arkansas River to·the northwest of 
Fort Blunt. 
General Watie had a 800 man brigade. This unit was 
composed of the First.Cherokee Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel 
Co N. Vann commanding 200 veterans; Second Cherokee Regiment, 
Major John Vann commanding and 150 men; the First Creek Regi-
ment, 125 men with Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Chekote command= 
ing; 200 men in the Second Creek Regiment led by Colonel To 
Barnett; and 130 Seminoles of the First Seminole Battalion 
under Colonel Jumper. Gano had a reinforced brigade of 
1, 200 Texans. 
Early on September 15, 1864, General Watie with his• 
brigade as the advance party secured both banks of the 
Arkansas River at Redbanksv Ford, near the Creek Agency. 
General Gano moved up with the balance of the command and was 
disappointed to find the river swollen with recent rains. 
The expedition was stopped for six hours while the infantry 
waded, swam, and floated across the river. Several of the 
Indian and Texas troops were nearly dro'lilmed when they became 
mired in quicksand in the water near the northern banks. All 
of the artillery and annnunition was packed over by hand. The 
soldier would hold it above his head or tie it to his horse 
to keep it dry; both the Indian and Texas troops knew the 
value of artillery in a campaign of this type. Only one Fed= 
eral Creek was sighted on that day, and he ran into the brush 
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as soon as he was fired on by an advance party. The Creek 
was so scared he left all of.his equipment behind. Delayed 
so long by the river crossing, the Confederate column went 
into camp in the river .. bottom, two miles above Redbank' s 
Ford and thirteen miles northwest of Fort Blunt.?; 
On September 16, the long Confederate column crossed 
the Verdigris River at Sand Town Ford. This ford wasr::seven 
miles northwest of Fort ·Blb.nitl:i a,:ndJ four miles southwest of . 
Flat.Rock. Proceeding northeast, the raiders made their way 
to their first objective: the hay station reported to be on 
the prairie near Flat Rock. After a patrol of scouts had 
been sent ahead, it was confirmed :that a party of Federals 
lay· to their immediate right front. Gano dispatched Colonel 
Vann of the First Cherokee Regiment and Colonel Edward J. 
Gurly and his command, the Thirtieth Texas Regiment, to go 
to the right, make a wide circle and attack the Federal rear. 
Thus any attempted escape of the Federal party to. the woods . · 
on the Grand River would be blocked. Gano and Watie pro-
ceeded to the top of a nearby ridge. Using spy glasses, they 
watched the Federals making hay. After a short discussion 
the decision was made to advance closer and make the attack. 
The signal was given, and the long columns that were waiting 
.. 7Maxey.to Boggs, September 14, 1864, Watie to Heiston, 
October 3, 1864, Gano to Cooper, September 29, 1864, ibid., 
pp. 9~0, 785, 788~789. 
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at the bottom of the ridge slowly moved forward toward the 
haying campo8 
The Union haying operation at Flat Rock was commanded. 
by Captain Edgar A. Barker. Captain Barker had two companies 
of his regiment, the Second Kansas Cavalry and four companies 
of the First Kansas Colored Infantry, a total force of.only 
125 men. Barker 0s scouts reported a large force of Confed-
erates bad crossed the Verdigris River and was advancing on 
his camp from the southwest. The first intelligence reported 
the Confederate party as numbering 200 men. With his command 
only slightly smaller, Captain Barker elected to fight. Re-
call was sounded by the bugler, and the soldiers out on the 
prairie hurried to camp. · With his men·assembled, Barker 
formed them in a ravine to the rear of his camp.· Taking a 
small detachment of mounted men, the Federal captain moved 
forward to reconnoiter the number and designs of the Confed-
erates .. a.dv:ancipg on his front. Captain Barker met Gano I s 
command two miles southwest of his camp. Here he correctly 
estimated the Confederate host at being near 2,000, not the 
previously reported 200. The flat prairie also disclosed the 
r~. . .. i .. C ... C.U;' ,"".:",' ·, ,·; .. , \ -~ · ..... I 
· .. Bo, .. '. ' · .·· ·f h · A · ·f .. h · ., . · '\\i,f' • • • .. · .. :: .. :r, ... rgaa1.zat1.an .. :o ... t er· rm:¥, a .,t e: tl'l!ans .. !•1J..SS1.ss1.pp1. De-
partment, Kirby-Smith, C. S. Army, commanding, September 30, 
1864, Gano to Cooper; September 29, 1864, Watie to Heiston, 
October 3, 1864, Johnson to.Hoyt, September 25, 1864, ibid., 
pp. 967, 788-789, 785, 775-776; Britton, The Uniori Indian 
in the Civil War, pp. 437-440; Hathaway, ':.1Brigadier General 
Stand Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," pp. 77-78; Flat Rock is 
located on the prairie near the mouth of Flat Rock Creek on 
the west side of Grand River about five miles northeast. of 
present-day Wagoner, in Wagoner County; Muriel H. Wright and 
LeRoy H. Fischer, "Civil War Sites in Oklahoma,". Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, XLIV (SunuI1er, 1966), p. 212. 
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six pieces of artillery the Confederates had with them. 
Barker made his reconnaissance and immediately fell back·· 
when approached by a Confederate advance party. ·He skir-
mishedwith this advance all. the way back to the camp. Ar-
riving at the ravine, to the rear of his camp, Barker 
, 
dismounted his detachment and prepared to meet the Confederi-
ateattack.9 For the Negro troops with Captain Barker, it 
~ouic1: be a:,c"f:ight to t~e dE!athi· arid· .the· Neg+b infantry would 
make -the Confederates: ·pay,::dearly for their lives... It was 
well known to the Federals that the-Confederate forces did 
not take prisoners when the Negro soldier was involved.IO 
General Gano could see from his vantage point that the 
Confederate party sent to cut off the escape of the Federals 
was in position~ Captain S. M. Stayhorn of .the Thirtieth 
Texas Regiment was begip.ning to advance bis skirmishers. 
Watie and his entire brigade minus the First Cherokee Regi-
ment, which was with Colonel Vann at the rear of the Union 
camp, . advanced to the left of the field. Gano dispatched 
Lieutenant Colonel William G •. Welch with a column to the 
right. It was composed of Colonel Charles DeMorse and the 
Twenty-Ninth Texas Cavalry Regiment and Lieutenant Colonel 
9Barker to Adjutant Gene~~l, September 20, 1864, .Qff!.~. 
c.ia.1 Records, i, XLI, Pt. 1, pp. 771-772; Britton, The Union 
iruff'an Brigade in the Civil War, p. 438; Hathaway, "Brigadier· 
Gene:ral Stand Wa'tie, Confedera.te Guerrilla," p. 78. 
lOFor -further information on the treatment of the Negro 
soldier by Confederates, see Britton, The Union Indi.an_Bri"'. 
gade tn the Civil War, pp. 359-373, 43'5"=4'39 and Dudley r.-
Cornisn, The. Sable Arm; ~egro Troops in the Union Army. (New 
York:[ Longman, Green an Co., 1956), pp. 145-147. 
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Peter Hardeman of the Thirty .. First Texa.s Cavalry '.Rkgiment. 
Welch advanced to a position about200 yards·to the·right 
of Ga.no and halted. Gano and the re~inder including the: 
artillery, made up the center~ O:Picket···f:f,:rtng to the Federal 
rear indicated that Colonel Vann was advancing. Gano gave 
the order., and the V-shaped procession moved on the hay 
c:a;ll.lp! , Tl1e infantry with Gano advanced to within 200 yards 
.·· : ; . 
. ::l:f,.'..,d~p~ain; B~rker ~nd <opened f-:Lre. · ·, Watie arid Welch'with 
their cavalry forces charged the flanks of the Federa.1-held 
ravine, but were repulsed three times.11 
Captain Barker held his ground for a half-hour, but his 
position grew mdre untenable as the Confederates began to 
~ove in closer. With the Confederate troops positioned as 
they were, the Federal haying party was assailed from five 
directions at once. Barker knew it would be only a short 
time before he would be overwhelmed and wiped out to the last• 
man. With Negroes in the Federal command, the Confederate 
force around him would not show much mercy to any person in 
the unit, white.or black. He spotted a weak point on the 
Confederate left in Watie•-':s section of the line. · Barker. 
decided to mount all those w:ho had horses, break through if 
-~;.p:o:q.lcl.;,,,"and try to save a portion of the doomed conunand. 
Mounting sixty-five men, he charged the Confederate left. 
; 
11Watie to Cooper, September 23,. 1864, Gano to Cooper, 
September 29, 1864, Watie to Heiston, October 3, 1864,·Barker 
to Adjutant General, September 20, 1864; Official Records,. 
i, XLl, Pt. 1, pp. 784, 788-789, 785, 771 ... 772; Hathaway, ·· 
"Brigadier General Stand Watie, Confederate Guerilla," p.78; 
Britton, ~.Union Indian Brigade in. the Civil~' .P• 438. 
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Watie in command of that portion of the line ordered re-
inforcemei:its in, and all but fifteen of the Federal cavalry 
were captured or killed. The colored soldiers and some white 
infantry left in the ravine rallied under Lieutenant Thomas 
B. Sutherland of the First Kansas Colored Infantry Regiment. 
For two more hours the Confederate charges were repulsed. 
When the ammunition supply became exhausted, Sutherland told 
bis.colored troops they would have to save themselves.as 
best they could. Thirty-seven colored troops had been at 
the hay camp when the engagement started at noon; by that 
evening only four were still alive. These four colored 
soldiers had;secreted themselves in the prairie grass or in 
the nearby pools of water which were a runoff of the Grand 
River. When darkness came, they crawled between the Con-
federate sentries and mounted patrols and made their way to 
Fort Blunt to relate their story. The Confederates moved 
about the camp ·looting and looking at their captured prize. 
The bay--over 3,000 tons--was burned in its ricks. Also 
_,,.~ 
taken in the fight we,re twenty-£ ive horses, twelve army 
mules, and two six-team wagons with harness; destroyed was 
the bay and the mowing machinery. The equipment of McDonald 
and Fuller was destroyed along with all of Captain Barker·-~s 
papers, receipts., and tally books. The Federal party at 
Flat R,ock had been decimated. They lost forty killed, 
mostly Negroes, and sixty-six were wounded, missing in 
action or captured. The Confederate loss was only three 
slightly woundea.12 
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The Confederate raiding party encamped on the Flat Rock 
battlefield for the night of September 16. The camp awakened 
be-fore daylight the next mo.rning and prepared to move out. 
At sunrise scouts reported that two Federal columns had been 
s·ighted. Both Federal parties would converge on Flat Rock 
by evening if their march routes we:re continued, one from the 
north and the other from the ·south. Major Michael Looscan, 
First Texas-Arizona Battalion, was sent southward with sev-
e-ral troop units to meet the Union force coming from Fort 
Blunt. The remainder of the Confederate party proceeded 
northward to make contact with that forc-e of Federal cavalry·. 
General Watie sent Major Vann and his unit, the Second 
Cherokee Regiment, up the Fort Scott Road, four miles in 
advance of the main column. He was ordered to engage :any 
Federals in his front and ascertain .if the train was in the 
innnediate vicinity. Having advanced a· short distance up the 
road, his party was fired into by Federal pickets, Major Vann 
being narrowly missed. Thinking the ·train' s escort was be.ing 
engaged, Lieutenant Colonel Vann with his command, the First 
Cherokee Regiment, was sent t9 assist. The Federal party 
turned out to be a small reinforcement going to meet the 
12rbid.; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil 
War, pp. 439-440; Maxey to Boggs, October 7, 1864; Cooper to 
Scott, September 14 and September 24, 1864, Official Records, 
i, XLI, Pt. 1, pp. 780, 781, 782. 
123 
supply -train. It moved northward during the night.13 Major 
Looscan engaged the Union patrol from the south and killed 
one of them. - He drove the balance of the Federal party back 
to ::·Fa·rt Blunt.. Gano' s force which had moved further on, 
met the main body of the northe.rn party and drove it off 
without a fight. 
With the Fede.ral patrols out of the way, Gano and Watie 
proceeded in the same direction in search of the Federal sup-
ply train. The Confederate party reached Rock Creek and did 
not find a -sign of the :passing of a train of any size. Be-
cause :the-Federal train might have taken a trail on the east 
side of the Grand Rive.r·, several patrols were sent in that 
vicinity to search it out if there. The Confede-rates camped 
mid-way between the two-possible roads, at Wolf Creek, and 
waited for the ·scouts to report in. All the patrols re-turned 
and reported that the train had not passed on either road. 
Early on that same morning, September 17, an additional 
party was sent to burn a nearby hay station called Hickey's. 
The Confederates -found it reinforced by Federal troops 
recently arrived from Fart Blunt, so the Confederate :troop-
ers ,bad to send for -assistance from the main column. A large 
force was ·immediately dispatched to Hickey's, and upon its 
arrival a heavy skirmish ensued between the Confederate 
-raiders and ,Federal haying party. Recognizing that the 
·i3Gano to Cooper, September ·29, 1864-, Watie to Heiston, 
October 3, 1864, ibid., pp. 789, 786; Organization of the 
Army of the Trans·-Mississippi Department, Kirby-Smith, C. S. 
Army, conunanding, Septembe.r 30, 1864, ibid., Pt. 3, p. 967. 
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Feder-als :we.re entrenched and pr-epared to put up s·tiff resist-
ance, the Confede·rates broke contact. Too much time would 
have be·en required to try to ove:rrun the Union hay station, 
and time had ·become important. The Confeqerate -command had 
to locate the train quickly or pass it up altogether. It 
would not be ·long before Federal detachments from Fort Scott, 
Fort Smi-th, a n.d: Fort Blunt would be assembled to hunt them 
down. 14 
To prevent unne·cessary movement of the large Confederate 
column, General Gano on September-18 took 400 men and two 
piec·es of field artillery from Howell's Texas Battery and 
. proceede:d. in the direction of Cabin Creek, located to the 
northeast of his ·camp at Wolf Creek. Gener·a1 Gano arrived at 
Cabin Creek about 2:00 p.m. He found roughly 300 men of the 
Second _Indian Regiment garrisoning the log stockade ·located 
there. 15 A me·ssenger was immediately dispatched to bring up 
the balance of the command under Watie. 
The Federal force:s in Indian Territory knew that the 
large Confederate ·force reported in the area was out to break 
the all-important -Supply ·line between Fort Scott and Fort 
Blunt. Should the Texas Road be effective·ly blocked -for ·any 
length of time, Fort Blunt would fall. Since the experiment 
1 4Gano to Cooper, Septembe·r 29, 1864, Watie to Heis·ton, 
Octobe.r 3, 1864, ibid., Pt. 1, pp. 789, 786. 
15Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, 
p. 441; Gano to Cooper, September 29, 1864, Watie to Heiston, 
Octobe-.r 3, 1864, Official Records, i, XLI, Pt. 1, pp. 789, 
786. 
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with the J. R. Williams had failed miserably, the only alter-
native was to keep the Texas Road functioning as a Federal 
supply line. General Thayer, connnander of the District of 
the Border with headquarters at Fort Smith, had been receiv-
ing reports of an unusual amount of activity around Perry;. 
ville. The Confede.rate movement toward Fort Blunt indicated 
to General Thayer that Colonel Wattles' command was in danger 
and not his. To prepare for the anticipated attack, Thayer 
ordered six compc:1nies of infantry and a cavalry force of 150 
men to Fort Blunt. On September 14, Thayer bolstered the 
force even more by sending the Seventy-Ninth United .States 
Colored Infantry Regiment under Colonel James M. Williams to 
reinforce Fort Blunt. Four days later the Twelfth Kansas 
Infantry Regiment under Colonel Charles W. Adams was added 
to the Fort Blunt garrison. Since Adams out ranked Wattles, 
the connnand was temporarily put into the hands of a more 
competent officer. The same order which transferred the 
Twelfth Kansas Infantry Regiment also instructed Wattles to 
send more men to meet the supply train that was due from 
Fort Scott. 16 
Major Henry Hopkins, Second Kansas Cavalry, the command-
er of the supply train that was then making its way to Fort 
Blunt, made eve.ry effort to prevent a surprise attack on his 
connnand. On September 12, Hopkins sent orders to all 
16Thayer to Steele, September 8, 1864, Thayer to Wattles, 
September 14, 1864, Thayer to Wattles, September 18, 1864, 
ibid., l?t. 3, pp. 105:-106, 187-188, 238, 239. 
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commanding officers of the posts on the ·road between Fort 
Scott and Fort Blunt to thoroughly scout their areas of 
responsibility. Major Hopkins requested that these :post com-
manders also send.all the men to him they could spare. As 
he left Fort Scott, his escort numbered only 260 men. These 
troops were from the Third Brigade of the Frontier Division, 
under Colonel William R. Judson.. The Third Brigade troops 
assigned to Major Hopkins were fifty cavalry and thirty in-
fantry from the Second Kansas Cavalry Regiment; sixty mounted 
and seventy dismounted men of the Fourteenth Kansc:;1.s Cavalry 
Regiment under the conµnand of Captain H. P. ·stevenson; ten 
mounted and forty infantry from the Sixth Kansas Cavalry 
Regiment under the command of Captain Henry P. Ledger. At · 
Baxter Springs the escort was augmented by the arrival of 
one hundred Cherokee Indians from the Second Indian Regiment 
under the command of Captain Ta-la-lab, attached from the 
Third Indian Regiment on temporary duty. His executive of-
ficer was First Lieutenant Andrew J. Waterhouse.of the Sec-
ond Indian Regiment. Captain Ledger received a dispatch 
from Colonel Blair at Fort Scott that Price had crossed the 
Arkansas River at Dardanella, Arkansas, and was moving north. 
Along with that news, Ledger forwarded an urgent request for 
more troops to Colonel Wattles. The Federal captain knew 
that with Price across the Arkansas River, the rumors of 
Confederate raiders operating in his area were most probably 
true. September 17 found Hopkins ·located fifteen miles north 
of Cabin Creek. At that point he received word from Wattles 
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at Fort Blunt that a Confederate force of 1,500 men was mov-
ing in his direction. Colonel Wattles ordered Major Hopkins 
to move his train with all possible dispatch to the Cabin 
Creek stockade immediately. 
The Federal train was immense for a military supply con-
voy. It consisted of 300 wagons; 205 were government supply 
wagons, four were ambulances, and ninety sutler wagons. To 
increase the speed of the train, it was put into double 
column. Traveling throughout the pre-dawn and early morning, 
the train covered the fifteen-mile·distance in six hours, 
arriving at Cabin Creek by 9:00 on the morning of September 
18.17 Lieutenant B. H. Whitlow of the Third Indian Regiment 
arrived shortly thereafter and reinforced Hopkins with·140 
Cherokees. A force of 170 men from the Second Indian Regi-
ment commanded by Lieutenant John C. Palmer was stationed at 
Cabin Creek. With the addition of these troops the whole 
Union force numbered 610 men: 150 mounted and the remaining 
460 men acting as infantry.18 
On that same afternoon, Major Hopkins took a patrol of 
twenty-five men and scouted the area south of the Cabin 
· Creek stockade. Hopkins sighted the Confederates three miles 
from the stockade. They were posted in a hollow of a ravine, 
17Report of Hopkins, ... Septe,mbe:r 22, 1864, Gano to 
Cooper, September 28, 1864, Watie to Heiston, October 3, 
1864, ibid., Pt. 1, pp. 766-767; 789-790, 786; Britton, The 
Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, p. 441. -
18.Jennison to Hampton, September 22, 1864, Report of 
Hopktns, .. September 22, 1864, Official ·Records, i, 'J.f_];.,I, _ . 
Pt. 1, pp. 772-773, 767. 
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and Major Hopkins could only guess at their numbers. It was 
about evening, so Hopkins returned to the Cabin Creek ·stock-
ade to prepare for the coming Confederate assault. He dou>-
bled the forward pickets and formed the wagon train in a 
quarter circle outside the stockade. 
In response to Gano's request, Watie arrived at a point 
three miles south of Cabin Creek just past midnight. After 
a conference there, the two Confederate generals decided to 
launch an attack innnediately. Gano ordered Lieutenant Colo-
nel Welch and the _Twenty-Ninth Texas Cavalry-Regiment to 
take the point. Companies were dispatched ·left and right of 
the advancing column to protect the Confederate flanks. The 
column was halted a half mile from the barricaded Federal 
train. Gano quickly drew his column into line of battle: 
Gano' s · brigade took the center and right portions of the·. : 
· line; Watie 's brigade was to Gano' s · left; Colonel Welc.h was 
positioned on the extreme.right with the Twenty-Ninth Texas 
Cavalry; next came Martin's Battalion of Texas cavalry with 
Major W. M. Mayrant connnanding; on Mayrant's left was Captain 
Howell and his six batteries of artillery; and the Thirtieth 
and Thirty-First Texas Cavalry regiments were supporting 
Howell on his left and rear, with Major Looscan and Captain 
Stayhorn connnanding these uni ts:. 
General Watie and his Indian Brigade formed the left of 
the Confederate line. The Confederate guerrilla placed his 
units as follows: First and Second Cherokee regiments on the 
.right and linked with the united connnands of Looscan and 
Stayhorn; Seminoles under Colonel Jumper were next to the 
Cherokee regiments, with the First a:hd Second Creek regi-
ments completing the'left portion of the, line.19 
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The brigades in their assault line were slowly advanced 
to an elevated position looking down on the Federal defensive 
,works. There Major Hopkins got his first good look at the 
Confederate force arrayed before him, taking in his entire 
,line and flanks, was a double line of Confederate cavalry 
and infantry. The first line was cavalry, and a few feet to 
the rear of the Confederate cavalry were the infantry compa-
nies, kneeling in ranks, waiting for the word to move forward 
in support of the cavalry. Hopkins quickly rearranged bis 
lines, sending the wagons to the rear of the stockade near 
the edge of the bluffs located there. The Federal infantry 
were all moved to within the confines of the stockade. The 
movement of the wagons caused General Gano to order the Con-
federate line forward to a position within 500 yards of the 
Federal stockade. 
At this point a Federal officer, Captain Patrick 
Cosgrove, came out of the darkness to hold a parley with the 
Confederates. After Captain Cosgrove had authenticated that 
they were Confederates, be cursed them and invited them for-
ward. General Gano instructed his representative to query 
l9Hancock, "The Second Battle of Cabin Creek," Chroni-
cles of Oklahoma, XXXIX, pp. 415-417; Report of Hopkins, 
September 22, 1864, Watie to Heiston, October 3, 1864, Gano 
to Cooper, September 29, 1864, Official Records, i, XL!, 
Pt. 1, pp. 767, 786, 789. 
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them and see if the Union commander would respect the flag 
of truceo General Gano was told to wait five minutes while 
Captain Cosgrove went to Major Hopkins to have the flag of 
truce approved. Cosgrove returned to the portion of the 
line where he had talked with the Confederates. Somehow the 
word was not received by Gano. The Confederate commander 
waited fifteen minutes, and hearing no word from the Federal 
Captain, prepared to attack. The movement of the Federal 
wagons into the stockade signaled the attack. Gano took the 
renewed movement within the Union lines as a negative answer 
to his truce request and ordered his entire·line forward.20 
The entire Confederate front moved forward at a slow-
measured pace. The darkness prevented any faster movement. 
The Federal defenders did not open fire until the Confeder-
ates were within 300 yards of their barricades. The Federals 
then opened fire all along the line, to which the Confeder-
ates immediately replied. Howell's batteries opened fire 
from the Confederate center, all six guns blasting forth 
with solid shot. 
The teamsters and wagonmaster, all civilians under con-
tract with the army, fled at the first volley of Confederate 
20rbido; Jennison to Hampton, September 22, 1864, Gano 
to Cooper, September, 29, 1864, ibid., pp. 778, 790; Hancock, 
"The Second Battle of Cabin Creek," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 
XXXIX, 417":"418~ The official reports are conflicting at this 
point, but it appears that the Federals received word from 
Major Hopkins that the flag of truce would be accepted. The 
reason for the requested flag of truce was not mentio~d in 
the official correspondence of the Confederate commander, 
General Gano. The truth as to wh7. the truce was desired died 
with the participants. Hancock, 'The Second Battle of Cabin 
Creek," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXIX, p. 420. 
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musketry. They each took from one to two mules with them, 
slashing their mounts free of their harnesses wherever they 
found them. This des~rting by the -teamsters was disastrous 
to the wagon train. The gunfire drove some of the mules mad 
with fear, and in their efforts to escape the noise, the 
train became hopelessly entangled. Other teams pulled their 
cargoes over the hundred-foot bluff, which could not be seen 
in the darkness. The night also concealed the details of 
the Federal fortifications from the probing Confederates. 
Since Gano's objective of stopping the train had been ac-
complished, the bugler was ordered to sound recall, and the 
Confederate line fell back to its original position on the 
elevated prairie. After an hour's rest, the Confederate 
Indian units were called back to arms. Pickets had reported 
that Union troops were trying to untangle the teams and 
wagons in order to make an escape attempt -when dayl~ght 
arrived. Gano ordered another assault, and after an exchange 
of volleys, the Confederates returned to their original 
lines. The Federals remained concealed behind-their forti-
fications and did not try to untangle the teams again.21 
General Watie and his Indian Brigade did very well on 
the left of the battlefield. During the second assault 
Watie found a weak point on the Federal right. He pressed 
21Hancock, "The Second Battle of Cabin Creek," Chroni-
cles of Oklahoma, XXXIX, pp. 415-417; Report of Hopkins, 
Sept,ember 22, 1864, Watie to Heiston, October 3, 1864, Gano 
to Cqoper, September 29, 1864, Jennison to Hampton, September 
22, 1864, Official Records, i, XLI, Pt. 1, pp. 767, 786, 789, 
·118. 
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forward his brigade and drove the Federals from their posi-
tions. The Federal train was parked in that portion of the 
camp, and when the Union soldiers fell back they left a large 
~egment of the train in the hands of General Watie's brigade. 
To prevent its recapture; a heavy guard of Confederate infan-
try was put around its perimeter and the captured wagons were 
taken piecemeal to the Confederate rear and parked. 
At daybreak Watie received reports of more Union activ-
ity to his front. Skirmishers reported that it sounded as 
if wagons were moving across Cabin Creek in the rear of the 
Federal camp. Colonel Vann was sent with the two Cherokee 
regiments with orders to skirt the Union camp and cut off any 
attempt to escape with any part of the remainder of the 
train. Shortly messengers brought word that no wagons were 
moving in this area but that eighteen prisoners had been 
taken while attempting to escape into the surrounding woods. 
With the sun up, the true Federal position was revealed 
to the Confederate generals. The sunlight revealed a line 
of ten immense hay ricks. A log wall had been constructed 
behind that as a second line of defense. Gano decided to 
change his artillery positions so as to command the flank of 
the Federal fortifications. Immediately two pieces of 
Howell's battery were shifted to the left to cover the Fed-
eral right. Colonel Jumper's command was dismounted in order 
to support and protect this battery. 
The Twenty-Ninth Texas Regiment was ordered to assault 
the Federal units located to their front. Colonel Jumper, 
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then supporting the two ... gun battery of Howell, was also 
ordered to move forward and attack the Federals' right flank. 
With the Seminoles driving the Union troops 150 yards into 
their own fortifications, General Gano saw a chance to drive 
or capture the entire Federal force. He led segments of the 
unused Twenty-Ninth Texas Regiment into the thick of the 
fighting in an effort to overpower Federal resistance. After 
pushing the Federal line back another twenty-five yards, the 
Confederates were thrown off balance and repulsed by a gully 
filled with troops that had not yet participated in the 
fight. With a yell of defiance, they surged forward and 
stopped the Confederate advance. Gano, seeing that the at-
tack had stalled, called for a withdrawal. Gano, having re-
turned from the left flank attack, ordered Colonel Welch and 
the remainder of his conunand, the Thirty-First Texas Cavalry 
Regiment, to drive the opposite end of the line, the Federal 
right. Captain Stayhorn and Major Mayrant would assist him 
with their units. The Creeks and Seminoles, who had ex:.. 
hausted the arrnnunition, pulled out of line to let Colonel 
Welch and his troops take their place. Jumper hurried the 
Creek and Seminole units to the ordinance wagons in the rear 
to replenish their cartridge boxes. 
Howell's battery, now located in the Confederate center, 
was firing on the Federal flanks. Shot and shell ripped 
down the line of Federals, pounding their resistance into 
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the ground.22 The return of the Creek and Seminole regiments 
with a fresh supply of ammunition crumpled the last of the 
Federal will to resist. The Federal line gave way, and the 
Union soldiers melted into the brush, running for their 
lives. 
Although his chance to get the wagons to safety had been 
crushed by the envelopment of his right flank, Major Hopkins 
hoped to hold the stockade until the next morning. Major 
Foreman with six companies of infantry and two pieces of 
artillery was believed to be in the area and moving to rein-
force the wagon train. Should they arrive by daybreak, they 
could hit the Confederates from the rear and destroy the be-
sieged train, leaving the garrison at Fort Blunt helpless 
without supplies. 
The onslaught of Colonel Welch and his reinforcement by 
the Creek and Seminole units prevented any Federal planning 
except that of escape. The remaining Federals ran for the 
safety of the brush. Most headed east in the direction of 
the Grand River and from there went eitber: .. north to Fort 
Scott or south to Fort Blunt. 
By 9:00 o'clock on the morning of September 18 the en-
gagement at Cabin Creek was over. The Southern forces had 
22Gano to Cooper, September 29, 1864, ibid., p. 790. 
General Gano was exc!?p:tipnal. in the writing of his reports. 
His official correspondence read more like a novel than an 
official army report. His flair for dramatics proved use-
ful to him after the war, when he became a Presbyterian 
minister and preached from the pulpit the rest of his days. 
Warner, Generals in Grey, p. 96. 
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complete control over the field. The Federals had left 
their dead and wounded in their haste to escape. Gano sent 
details to bury the dead and to secure the area from surprise 
attack. With this done, Watie and Gano gathered the wagon 
train together and prepared for an innnediate return south. 
Watie's and Gano's brigades clothed themselves from the 
captured supplies. The booty of the Federal train was a 
virtual godsend. Most of the salvaged wagons contained 
clothing which the ragged Confederate troops could use. 
Though the uniforms were blue, they would fade quickly in 
the sun and turn a dull butternut color. Other wagons car-
ried guns and annnunition. An abundant supply of liquor was 
found in several of the sutler wagons, and the jubilant 
Indian soldiers gleefully drank their find out of existence. 
The most valuable prize, next to the clothing, was $8,000 
worth of blankets. These would be useful for the coming 
winter. The Confederates had captured 130 wagons and 740 
mules. Although over one hundred wagons had been burned, 
the remaining were valued at over $1,500,000. The casualties 
had been slight for the number of men involved: the Confed-
erate loss was no more than forty-five, killed, wounded, or 
missing. The total Federal casualties were not in excess of 
fifty-four. 23 
23watie to Heiston, October 3, 1864, Watie to Cooper, 
September 23, 1864, Gano to Cooper, September 23, 1864, Gano 
to Cooper, September 29, 1864, Return of casualties in Gano's 
brigade, September 19, 1864, Hopkins to Thomas, September 25, 
1864, Sykes to Charlot, September 25, 1864, Oliver to Bell, 
September 25, 1864, Hildebrand to Cooper, September 26, 1864, 
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General Gano put his newly-outfitted men into columns 
and moved out in a southwesterly direction. Gano knew that 
reinforcements were on their way or soon would be, and he 
hoped to avoid them if possible. He did not want to risk 
losing his priceless prize. The fight at Cabin Creek had 
terminated by 9:00 a.m., and General Gano was in column by 
10:00 a.m. 
An hour later scouts brought in reports that a Federal 
force was ahead at Pryor's Creek and was presently pressing 
the Confederate advance party. Gano ordered the entire com-
mand forward, except those guarding the captured wagons. 
Placing his men in line on a prairie, Gano held the Federal 
brigade at a distance. The two commands skirmished the rest 
of the morning and long into the afternoon. At 4:30 p.m. 
the shooting died down, and the Federals secured their artil-
lery. 
Colonel Williams, commander of the Federal brigade on 
Gano's front, did not want to force a general engagement. 
His men were exhausted and badly needed rest. They had 
marched eighty-two miles in less than two days, with full 
field equipment. A hard push by the Confederates to his 
front would overcome his men. He wanted to hold the 
Maxey to Boggs, October 8, 1864, Official Records, i, XLI, 
Pt. 1, pp. 786-787, 784, 788, 790-791, 792, 770-771, 764-
765, 778, 779, 780; Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand Wat;i.e, 
Confederate Guerrilla," pp. 78-81. 
Confederates in their position until reinforcements could 
arrive; then they could be dealt with.24 
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At dark Gano ordered one of the wagons emptied. It was 
,then driven over a rocky place nearby for two hours. This 
gave the Federal pickets the impression that the convoy of 
wagons was being parked. The actual train was at that moment 
moving southwest toward the Arkansas River. Gano ordered his 
troops into columns at dawn and they followed the train : 
toward the Arkansas. 
A short time later, the Federals sent skirmishers for• 
ward to renew contact with Gano and found the Confederate 
emplacements empty and the train gone. Colonel Williams' 
connnand was too exhausted to follow with any speed. For the 
next three days the Confederate raiders got little sleep in 
1their race to the south side of the Arkansas River. Some 
managed to catch a little sleep in their saddles or while 
resting their wagon teams. The Indian soldiers were quite 
exalted over their captured prize and went about their tasks 
cheerfully. Traversing rough terrain, they had to dig out 
steep creek banks to enable the wagons to go across. Wagons 
had to be pushed up the steep grades which abounded in the 
area, and thick scrub brush had to be thinned to let the big 
wagons through. 
24williams to Blair, September 20, 1864, Gano to 
Cooper, September 29, 1864, Watie to Heiston, October 3, 
1864, Official Records, i, XLI, Pt. 1~ pp. 765, 791, 787; 
Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in_ the·: Ci:vil War, pp. 444-
445. ---- - - ·- -
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General Watie had sent several messengers on ahead to 
notify General Cooper of his success and return route. In 
response to his message, Cooper sent Colonel D. N. Mcintosh 
and a force of 400 Creeks to meet the returning expedition 
and help bring it in. Upon finding that the Federals had 
given up the chase after crossing the Arkansas River near 
Tulsa Town, Mcintosh took his command and proceeded to scout 
the area between the Creek Council Grounds and Fort Blunt. 
If any Federal units were to try to interrupt Watie, Mcintosh 
could pursue and strike them from the flank or rear. 
Having crossed the Arkansas River at Tulsa Town, Watie 
proceeded to Fisbertown, southeast of present-day Eufaula, 
Pittsburg County. The Confederate raiders were met at 
Fishertown by General Cooper in person. He bad moved up from 
Fort Towson immediately after Colonel Mcintosh had departed 
from there.ZS 
The captured prize gave a much needed boost to the low 
morale of the Confederate troops in the Trans-Mississippi 
Department. It was also a bright spot in the Confederate 
operations. On January 19, 1865, a joint resolution of both 
houses of Congress was passed commending Gano and Watie on 
25rbid.; Hancock, "Second Battle of Cabin Creek," Chron-
icles of Oklahoma, XXXIX, pp. 421-423; Gano to Cooper, 
September 29, 1864, Hilderbrand to Cooper, September 26, 
1864, Cooper to Scott, September 24, 1864, Cooper to Scott, 
September 27, 1864, Cooper to Scott, October 1, 1864, Watie 
to Cooper, September 23, 1864, Watie to Heiston, October 3, 
1864, Official Records, i, XL!, Pt. 1, pp. 790-791, 779, 782, 
783, 781, 784, 787-788; Hathaway, "Brigadier General Stand 
Watie, Confederate Guerrilla," p. 80; .Maxey to Boggs,:·Septem-
be.r 30~ .. 18(54, Official Records, i,"XLL; Pt: 1,.P~ 778. 
their "daring and skill exhibited" in the capture of the 
Federal wagon train on September 19, 1864. The following 
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year, on January 24, Davis signed the resolution. General 
Maxey and General Cooper published and had circulated to all 
units a proclamation that lauded the accomplishments of Watie 
and Gano. Maxey reminded the soldiers of his command that a 
great victory had been won, but that the Federal invaders 
were still cursing the country with their presence and a more 
united effort in the future would be necessary to remove the 
Federal force from Indian Territory.26 
The speed and.adroitness of the Confederates in their 
Cabin Creek foray left the Federal forces at Fort Smith and . 
Fort Blunt temporarily confused and frustrated. General 
Thayer began to·see Confederates behind every bush. For the 
duration of September, 1864, Thayer was marching and c.ounte,r-
marching troops from Fort Blunt.· He plagued his.superiors 
with so many requests for troops and assistance. they began 
to believe that he was about to be overwhelmed.. On September· 
29, Thayer ordered the stoppage of all supply trains from 
Fort Scott to Fort Blunt. He explained that the Confederates.· 
26u. S. Congress.,. Senate Executive Documents Number 234, 
Fifty-Eighth Congress,. Second Session,. IV, pp .. 42'9, 486, .. and 
VII, pp. 465, 495;General Order No. 26, Headquarters, Indian 
Division, September 30, 1864, General Order No., 61, Head-· 
quarters,: District of Indian Territory, October 7, 1864; 
General Order No •. 81, Headquarters, Trans-,,Mississippi 
District, October 12,. 1864, Official Records,. i, XLI, Pt. 1, 
pp. 792-=793, 793~794, 794.· 
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were massing to bis front to attack and would try to stop· 
any attempt. t.o supply: him.: 27 
On October 1·8,, Thayer exhibited: the extent of his. panic. 
He instructed Colonel Wattles to be- prepared at a moment's 
notic.e to .. evacuate Fort Blunt and repair to Fort Smith with 
his entire command,, destroying the e.quipage that wasunserv ... 
iceable or could not be transp-orted with him.: It was not 
until the last.week-in October that General Thayer cancelled· 
his-. order.s for. the· removal ofi the troops from Fort Blunt and . 
lifted his prohibition on supply trains frdm Fort Scotto-
Thayer seemed to have· temporarily lost. confidence· in his. 
command's·ability to fight off the Confederates •. This turn 
of events encouraged more than anything else:tbe connnon talk 
of weakness,. incompetence,. and corruption in the Fort Blunt 
and Fort Smith area •. 28 
During late. September and early October,. the Confeder- · 
ates were preparing for.winter quarters,- not for a raid on 
27Thayer to Halleck, September22, 1864, Thayer to 
Williams,. September 22,. 1864, Thayer to. Adams,. September 22,-
186.4, Adams to Curtis,. September· 22,. 1864, Curtis. to Blunt, 
September 22, 1864, Tbayer·to Halleck, September 24, 1864, 
Thayer to Steele, September 24, 1864, Curtis to Rosecrans,. 
September 27, 1864, Thayer to Wattles, September 28, 1864, 
Sykes to Curtis,. September 28, 1864., Thayer to Halleck, 
September 29, 1864, Thayer to Steele, October·4, 1864, Thayer 
to Halleck, October 13, 1864, Thayer to Lacey, October 15, 
1864, ibid.-, Pt. 3, pp. 300, 300, 301, 314, 314-315, 340, 
341, 426, 639, 461, 475, 608~609, 831, 882-883. 
28 . Thayerto Wattles,. October 18, 1864, Thayer to Wat ... 
tles,. October 19, 1864, Gallaher to Williams,. October 20, 
1864, Thayer to Wattles,. October 20, 1864, Thayer to Wattles,. 
October 24, 1864, Thayer to Wattles,. October 27 ,· 1864, ibid.·, 
Pt.· 4, pp. 74-75, 107-108,- 130, 130-131, 218, 272; Britton, 
The Union· Indian Brigade in the Civil War, pp. 452-453. 
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Fort Smith or Fort Blunt. -Though Watie's command had re.;. 
ceived new clothes,. it was still lacking in many essentials:• 
· guns, ammunition, proper rations:,. anq most important horses,. 
which were imposs.ible to obtain in Confederate. Indian Terri ... 
tory. Watie and his First Indian Brigade. moved to the North 
Fork Road on- October. 7. There· Watie still tried to· get per-
mission for his proposed. Kansas raid •. But. the- question be.-· 
came stalled and deeply entangled over the- question of· 
"spoils.-" Watie had: found-that. letting his Indian troops 
ga.ther spoils as an incentive gave him better performance-in 
return. Cooper-sided with Watie,- but did not go out on a 
limb over the question •. The Kansas raid was. eventually for-
gotten because of the Confederate inability to gather the. 
· · 29 men and material necessary for 1.ts success •. 
The remainder o.f, 1864. was. a· period of- relative quiet •. 
General Maxey and General Thayer were· both busy trying. to .. 
prepare·attacks or defend their assigned area •. The only 
·· military activity took place in early November. General. 
Price had. a series of setbacks .on his raid into Missouri so 
that by late October he-was retreating.toward Indian Terri-
tory. Price hoped to. capture· Fort Scott on the way, but the 
Union cavalry put too. much. pressure- on. him. On. November 7, 
1864; General Price crossed. the Arkansas River, into 
Confederate-held Indian Territory. He crossed at a point 
29cooper to Bell, October 6, 1864, Maxey to Boggs, 
October 9, 1864., Official Reco.rds,. i, XL!; Pt. 3, pp. 982-
984, 990-991; H..9.tbaway,_ "Brigadier General Stand Watie, 
Confederate Guerrilla," p. 84. 
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thirty-five· miles west. of Fort Smith and. immediately headed 
for Boggy Depot and Perryville·to get badly needed supplies. 
From there under escort of General Cooper, P:i:-ice·continued 
onto Bonham, Texas, and on December 2, 1864, ended his long 
march at Laynesport, Texas, a defeated man.30 
General Maxey was. invited to attend and speak at the 
Choctaw Grand Council to be held on November 4 and 5, 1864, 
at Armstrong Academy. He arrived there early on Thursday, 
November 3 •. At the meeting,. Colonel Mcintosh and Colonel 
Adair acted as an escort for the Confederate commander. A 
resolution of· the council requested General Maxey to speak 
to them, which he did at 10:00 a.m •. on the second day of·the 
meeting. In a three-hour address,.he reviewed the highlights 
of his administration. He concluded by reading his report 
as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in which he covered the 
promises made. by the Confederate government and pointed out 
how the government had tried to keep its word.· His speech 
was received with "marked attention.II From Armstrong 
Academy, Maxey went to Fort Washita,. where he made an in-
spection of. the post and garrison. He reported the situation 
at Fort Washita "in good condition. 1131 
30Morrow, "Price's 'Missouri Expedition, 1864," pp. 138-
159; Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in~ Civil .. War, p. 
452; Magruder to Maxey, November 15, 1804, Scott to·Macleon, 
November 18, 1864, Maxey to Boggs., November 20, 1864, Offi-
cial Records, i, XLI, Pt. 4, pp. 1050-1051, 1063, 1067-=-:--
31Maxey to his wife, November 6, 1864, Maxey to Kirby-
Smith, November 12, 1864, Samuel Bell Maxey Papers, Thomas 
Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma;.Magruder to Wharton, November 8, 1864, 
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Though the situation was :ggod in. severa.i:·_of thecConfecl- _ 
erate posts, defeat was inevitable. The whole Confederacy 
was doomed. The Confederate government had lost the ability 
to adequately supply her troops in the East,.and she could 
do nothing at all for an area west of the Mississippi River 
considered. by general headquarters as a mere sideshow. 
Colonel Phillips was suddenly returned to his command 
on December 29, 1864.· Since he was pleased to be assigned. 
to a field command again, he did not press General Thayer for 
his reasons. To General Herron, however, Phillips expressed 
disappointment that he was not able to press his suit against 
McDonald and Fuller. The general situation of the Fort Smith 
and Fort Blunt area,. plus the unwanted pressure exerted by 
Phillips,. undoubtedly played a large. part in his reappoint-
ment. The reconnnendation of General Herron was a timely 
piece of correspondence that assured Phillips his field com-
mand again. Returning to Fort Blunt, Phillips was appalled 
at the low state of the connnand and the wanton corruption 
that. prevailed. . Phillips asked advice from his superior as. 
to what assignment should be given Wattles,. one·of his former 
regimental commanders. Phillips innnediately set about cor-
recting ·the irregularities: quartermaster records·were 
audited, and corrections ma.de; a blackmailing ring, led by 
the post commander, was broken up and the members arrested .• 
Maxey to Kirby-Smith, November 8, 1864, Kirby-Smith to 
Delegates from the Grand Council, December 17, 1864, Offi-
cial Records,. i, XLI, Pt. 4, pp. 1034, 1035-1037, lllS:--
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In addition.,. Pq.illips deplored. the way that the infamous --Fort 
Smith contractors of, McDonald and Fuller were cheating the 
Indians •. Mc:Ponald and Fuller agents would'buy a whole crop 
at. a low· price,. and the.· Indians would get only a portion ·of· 
what.they deserved. That and other: schemes of-corruption 
which had. emerged. during. Wattles' tenure as.· post commander' 
were righted by Ph:j_llips during the next four weeks; 
Phillips also began to pester his superior for· more mounts.-, 
To defeat the Confederate forces in detail, more horses.· 
would have to be.obtained •. Cavalry was necessary to main-: 
tain contact with the Confederate forces south of. the. 
Arkansas River.32 
During February the Union·and Confederate forces reor-
ganized.their commands. Thayer and Steele were replaced;· 
Thayer was reduced to a command at Saint Charles; Arkansas,, 
and Steele was transferred completely out of. the Department 
of-Arkansas. On the Confederate side, General Maxey by his 
request was transferred to a district in Texas. The.new. 
Federal .officers were new to the area; General J. J. 
Reynolds. took command-of the Department, and General Cyrus 
Bussey moved to Fort Smith as its·commandant. Confederate 
General Cooper succeeded Maxey and with this promotion 
32Phillips to Herron,. January 16, 1865, ibid., XLVIII, 
Pt. 1, pp. 542-543; Wyant, "Colonel William A •. Pbillips-and 
the Civil War in Indian Territory," pp. 72-75; General 
Order No. 4, January 14; 1865, Official Records, i, XLVIII, 
Pt. 1, pp. 516-519; Abel,TheAmerican Indian Under Reconstruc-· 
tion, pp. 90-92; Britton,1'.be Union Indian Bri!adein the 
civil War,. pp. 453-454; · Thoburn and Wright, 01< ahoma: A· 
History_of- the State~ Its People,. I, pp. 357;..JSB. 
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achieved his long-sought goal as Indian Territory District 
commander. These·changes. were for naught because from that 
point until the end of the war there was no significant 
military activity. The opposing forces kept scouts.out, but 
no engagements were reported.~3 Watie replaced Cooper as 
division commander of Indian troops. On taking command, 
Watie moved his Indian division to Boggy Depot, where it re-
mained until the men were mustered out after· the war. 34 
One last treaty between the Plains Indians and the Con-
federate Indians was signed on May 25, 1865, at Camp 
Napoleon, located on the Washita River near present-day 
Verden, Oklahqma. In that alliance, agreed to and. signed· by 
the Plains Indians and the Five Civilized Tribes, an Indian 
confederacy was.formed, to be controlled by the contracting. 
tribes. Confederate representatives had been sent by Gener-
al Cooper, but no attempt was made to directly negotiate a 
treaty with the Plains. Indians. Since the Five· Civilized 
Tribes were already bound by treaties to the Confederacy, 
this agreement·between these Indian tribes served the Con-
federate States as an indirect treaty with the troublesome 
33Maxey to Schultz, February 17, 1865, General Order:-
No. 411, Headquarters, Trans-Mississippi Department, February 
14, 1865, Samuel Bell Maxey Papers, .Thomas Gilcrease Insti-
tute of American History and Art, Tulsa, -Oklahoma; Hood, -
"The Twilight of the Confederacy in Indian Territory," 
Chronicl.es of- Oklahmpe;, XLI, pp. 439-440; -General Order No. 
7, Headquarters · District of Indian Territory, February 24, ·· 
1865, Official Records; i, XLIII, Pt. 1, p. 1403. 
34special Order, No. 40, Headquarters, Trans-Mississippi 
Department, February 14, 1865, ibid. , p. 1387. 
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Plains Indians, although it just obligated.the.Confederacy 
to no specific :terms ... The terms of the.alliance called for 
perpetual peace between the, Five Civilized Tribes, and the·.· 
Plains Indians •. It was agreed that internal fighting between 
tribes would cea'se and any disagreements which might arise . 
would be.arbitrated. The.Confederacy was pleased at·the 
outcome.,of the meeting. because on several occasions these. 
Plains·Indians had caused more trouble in Indian Territory 
than Fe.deral troops.. The .motto of the new Indian confederacy 
was "An Indian.shall not spill an Indian's blood. 1135 
IIIimediately upon taking command in March, 1865, Cooper 
qa.d .begun to prepare·. his troops for a rumored Federal attack. 
The long-talked-about Kansas raid was still in the air, but 
it would remain nothing.more than talk. On May 16~ 1865, 
Cooper began to get reports on conditions of the war in the 
East. He refused, however, to put any credence in the 
stories and continued.his preparations. When the rumors 
persisted, Cooper ordered his connnand to stand by their col-
orsandawait further developments. He. discouraged .contact 
with the Federal forces, but issued orders not to allow 
Federals to enter Confederate territory.36 
35Thoburn.and Wright Oklahoma: A History of the State 
and m_ People, I, pp. 364 ... 365; Anna Lew1s "CanqrN'apoleon;" 
'C'fironi.cles of- Oklahoma, IX (December, 1931L pp. 359-364; 
COOJ?er to Andersoni May 15, 1865, Kirby-Smith to Cooper t~fB~ 8, 1865, Official Records, i, XLVIII, Pt. 2, pp. 1306, 
, 36cooper to Anderson, May 15,. 1865,1 .. _ Coo12er to Throck-
morton; May 16, 1865, Cooper to ·Aaair ~iay lo 1865, Cooper 
to Ande·rson, May 17, 1865, Cooper to McCulloch, May 18, 1865, 
Cooper to Watie, May·22, 1865, ibid., pp. 1305-1306, 1307, 
1307-1308, 1312; 1312-1313, 13;1.8;. Lewis, "Camp Napoleon," 
Chronicles .. of. Oklahoma, IX, pp. 360-364. 
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General Gooper advised several of.the Confederate 
Indian. leaders to call a meeting of the-Grand Council of the 
United Indian Nations to be· held 'on· June 10, 1865, at. Chahta : 
Tamaha. At this meeting• the:- Indians were· of one .accord;· they'. 
saw themselves as indep.endent nations and reserved the right 
to surrender to the Federal authorities as such. General 
Cooper, pursuant with the May 26 surrender by General Kirby-
Smith, surrendered onJy the white troops in Indian Territory. 
General Herron, then.commanding the Northern Division· 
of Louisiana,- ordered a meeting with the Indian representa7 . 
tives at Doaksville, in the Choctaw Nation.· Lieutenant Colo-· 
nel Asa C. Matthews and Adjutant William.H. -vance arrived. 
there about June. 18 and prepared to receive the surrender of· 
the Indian tribes·.· The Choctaws were the first tribe to sur-
render; they did s.o on June 19, 1865. At the same place 
four days later, General Watie surrendered the Cherokee 
forces under his command. With him cameelements·of the. 
Creek and Seminole units and the Osage Battalion. 
The surrender·terms,presented to Watie were about the 
same as those signed.by the other Confederate commanders in 
the Trans-Mississippi Department. Watie agreed to immediate-
ly cease all acts.of hostility against the Federal forces in 
Indian Territory .. The Federal authorities agreed to assume 
the responsibility of protecting the persons and property of. 
the late Confederate soldiers. This peace document was to 
remain in effect until the Grand Council convened at Arm-
strong Academy in the Choctaw Nation on September 1, 1865. 
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After the decisions of the Grand Council were accepted and 
ratified.by the Federal government, the resulting.peace terms 
acquired permanency and superceded the temporary conditions. 
signed by Watie on June 23,. 
Though other .... units .dtd: .sl,irr·end~r·:aftetf ... June:'23;· 1865,. ·· 
Watie_,.was -the last ... Confederate officer of general grade. to 
lay down his arms. It was not until July 14, 1865, that the 
last Confederate Indian units laid down their arms and 
accepted surrender terms similar to those·harided to Watie 
artd his troop units. These were the Chickasaw troops and 
the _Caddo Battalion. With the end of· the fighting by the 
Chickasaw and Caddo units, .the Civil War ended.in Indian 
Territory, and as General Cooper said, "The country is quiet,· 
and no danger-in traveling alone. 1137 
September, 1864, had brought high hopes .. of increased 
military activity for·the Confederates .in Indian Territory. 
The Confederate raiders Gano and Watie had brightened the•· 
37cooper to Walker, May 23, 1865, Cooper to Anderson, 
May25; 1865, Cooper to Scott, June 26, 1865, Treaty stipula-
tions signed ·by Stand Watie, June 23, 1865, -Official Records, 
i, XLVIII, Pt. 2, pp. 1318, 1319, 1324,· 1100-.llOl; Thoburn 
and Wright, Oklahoma: A History of the State.and Its 'People,· 
I, I_>P· 366 ... 367; Harlo~,-Okl~homa Iti:COriyins ~ Developlllent:_ 
A History, p. 152; Wright, Genera'rDoug as H. Cooper; • ... 
C. S. A., 11 Chroni9le.s . .2.f Oklahoma,. XXXII, pp. 178-179; Dale, 
"The ,Cherokees -in the Confederacy, " Journal . of Sou.thern 
History, XIII, pp. 184-185; Cunningham, General Stand Wati.e's 
Confederate._ Indians, pp. 196ml98; Minnie Elizabeth Thomas ·. 
Bailey, "Reconstruction in Indian Territory, 1865-1877," . (Un- ·. ·. 
published Doctor of Education Dissertation, Oklahoma State 
University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1967), pp. 36 ... 37; J. B. 
Davis, "Slavery in the Cherokee Nation," Chronicles Qf Okla-
homa., XI (December, 1933), pp. 1070.;.1071; Angie Deho-;-T~ 
Rise· and FalL of· the Choctaw Re~ublic (Norman: University 
otOkiaiioma Press-;-f934), pp. 8 -85. 
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outlook.for the Trans~Mississippi Departmentby their daring 
expedition to Cabin Creek. Watie had then plaguedhis 
superiors with renewed. requests for a raid further north · 
into Kansas. The Confederate forces in the East, however, 
had already started deserting by regiments, and some areas 
were already under complete domination of Federal authori-
ties. ·The endwas not far away for Indian Territory. By 
April, 1865, the course of direction was clearly indicated 
to General Cooper, the new district commander. He realized 
fully:tbat bis meager force was too weak to put up·stiff 
resistance, and so ordered all units to stay alert but not· 
to take offensive action •. He was waiting for his turn to 
surrender. 
The end came to the Trans-Mississippi as it did to the 
East, quietly and with solemnity. The Confederates moved to 
nearby Federal posts and were paroled. From there the 
Indian soldier returned to his home, hoping to take up his 
life where he had left it four years before. The Civil War 
was over in Indian Territory. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
During the twenty-two month period from the capitula-
tion of Fort Smith in September, 1863, to the close of the 
Civil War in Indian Territory, Confederate power in that 
area steadily declined. Sporadic as the Federal invasion· 
attempts had been previous to the fall of Fort Smith, they·· 
had succeeded in their objective: the clearing out of Con-
federate forces north of the Arkansas River. The bewildered 
Confederate forces, Indian and white, then looked to their 
commanders for leadership. But the Confederate high command 
in Indian Territory was lacking in insight, imagination, and 
aggressiveness. General Watie was at the time the only of-
ficer that could have delayed defeat by leadership ability, 
but he was in a subordinate position which left him with no 
opportunity to display the ·initiative that would later win 
him legendary fame. The loss of the north side of the eas-
ily defensible Arkansas River was disastrous to Confederate 
strategy. The only natural bastion left to the Southern 
forces was the Red River, and the Confederacy was too defi-
cient in necessary men and money, and construction material 
necessary to build a defensible line. 
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The Federal army opposing the Confederate·units did not 
suffer from scanty military supplies. Though the Union sup-
ply line along the Texas Road was continuously harassed, the 
quartermaster and sutler·trains continued to move to the· 
forward Federal posts of Fort Blunt and Fort Smith. 
The Federal forces did, however, suffer in adequate 
leadership. Staff bungling cost the Union armies opportunity 
after opportunity to invade south of the Arkansas River and 
destroy the meager Confederate forces stationed there. The 
two most glaring mistakes in Union strategy were the July, 
1863, invasion of General Blunt and the February, 1864, 
sortie by Colonel Phillips through southern Indian Territory. 
General Blunt, although fully competent and proportion-
ately balanced with an adequate amount of offensive aggres-
siveness, lacked in one area necessary for final victory. 
He was considered a political general and did not have the· 
confidence of his superiors. The first on the list of those 
not trusting Blunt was his arch-enemy and department com-
mander, General Schofield. Schofield, a regular army offi-. 
cer, did not like Blunt or his sponsor, Senator Lane. Using 
Blunt's recurring malady of malaria as an excuse, General 
Schofield was later instrumental in having Blunt removed 
from command. Blunt, in spite of his abilities, was maligned 
to the point that he brought his grievances to the attention 
of President Lincoln. The harmful aspects of this malevo-
lence on Schofield's part was far more disastrous than.harm-
ing Blunt. This lack of trust and confidence from the Union 
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high command kept Blunt from receiving the necessary men and 
material he needed to push his.campaign to victory. Only by 
manipulating orders did the Federal general gather enough 
supplies for active campaigning. Successful in every respect 
and rightly deserving of promotion, Blunt was removed from 
his command by General Thayer for a petty defeat that lacked 
the importance of an engagement. The East, it would seem, 
was not the only area where generals played politics. 
Colonel Phillips was another officer who unselfishly 
gave of his abilities for a cause be believed in and who in 
return received criticism, removal, and humiliation. In 
February, 1864, Confederate forces were weak and scattered 
throughout the Choctaw Nation, which allowed a perfect oppor-
tunity for the Federals to deliver a telling blow to the 
Southern units across the Arkansas River. However, Phillips' 
plan for a large-scale invasion of Confederate 'territory was 
criticized by his superiors. He was not criticized or dis-
liked by his Federal superiors because of politics; he was 
the victim, however, of plots and efforts toward removal 
because he was too honest, too efficient, and. too victorious. 
Phillips' invasion of southern Indian Territory was reduced 
to a sortie because of the failure of Blunt, the department 
commander, to support him with even a minimal amount of sup-
plies necessary to carry on offensive campaigning. Phillips' 
request for men had been honored most of the time, but needed 
cavalry reinforcements.on this occasion were not forthcoming. 
Infantry, unsupported by cavalry, could not hope to 
accomplish much in the rugged terrain below the Arkansas 
River. 
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The Confederate forces were·also plagued by the politi-
cal game. General Steele, heaped with abuse by his ambitious 
subordinate, General Cooper, resigned in disgust and humilia-
tion. General Maxey, Steele's successor and a better general, 
bec-ame the victim of the same abuse. Cooper believed he 
deserved the·position of Indian Territory commander·and did 
not hesitate when the situation called for back-stab.bing. 
Maxey labored.under the yoke of harassing, rebellious offi-
cers as well as a lack of -men and mater·ial enough to hold 
his area of responsibility. Being of the same mind as Feder-
al General Blunt, Maxey believed that the only hope for Con-
federate victory lay in launching an immediate offensive 
campaign. Realizing that his command was physically unable 
to accomplish this, Maxey used the troops in his department 
for harassing raids. Maxey constantly tried.to muster men 
and supplies for an invasion north of the Arkansas, but he 
was -stopped again and again by. lack of ade:quate support. To 
the Confederate high command in Richmond, Virginia., Indian 
Territory never took on any more importance than that of a 
buffe·r for their flanks and pro,te·ction for foodstuff-producing 
Texas. The whole Trans-Mississ.ippi area · suffe:red depriva-
tions. since it was at the bottom of the Confederate priority 
list for supplies and equipage. 
As ·in any war-, the :innocent as well as the guilty suf-
fered from the e.f:fi'e.cts of military activity. The :refugees, 
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whether loyal to the Union or adhering to the Confederate 
caus·e·, suffered as much if not more than the soldiers partic-
ipating in the fighting. From the beginning the Union 
refugees from Indian Territory had a difficult timeo Expect-
ing food and.shelter upon reaching sanctuary in the Federal 
state of Kansas·, these exhausted and beleaguered people 
:found only impatience, bate, and inadequate food, clothing, 
and shel te.r. Moved around at · the whim of the Bureau of 
.Indian Affairs authorities, the :refugee ranks were quickly 
thinned by death. Thes·e Federal refugees met and were ex· 
posed to frustration in false ·promises., grief from death, 
and disappointment at every turn. Even on their return to 
Indian Territory in June, 1864, nothing but frustration 
awaited themo Recent raids by Confederates ·required the.ir 
indefinite containment around the .Fort.Blunt stockade. Not 
until the end of the war would peace return these Indian 
refugees to .their homes · and farms. 
The Union refugees were not alone in the,ir plight. 
Refugees that took the cause of the Confederacy suffered as 
much·if not more than their Northern counterparts. These 
people were also forced from their homes and driven to un-
.familiar, and in some cases, .hostile regions in Texas. The 
added burden of no.t even having available a minimal amount 
of commissary supplie,s made the Confederate refugees suffer 
immense privations. Since suffering, death and social up-
heaval were experienced by Union and Confederate .refugees 
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alike, it is difficult to c.onclude which group .of refuge-es 
suffered,the mosto 
Many · of the needs · of the Indian refugee·s were · taken 
care of by . individual soldie,rs who had relatives or friends 
among the re:fugees. The military units ·of both the Union 
and Confede:rate armies in Indian Territory we.re reduced be-
cause of des·ertions due .to soldiers seeking out their refugee 
families. Colonel Phillips was forced to ·keep his Federal 
Indians as ·close to .their home·s as possible or else they ·: 
would have deserted en masse in their efforts to care for 
their familieso Over half of Watie's Indians deserted after 
the capture ·of the Federal s·tern-whe·eler J. ,. Ro Williams. ·in 
June:, 1864, when these :men, loaded with loot, rushed home .to 
give their priceless cargo to starving families and friends. 
The -dispatch with which ·the Confederates cap.tured and whisked 
to safety the Federal wagon train at Cabin Cre·ek, in 
September, 1864, was motivated by the ·desperate need of the·se 
soldiers and their familie-s. 
The Confederates in Indian Territory used their vie to·~-
ries such as at Cabin Creek to ·sell their ·efforts·. Maxey 
and Cooper, either together or singly, attended all Indian 
General Council meetings in order to properly present their 
military accomplishments. These two .generals achieved so 
much success in their efforts that they received official 
sanction and acceptance of their Confederate·administration, 
both civilian and military. In spite of some military suc-
.cess, the Confederates were forced out of ;Fort Blunt and then 
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Fort Smi-th, and were contained for the duration of the war 
below the Arkansas River. Al though the · accession o-f Gene:ral 
_Maxey in December, 1863, put an aggressiv,e commander in 
charge of Confederate forces ·in Indian Territory, he did not 
have enough war material to -launch into a full-scale·cam-
paign. Early in.1864, as a substitute procedure, Maxey 
swung into full-scale -guerrilla operations. His g.oal was· to 
harass . :the Federal. force·s until the Confederate Indian bri- · 
gade could be -brought up to-fighting trim •. Watie, Mcintosh, 
Walker, and ,Adai_r were, at that time-, Maxey's most prominent 
·subordinate commanders. They all we.re well respected by 
their men and by Maxey. Because of the inability of Conf'ed-
e:rate authorities at Shreveport and Richmond to provide vital 
s-upplies, hit-and-run techniques were the only effective 
:resistance open to the Confederates in Indian Territory. 
Fabian tactics would therefore prevail. 
By 1864, it was evident .to .many of the higher echelon 
in Indian Territory that .the Confederacy had lost the war. 
With only a little hope and the faith of the Indian soldiers 
left, the Southern military leaders -in Indian Territory urged 
"their soldiers on in the chance that the Federals might make 
a fatal blunder. 
It was -in that same year that Watie matured into the 
foremost of the Confederate cavalry guerrillas. His exploits 
cannot be -likened to John Bell Hood or James Long.street be·-
·cause Watie held a subordinate command. His point of excel-
lence and ability was ·bis guerrilla instinct and .ability. 
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He was peerless in quick, slashing forays, and attacks on 
communication systems at the Federal rear were a specialty. 
The guerrilla commander is not to be judged by the·amount of 
territory he can take and hold; he should be evaluated by 
the extent to which he disrupts the enemy. Therein lay 
Watie's greatness. Although he someti11l,es operated with a 
command of 800 men or more as at Cabin Creek, he operated at 
peak guerrilla efficiency with a command of 500 ,men or less. 
Watie's command did not look or operate anything like a reg-
ular army unit. His band in many cases was small, loosely 
organized, lacking even in rudimentary discipline, poorly 
equipped, armed with a variety of weapons, completely inde-
pendent, and of utmost importance, highly mobile. In several 
contacts with the Federal forces, Watie's men were numerical-
ly inferior to that of the Federals, yet performed with 
unique efficiency and telling results. 
By the middle of 1864, Watie had become the only hope 
for the Confederates in Indian Territory. General Maxey 
heeded without hesitation Watie's request for a raid into 
Kansas, but the over-cautious Cooper modified it to encompass 
territory only to the Kansas border. Cooper's timidity and 
total lack of incentive cost the Cherokee general a more 
substantial victory than the one he accomplished at Cabin 
Creek in September, 1864. With General Price in Missouri 
at the same time, Watie probably would have drawn many Fed-
eral troops out of Indian Territory. The Confederate units 
south of Arkansas River would then have been strong enough 
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to attack·the understrengthed garrisons of Fort Blunt and 
Fort Smith. Thayer would most likely~have·abandoned the en-
tire district after the Federal wagon train fell to the Con-
federates, and Watie ,could have ·captured or destroyed Baxter 
Springs ·and Fort_Scott as originally planned before modifica-
.tion by Cooper. This case of.a subordinate being more compe-
·tent than a superior officer was not confined entirely, of 
course, to the ranks -of Confederate officers in Indian Terri-
tory. A Phillips-Thayer comparison could be drawn along the 
same vein for the Fede-ral forces. 
The -guerrilla tactics used by the Confederate,s prolonged 
the ·conflict in Indian Te-rritory two months longer than the 
war lasted in the Eas·t. In ·general, the Confederates in 
Indian Territory ended the war as they·fought it: with pride 
and with honor. Even after the war was .over east of the 
Mississippi River, Cooper was planning a counter-offensive. 
The Confederates had the ability and will to fight, but 
lacked the necessary supplies. But by the·end of the war in 
Indian Territory, most of the materials used by Southern 
fighters were of Northern manufacture, captured or salvaged 
in combat. 
As a whole, both sides mistreated and misunderstood the 
Indian soldier. While in cormnand, General Blunt tried' to 
have .the Indian units-removed from active campaigning. Con-
federate General Steele and .General Maxey disliked the Indian 
.soldier's fighting ability. Yet, Gene:ral Watie, a full-
blooded Cherokee, and his Indian brigade did what the white 
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troops had failed to do--harass the Federals until they were 
· .ready to pull out of Indian Territory. 
The dislike .for the Indian tribesmen as soldiers was 
due mainly to the Union and Confederate officers' failure to 
. le.t the · red man fight as he desired. His natural instinct 
was ·to fight in guerrilla style. The Indians' ability in 
combat was ·proven by Watie's successes on the·battlefield. 
If the Federal and Confederate Indians ·bad been allowed to 
fight the war in their.own way, the results would undoubtedly 
have been different in more than one engagement. 
As it was, the Confederate Indian troops were forced 
from a position of dominance in Indian Territory. Their fam-
ilies were uprooted from their homes and these soldiers were 
de.spised and distrusted by the Confederate officers over 
them; yet these troops fought on admirably .as .. guerrillas for 
the Confederate cause. Time and time again they were poorly 
led, inadequately equipped, and mistreated, but they fought 
t 
on with unfailing devotion. This dedication, shown for a 
cause they had chosen as their own and for the ·leaders they 
respected, resulted in their being the last soldiers in the 
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Territory, 1865-1877." Unpublished Doctor of Education 
Dissertation, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater~ 
Oklahoma, 1967. 
This dissertation is an extensive survey of Recon"' 
struction period problems related to the Five Civilized 
.Tribes in Indian Territory. Chapter I was useful as an 
accurate reference for this thesis. 
Barksdale, Ethelbert c., "Semi=Regular and Irregular Warfare 
in the Civil War." Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy 
.Dissertation, ·1I1nivltr1:dcty:'.o.;f .T e.xa ·s:~. Austin, Texas, 
1941. 
This well=researched dissertation is a narrative 
of the guerrilla and partisan activities of the Civil 
War. The usefulness of this study lay in the·large 
~mount of documented material on William C. Quantrill 
and his activities in Missouri,. Kansas, Arkansas·, and 
Indian Territory. It is thorough and moderately 
interesting. · · 
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Claims, Cherokee File, Indian Archives Division, 
Oklahoma Historical .societyj Oklahoma~Ctt~, Oklahoma. 
This collection is an extensive compilation of cor= 
respondence from prominent Indian military and civilian 
leaders. It was a source of general information, but 
of limited value. It did supply some pieces ·Of informa= 
tion on specific occurrences, but nothing extensive. 
Foreman, Grant. Grant Foreman Papers, Civil War Cherokee 
Collection, Indian Archives Division~ Oklahoma Histor= 
ical .·Society, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 
This ·is an invaluable typescript aid for any schol= 
arly piece of research done on Indian Territory for the 
period of the Civil War. Arranged·by tribes, then ar= 
ranged alphabetically within the tribe, this research 
to.ol is very usefuL It provided two pieces of informa= 
tion found nowhere else. 
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Francis, Charles Richard. "Confederate Ascendancy in Indian 
Te-rritory· 1860-1861." Unpublished ·,Master of _.Arts The~. 
sis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 
1963. . 
This thesis was used to give the writer a sound 
orientation into the pre-1863 period. It is well organ-
ized and is moderately interesting. His coverage of the 
Confederate-Cherokee treaties is clear and easily under-
. stood. 
"'"'Hathaway, Worten Manson. · "Brigadier General Stand.· Watie, 
Confederate Guerrilla," Unpublished Master of Arts The-
sis, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 
1966. . 
This thesis is a very useful source for information 
.on Watie. It lacks in detail in some of Watie' s late . · 
1864 exploits, but this does not detract from its value. 
Much use was made of Hathaway's chronology for binding 
together many sketchy items that would have otherwise 
gone unnoticed. 
Maxey, Samuel Bell. Papers of Samuel Bell Maxey, Thomas 
Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, 
·oklahoma. 
This collection of .Maxey's papers was useful in 
supplying several items of importance not found in the 
Official Records. Most of the letters are still in 
their·original handwritten form, but some have been 
transcribed to typed pages. An excellent source for 
learning more of this Confederate general while com-
mander of Indian Territory. 
Morrow, Norman .P. "Price's Missouri Expedition, 1864." Un"': 
published Master of Arts Thesis, University of Texas, 
Austin;, Tex~s, 1949. :· .. -_ , 
Morrow's thesis was useful in providing information 
and chronology of Price's route and ensuing retreat 
through Indian Territory. It is informative, but lacks 
color. 
Neal, Barney King, Jr. "Federal Ascendancy in Indian Terri-
tory, 1862-1863." Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, .Oklahoma, 1966, 
This thesis was invaluable in its content for the 
1862-1863 period. It is well-written and thoroughly 
documented. Neal's minute coverage of the topic pro-
duced an interesting chronology that made it an enjoy-
able tool for this thesis. 
Oates, Stephen B. "Confederate Cavalry in the Trans-
Mississippi." Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, Uni-
versity of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1960. 
This thesis was useful in gaining .background know-
ledge on the tactics, origins, systems of procurement, 
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and process of remounting cavalry units in the Confeder-
ate Trans-Mississippi area. Though not cited in foot-
notes, it was invaluable for the general and specific 
information it contains. This thesis is well-documented 
and written in an interesting style. 
Wyant, Sharon Dixon. "Colonel William A. Phillips and the 
Civil War in Indian Territory." Unpublished Master of 
Arts Thesis, Oklahoma State University, Sti11water, 
Oklahoma, 1967. 
This thesis was useful in giving insight into the 
m\litary activities of Phillips, the commander of Fort 
,....B1imo.. H,e is portrayed as an honest, hard;.;;'f,tghting 
colonel among a group of corrupt or insane general offi-
cers. Although Wyant's research is very sketcpy in 
several of the·military activities of Colonel Phillips, 
it was used extensively to correlate information found 
in less reliable sources. 
Government Documents 
Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 
186'f=l'B'65. 7 vols., included in United States Senate 
Documents No.. 234, 58th Congress, 2nd Session", Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1904. 
This primary source was found to be helpful in pin-
ning down the date of Jefferson Davis' congratulatory 
resolution to General Watie and General Gano. It is a 
printed collection of the entire proceedings of the 
Confederate Congress. 
·United States Department of the,Interior~ Report of the Com-
niissione.r :of Indian Affairs for the Year 18~2-. - ·- ·~ 
Washington-=--- Government Printing Office, I'86'3. 
United States Department of the Interior. Report of the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1864. 
Washington"':"".Government Printing Office, I'Sb'5. 
These volumes contain valuable information on the 
health and welfare conditions of the Indian tribes dur· 
ing the years, 1862, and 186A~,! The~. were 0:a very ,use,fuJ 
and:'17.el.ialHe .source cff ::.informa.t:iron. .c · • 
United States Department of War. Atlas to Accompany the Of-
ficial Records of the Union and Conrederate Armie's:- --
3 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891-
1895. 
This primary source was used to compile segments 
of the map used in this thesis. It contains several 
locations of important towns and rivercfords found no-
where else. This atlas is essential for the preparation 
of Civil War maps. 
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United States Department of Wara Wa.r of the Rebellion~ A 
Co~ilation of the Official Recoras 'ortbie Union 
an ConfederateA'rmies. 70 vols. (l'ZB" books 1.n the 
United.States Serial Set), Washington~ Government 
Printing Office, 1880-1901. 
These volumes contain most of the ordlets 3 corre"' 
spondence, and reports.of the Union and Confederate 
armies during the Civil War. Instead of being dull 
reading, this source was the most informative and enter"' 
taining used. It provided over eighty per cent of the 
information used to compile this-military study. It 
needs to be brought up to date with all the discoveries 
since its printing, but that does not deter from the 
value or negate the usefulness of the set. 
Articles 
Abel, Annie H. "The Indians in the Civil War," American 
Historical Review, XV (January, 1910), 281=296. 
This article was written as a survey of the par-
ticipation of the Five Civilized Tribes in the Civil 
War. Mrs. Abel later expanded this topic into an 
authoritative book. Well~documented and adequately 
written, this was a useful piece of research. It was 
used extensively for background material in the first 
portion of this thesis. 
Anderson, Mabel Washbourne. "Excerpts from the Life of 
General Stand Watie, 11 The Southern Magazine, III 
(Winter, 1936-1937), 7-8, 46. ·.. . · 
This brief, synopsis=type article was only used to 
cross reference with the other articles written about 
Watie. It is outdated, and this limited its usefulnesso 
o "General Stand Watie," Chronicles of Oklahoma, X 
--... ,--D-ecember, 1932), 540=548. . · - · · · 
· This brief article on General Watie was used to 
compile and correlate information about this Confederate 
guerrilla and his colorful activities in Indian Terri-· 
tory during the Civil Waro There a);'e much better works 
available .. 
Banks, Dean9 "Civil=War Refugees from Indian Territory, in 
the North, 1861=1864," Chronicles·of Oklahoma, XLI 
(Autumn, 1963), 28600 298. -
·. . This study was of i:u.,ortance for the first section 
of Chapter IIIo B~nks limited his discussion to the 
Indians who remained loyal to the Union. Herelated 
their hope~, fears, continued disappointment, and con= 
Stant migrations., Bank's narrative and findings are a 
clear 1:rtdication of a well~written piece of scholarly 
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research. His style is. flowing and easy to read. The 
article was informative and interesting. 
Blunt, James G. ''General Blunt' s Account of His Civil War 
Experiences," Kansas Historical Quarterlz,. I (May, 
1932), 211-265. 
Autobiographical in nature, this controversial 
article was not published until 1932. Blunt makes map.y 
unsubstantiated accusations in it. It is a graphic ,.1 
account of the general's civil war campaigns. The .. 
article was useful in supplying Blunt's side·of the 
internal strife in the Union high connnand. The article 
is of some value, but a researcher should weight its 
creditability carefully. 
Britton, Wiley. "A Day with Colonel W. F. Cloud," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, V (September, 1927), 311-321~ 
This article by the prolific Britton ;is a survey 
of the more lighthearted moments of this fighting Union 
colonel. Britton uses no documentation, but it is 
clearly evident that the material is true and accurate 
in substance. It was used by the writer to give back-
ground on Colonel Clotid. Though a better officer than 
some generals, Cloud ~.a s n e.v e r promoted above full 
colonel. 
• "Some Reminiscences of the Cherokee People," 
----=ch~r-onicles of Oklahoma, V (June, 1927), 180-184. 
This short article by Britton describes his contact 
and reminiscences with the Cherokee people. It contains 
useful data on the Cherokee regiments and their activity 
in the Civil War in Indian Territory. It is a brief, 
but readable article. In the usual Britton style, there 
is no documentation. 
Cubage, Annie Rosser. "Engagement at Cabin Creek, Indian 
Territory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, X (March, 1932), 
44-51. -
This is an article written on the first (1863) en-
gagement at Cabin Creek. It was used to document and 
supply information on this portion of the Civil War in 
Indian Territory. The narrative is interesting and 
matter-of- fact. 
Dale, Edward E. "Arkansas and the Cherokees," Arkansas 
Historical Quarterly, VIII (Spring, 1949), 104-114. 
This article by Dale relates the participation of 
the Confederate and Union Cherokees in military activ-
ities taking place in Arkansas. This research was used 
in compiling sources for the first half of this military 
thesis. 
, "The Cherokees in the Confederacy," Journal of 
----=so-u-thern History, XIII (May, 1947), · 160-185. 
166 
This article is a detailed coverage of Cherokee 
participation in the Civil War in Indian Territory. It 
relates not only military detail, but material on their 
culture, political administration, and civilian refugee 
problems are .also covered in _this research study. It is 
well-d9cumented and interestingly written. 
, "Some Letters of Genei;:il Stand Watie,." Chronicles 
---o""""f.--Oklahoma~ I (January, 1921), 30-59. · 
- This work is a carefully compiled series of letters 
pertinent to the life· of Watie while in the service of 
the Confederacy. Letters from his wife,, friends,. and·. 
subordinates are illuminating in giving little known 
details of Watie's feeling toward many issues and prob-
lems. This select compilation was useful in s·everal 
instances in shedding light on how Watie coped with 
many unusual and vexing situation~ •. 
Davis, J. B. "Slavery in the Cherokee Nation," Chronicles 
of·Oklahoma, XI (December, 1933), 1056-1072~ 
· This article is an extensive survey of· the history 
of slavery in the Cherokee Nation •. The time span covers 
from the late eighteenth century to slavery's dissolu-. 
tion· in 1865. This work bad several.. interesting and 
'documented items useful in prepa;ing this thesis. 
J??~,.~~ "Southern Refugees of the Cherokee Nation," South:-. 
western Historical Qugrterly, XXXV (April, 1932), 255-
266. · . 
This article is a narrative on the trials and .sit-
uations of. tbe,refugee Indians, particularly the Chero ... 
kees, who broke with the Federal Union and followed the 
Confederacy. The author relates their unswerving faith 
in withstanding death and starvation .. This study was 
used exten.~ively in supplying sources and survey mate'"! 
rial on the Southern refugee. 
Fischer,· LeRoy H. "The Im.pact of the Civil War in Oklahoma:. 
Death and Destruction," Oklahoma State Alumni Magazine, 
V (SeptEimhe:t·:, 1964,); 10.;; tz~ ·· ' . . 
This article is an excellent synopsis of the Civil 
War in Indian Territory. Its findings on the Phillips:' 
expedition were invaluable and prevented the possibility 
of-misinterpretation • 
. Freeman, Charles R. "The Battle of Honey Springs," Chroni-
cles of Oklahoma, XIII (June, 1935), 154-168. 
This article was useful at one time, but needs.to 
be revised, rewritten, and brought up to date. Basic-
ally, the author copied the reports from the Official 
Records and added his opinions here and there. This 
article was useful in several instances, but the battle 
reports are available in full in the Official Records. 
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Foreman, Carolyn Thomaso "Colonel Jesse Henry Leavenworth," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XIII (March, 1935), 14-29. 
This piece of research was of only limited value 
in writing this thesis. It supplied two pieces of in-
formation that helped the writer establish a proper 
sequence of events for Union troop movements. 
Foreman, Grant. "The Centennial of Fort Gibson," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, II (June, 1924), 119-128. · · 
~ This article was useful in supplying a brief and 
well-documented history of·Fort Gibson~ Particularly 
useful was its descriptions of the fort's location in 
relation to surrounding landmarks and a minute descrip-
tion of the defenses and buildings of the fort as it 
was during the Civil War. 
• "Fort Davis, " Chronicles o f Oklahoma, XVI I (June, 
-----=1,...,.9 ..... 39), 147-150. . -
Foreman has written this synopsis telling of the 
brief existence of this important fortification. Fort 
Davis existed only three years, but it played an impor-
tant role ;in the Confederate activities in the Civil War 
in Indian Territory. The writer found much useful in-
formation about the location and physical make-up of 
the fort in this article. It is well-documented and 
accurate. 
Hancock, Marvin J. "The Second Battle of Cabin Creek, 1864, 11 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXIX (Winter, 1961-62), 414-
426. 
This article was used to establish the sequence of 
events for the Cabin Creek action. It is a well-written, 
readable piece of research, and the documentation is 
very good. Hancock's work was also useful in compiling 
specific information on the troop positions of the 
Union and Confederate forces at the engagement. 
Head, J. D. "Albert Pike," The Southern Magazine, II 
(Winter, 1935-1936), 16-=I9', 47. 
This short article was useful in that it presented 
a well-organized critique of the life of Pike. There 
is no documentation, but it is still accurate. The 
writer used Head's article in compiling some of the ref-
erences to Pike in Chapter I. 
Holladay, Fliorence E. "The Powers of the Commander of the 
Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department," Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, XX! (January, 1918), .279-298, 
333-359. . 
This article is in two parts. Only the first seg-
ment was useful in compiling this military history. The 
author of these articles has done an excellent job. Her 
work is documented, accurate, informative, and very 
interesting to read. Her description of the boundaries 
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of the Trans-Mississippi Department is quite accurateo 
The biographical sketches of the sub-district. commanders 
are well-written and usefulo 
Hood, Fred. "Twilight of the Confederacy in the Indian Ter-
ritory," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI (Winter, 1963-64), 
425-44L -· 
This survey article is a well-written and adequate-
ly documented piece of research. It covers the· time 
span of this thesis and was used by the writer as a gen-
eral intr.oduction to the topic under consideration. 
Lewis, Anna. "Camp Napoleon," Chronicles of Oklahoma, IX 
(December, 1931), 359-364. · -· 
This article is a graphic survey of the historyof 
this fortification~ She puts emphasis on the usefulness 
of the fort as the 1865 meeting place between the Con-
federate Indians and the war-like Plains Indianso This 
work was particularly useful in supplying information 
on the negotiations that occurred there. 
Moore, Cherrie Adair. "William Penn Adair," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma, .XXIX (Spring, 1951) ,· 32-41. 
Written by a relative of Adair, .this article is a 
brief biography. It contains much useful information 
on Adair's Civil War activities in Indian Territory. 
The most important item was Adair's capture by Federal 
troops in 1865, just prior to the end of the war.· 
Morrison, . James,, D. "Capture of. J. R. Williams," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, XLIII (Summer, 1964), 105-108. 
- This article was originally a commemoration address 
on the capture of the stern-wheeler, the J. R. Williams •. 
It was useful in supplying pertinent information on the 
sequences of events. It has several inaccuracies, and 
should be ,used with care. 
Morrison, W. B. "Fort Towson," Chronicles of·Oklahoma, VIII 
(June, 1930), 226-32.. · -
This article is a picturesque and well-documented 
survey of the existence of Fort Towson, Choctaw Nation. 
The section on Confederate activity at Fort Towson and 
the surrender there in 1865 of several Indian units was 
useful in compiling segments of this thesis. 
. • 11Fort Washita," Chronicles of Oklahoma, V (June, 
---,,.1-9--2·7) ,- 256-258. -
This accurate piece of research is a survey of the 
origin, progress, and present condition of Fort Washita. 
Well-written, organized in proper sequence, it was a 
useful article in supplying important information of the 
part that Fort Washita played in the Civil War in Indian 
Territory. 
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Morton, Ohlando "The Confederate States Government and the 
Five Civilized Tribes," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXXI : 
(Autumn, 1953), 299-322. · 
This article . wa .. s used in tracing sources and ~up-
plying the sequence of events for the treaty negotia-
tions between the Confederate representatives and the· 
Five Civilized Tribes. It was accurate and interesting. 
Meserve, John Bartlett. "Chief Lewis Downing and Chief 
Charles Thompson," Chronicles of·Oklahoma, XVI (March, 
1939), 318-319. -
The information in this article on Chief Downing 
was pertinent to several references on the Choctaw units 
and their activity in Indian Territory, This study is 
an interesting and well-organized piece of research. 
• "Chief Opothleyahola," Chronicles of Oklahoma, IX 
~~--,(r=D.,....ecember, 1931), 440-453. 
This article was used to supply and correlate the 
activities of this Creek chief. It proved to be useful 
only in constructing the first chapter of this thesis. 
Oates, Stephen B. "Recruiting Confederate Cavalry in Texas, 11 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXVI (April, 1961), 
463-477. . 
This article by Oates is a brief synopsis-of the 
techniques used by the Confederates in Texas .and the 
Trans-Mississippi Department. Most of its information 
is taken from his 1960 Master of Arts thesis, but there 
are several pieces of data not in his thesis. This 
article is useful for research on cavalry participation 
in the Civil War. 
Thoburn, Joseph B. "The Cherokee Question," Chron_icles of 
Oklahoma, II (June, 1924), 141-242. · 
This long and exhaustive piece of research is help-
ful for furnishing letters and pieces of correspondence 
sent between Confederate and Union Indian leaders in the 
state of Arkansas and Indian Territory. The writer 
found it particularly useJ:uL in supplying information 
and documentation on John Ross's correspondence during 
1861. 
Trickett, Dean, "The Civil War in the Indian Territory,''. 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XVII (September, 1939), 315-327. 
----· "The Civil War in ':the . .Indi:an"·Terrj.'!;ory, '! Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, XVIII (June, 1940), 142-153. 
- This series is a well-documented study of the Civil 
War period. The information found in these articles was 
used in writing portions of Chapter I of this thesis. 
Trickett's survey of the Civil War is useful for any 
piece of research on Indian Territory. It is also help-
ful for further research sources. 
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Wind.ham, William T. "The Problem of Supply in the Trans-
Mississippi Confederacy," Journal of Southern History, 
XXVII (May, 1961), 149-168. 
This piece of research is a detailed study of the 
many problems faced by the Confederacy in supplying 
their forces in the Trans-Mississippi with the material 
necessary for active military campaigning. Of great 
importance in this article was the description of the 
extent of supply shortages in this Confederate depart-
ment. Windham also included a discussion of the dif-
ferent routes used by the Southern logistic officers. 
A well-documented study, it provided much important in-
sight into the necessity of keeping the Texas Road, 
running North and South through Indian Territory, open 
for supply trains. This is an article worth reading 
for any research dealing with logistics in the Civil 
War. 
Wright, Muriel H. "Additional Notes on Perryville, Choctaw 
Nation," Chronicles of Oklahoma, VIII (June, 1930), 
146-148. . -
This article is an accurate description of the 
town of Perryville. Accompanying her article is a dia-
gram, with all the structures present in the Civil War 
drawn on it. This is a. useful·piece of research, add-
ing. much to the orientation· nec.essary in describing the 
fighting that took place in the vicinity. 
~, and LeRoy H. Fischer. "Civil- War Sites i.n 
---...ok=-1=-ahoma,I' Chronicles of· Oklahoma, XLIV (Summer, 1966);, 
158-215. -
This recent piece of, research was of value·to the 
author in locating many of the battle sites and camp-
sites cited in this thesis •. · This article adds much new 
information on the location c;1nd history of Civil War 
sites in Oklahoma. 
• "General D9uglas H. Cooper, C. S. A.," Chronicles ----of Oklahoma, XXXII (Slimmer, 1954), 142-:184. : · 
- This well-written chronology of Douglas H. Cooper 
is another excellent contribution by Muriel Wright. 
This study tells of the military activity of the South-
ern g.eneral. Other. aspects of his life during the Civil 
War were dealt with, but his military efforts were the 
:prime concern of this article. The documentation and 
insights are commendable. 
----· "Old Boggy. Depot, " Chronicles· of, Oklahoma, V 
(March,. 1927:), 4,..17. 
This article is a·graphic description and history 
of Boggy Depot. The writer found the.description quite 
use;ful in locating .. the. town on the map drawn for this 




Abel, Annie Heloise. The American Indian ~ Participant .!.!!: 
the Civil War.-. Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 
ffi9. -
• The American Indian. Under Reconstruction. 
---C..,,,,..,,....le-veland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1925. · 
These books represent two of the three volumes of 
the·most comprehensive and outstanding coverage of the 
Five Civilized Tribes to date·. They provided much val· 
uable and well-documented information used in composing 
this thesis. The volume not used was Abel's first, The 
American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist.· -
Basler, Roy P., ed •. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 
9 vols.. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,. 
1953-55. " ' , 
. These volumes were useful in pointing out the con-
cern that Lincoln had for the problems of Indian Terri-
tory and the welfare of personnel stationed there. It 
was particularly useful for information on Lincoln's 
&nnesty Proclamation and for letters bringing out his 
skillful handling. of irate military officers from Indian 
Territory. 
Boatner, Mark M., IIL The Civil War Dictionary. New York: 
David McKay Company, 1959 •. 
· This single volume was used to furnish information 
on,,dates of battles, casualties, and units that had 
their designations changed during. the.war. It is well-
written, .· but sketchy. 
Britton, Wiley. The Civil War on the Border. 2 vols., New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons-;-1890-1904. 
Britton's two-volume work is a coverage of the 
Civil War.in the Trans-Mississippi area •. It is biased 
in favor of the Union. The author served as a soldier 
in Indian Territory and obtained much of his.material 
first~hand. Though this work is not documented,. it had 
much research put into its composition. Much of its 
information is correlated with the Official Records. 
__ _.,,,.......,• Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, 1863. 
Chicago: Cushing 7T°homas,. & Co:-;- T8"B"2. -
This is Britton's first book-length effort. It is 
quite similar in content to his The Civil War on the 
Border, but is organized differently. TakingTir6-r,-tbe 
author·relates in detail the events in which the Union 
forces were involved. He discusses areas outside of 
Indian Territory as well as in Indian Territory. It 
was a very useful work for acquiring a good balance on 
background for the year of 1863. · 
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o _ The Union_ Indian_ Brigade. in the· Civil War. . Kansas: 
---~-C'=""'"'i.t"""y, Missouri: Franklin HudsoaP'iiiE!ish1.ng Co., 1922~: -
·· This book by Britton is a single.,,volume. work. _ It 
is not. documented but is fc1.irly accurate. in_ its sequence. 
of events. Britton's bias shows through, but·not·enough 
to detract from the usefulness of the book.... His story 
of the Union Indian: Brigade encompasses.parts of.the-war 
in neighboring states. This volume was a very useful· 
source-for·transitionalmaterial. 
Brownlee, Richards. Grey Ghosts of the Confederacy. Baton· 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1958~ 
The book treats the guerrilla warfare in the Trans-
Mississippi_area •. Mention is also made of·John Mosby,,-
in the East, but most of the work dieals with the.West •. 
Cavalry operations and how they were utilized by the 
guerrilla leaders is one of the major topics of tbe book~· 
·Brownlee's findings and conclusions are interesting and 
provocative to read. He brings out the Union. and Con-
federate-efforts to reach_ the.modern concepts of war. 
Burch, John P. Charles W. -~antrill ~ A True History 2.f. His 
Guerrilla Warfare on te Missouri ancFK.ansas Border Dur ... 
!.gg_ the Civil War or IB"ol to 1865. ---Vega, Texas~ ~ii'o-
piililrslier, f92r - - - -
This is an account of ~ant+ill as told by one of 
his men,- Captain Harrison Leon, and written up by.John 
Burch. It is not.very useful historically because of 
excessive bias •. Quantrill is portrayed as a martyr to· 
the-civilian populace. The Union and. Confederate 
authorities are.exposed.as-pestering interlopers that. 
constantly were interfering with his mar~uq.ingo 
Castel, Albert. A Frontier State-!_! War~- Kansasf 1861=1865 •. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. 
Castel's book is somewhat of an expose of.Kansas 
politics during the Civil War:. Thoroughly researched 
and well.,-.written, it is a useful source for factual in= 
formation on Union. blundering and plots against.Blunt 
and Phillips. He brings out with great clarity the.use 
of.granting army. contracts for personal gain by military 
authorities. -
Connelley, William E.. Quantrill and the Border Wars. Cedar 
Rapids:. The Torch Press, 1910. 
This book is_ a biography of. Quantrill Os Civil War. 
years set against a backdrop of the conflict on the west=. 
ern border, including numerous forays into-IndianT~rri.;. 
tory. This work was used to get basic information for· 
Quantrill's raid on Baxter-Springs, Kansas. It contains 
much useful information on his personality and habits •. · 
Cornish,.· Dudley Taylor. The Sable Arm~ Negro Troops in the 
Union ~56y, 1861=186~ New York~ Longmans, Green a~ Co., l o . · · 
•. 
173 
This fascinating work by Cornish is a history of 
the origins,.development, and uses of the Negro soldier 
in the Union Armydu:t:'ing the Civil War. It is informa-. 
tive, interesting, and historically accurate. 
Cunningham;. Frank. General Stand Watie's Confederate-Indians. 
San Antonio: The Naylor Company, 1959. 
Cunningham's book is colorful, well-written, inter-
esting, and delightful to read, but lacks totally in any 
evident scholarship. It is biased, plays up Watie as a 
cavalier, and the Confederate cause as a crusade •. It 
bas no· documentation, and mm~t be used with care. 
Dale, Edward Everett, and Gaston Litton, eds. Cherokee 
Cavaliers. Norman: University of Oklahoma.Press, 1939. 
This.volume contains most of the important written 
correspondence of the Watie-Boudinot family. It was 
helpful in gaining insight into the feelings of Watie •. · 
It is a source that is a necessity for research on the 
Cherokees during the Civil War period. 
Debo, Angie. The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic. 
Norman: University of Oklalioma Press, 1934. 
This book is the most comprehensive coverage on 
the history of the Choctaw Nation. Its empahsis is the. 
political, economic, and cultural aspects of this group 
of Indians. The· author's coverage of the Choctaw · ·· · · 
Nation in the Civil War is accurate and brief, yet 
readable. It proved to be a very useful source in 
writing the closing portions of this thesis • .. 
Downey, Fairfax. Indian Wars of the U. S. Army 1776-1865. 
New York: Doubleday"'""and Company7 Inc., 1963. 
This book is a chronological and analytical study 
of the army and its participation in military operations 
west of· the Mississippi. The section on the Civil War 
was made interesting by the author's unique approach. 
This study was useful in reconstructing Plains Indian 
activity. This is a source not to be overlooked by a 
researcher in western military history. 
Duncan,· Robert Lipscomb. Reluctant General: The Life and 
Times of Albert Pike. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 
1961. - --
This is one of the best books available on Pike. 
The author comes to the persecuted general's defense 
by slanting the writing in bis favor. He tries to ra-
tionalize.Pike's refusal to take the field in 1862 by 
citing evidence that be had good intentions. This bias 
does not hamper the usefulness of this work. It was 
very helpful in Chapter I, giving insight into Pike's 
character and post-war activities. 
Dyer; Frederick H. A Compendium of the War.of the·Rebellion. 
2. vols., :Des Moines: Dyer Publishing Company, 1908. 
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This work is a well-researched computation·of all 
battles, engagements, actions, and skirmishes in the 
Civil War. It was used to cross.check the correctness 
of the.chronology of battles in this thesis. Volume II 
was used extensively. 
Evans, .Clement A., ed. Confederate Military History. 12 
vols., Atlanta: Confederate Publishing Company, 1899. 
Volumes X and XI were used in this thesis. Evans' 
work is a topical chronology of the history of Confed-
erate activities in the Civil War. The section on 
Arkansas·and Indian Territory are well written and were 
quite useful in supplying needed information for the. 
background of the operations in Arkansas. 
Foreman, Carolyn Thomas •. Park Hill. Muskogee: The Star 
Printery, Inc., 1948.--
This booklet is the history of Park Hill, Indian 
Territory, and the surrounding vicinity. The.descrip-
tion of Park Hill's location was useful in relating 
military activity around Tahlequah and John Ross's home. 
It is very accurate and well-written. 
Foreman, Grant. Fort Gibson. Norman: University of Okla .... 
homa Press, '193o'. 
This booklet is a brief history of the development 
and use of Fort Gibson. The study was· '.Used to correct-
ly place Fort Davis and in relating the characteristics 
of the fort's interior. This is a small but valuable 
piece of work. 
___ ......,.... A History of Oklahoma. Norman: University of 
Okl~homa Press, 1945. 
This well-written and readable history of the Soon-
er state gave the writer much background information. 
Fox, William F. Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, 
1861-1865. Albany: Albany Publishing Co., 1889. 
This extensive research work was used to check the 
activity and casualties of the colored troop units sta-
tioned in Indian Territory. 
Harlow, Victor E. Oklahoma Its Origins and Development: A 
History. Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Corporation, 
1949. 
This survey history of Oklahoma is one of the bet-
ter works on the subject.. His treatment of the Civil 
War period is skillfully organized, and is useful for 
background reference. 
Johnson, Robert Underwood, and Clarence Clough Buel, eds. 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vols., Grant 
and Lee edition, NewYorlc": The Century Company, 1888. 
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This series is a compilation of articles submitted 
by contemporaries and participants. It is biased in 
that each author of an article puts forth his opinions 
and views. This does not detract from its overall use-
fulness; and it contains many informative and useful 
articles. 
Johnson, Allen, and Dumas Malone, eds. Dictionary of Amer-
ican Biography. 20 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons,-~1928-1936. 
This series of collected biographies of American 
personalities was invaluable as a source for background 
material on important personnel of this thesis. These 
short biographies are written by authorities on each 
subject and are well-documented. They were used-exten-
sively to check correct spelling and accuracy. 
McReynolds, Edwin C. Oklahoma: A History of the Sooner 
State. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. 
This is another collegiate history of Oklahoma. 
This book was used to substantiate information found in 
other Oklahoma histories. It was useful in providing 
information not given in Thoburn and Wright's Oklahoma.: 
A History of the. State and Its People. This volume 
should not be bypassed ~the researcher • 
• The Seminoles. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
---P"'"r_e_s s , ---r§°5 7 • 
This book on the Seminoles is the most authorita-
tive work on the subject. Interesting to read and easy 
to comprehend and follow, this source was of great help 
in tracing the activity of the Seminole units and of 
their chief, John Jumper. 
Monaghan, Jay. Civil.War on the Western Border 1854-1865. 
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1955. 
This work Lacks adequate documentation. The use-
fulness of this study is hampered by the jc:>urnalistic . 
style and his use of too;..frequeri.t opinions·.;. This book 
should be. used with caution. •. · 
. r . . . 
Morris, John W.", and Ec;:iwin C." McReynolds.. Historical Atla·s 
· · of, Oklahoma.. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
TI'65. · . 
This accurate reference atltts was used· to construct' 
the major part·.· of the, map· in this. thesis._; It is well · 
researched, its plates are easy to understand, :and are 
clear. ·. All drawings· were constructed tcr deal with im··· 
por,tant topics. and time· periods· in Oklahoma history~• 
This. atlas s,hould be consulted for maps or. drawings 
c:evering the his.tory of Oklahoma. 
Oates, Stephen. B. Confederate Cavalry West .2f ~ River.: 
Austi;n: University of Texas Press~6L. 
17:6 
. . Th.is bopk is:. an adaptation of Oates 1 .Master of, 
Arts 'thesis o · · Though th~ book is quite simi1ar:. to. his 
thesi,s:~ .. this similarity does not detract or diminish 
its usefulness~ .. The writer found. seve-ral items· of,. in ... 
forlllB.tion that. were found. no.where else: in hi~ wo;ks ... ·· 
This:. book is well=documiented and fair:ly interestingo . 
Rea~. Ralph R. Sterling Price~ ·the Lee of· the. ~ ... __ : Little 
Rock: Pioneer Press,: 1959. . · . 
- This book was used. to giv,e· adequate background, . 
mate;ri~l for segments of the work referring· to · the Pri,ce, 
raid_ of 1864 and other operations. in western Arkansaso 
It is·· an interesting and moderately accurate work.> 
. . . 
Thoburn? Joseph Bo A Standar~ · His~orr .2£. 9kla:homa·., 5 vols.;: 
Chicago: The ·American H1.stor1.ca• Society~ 1916b 
This multil'-volumed set is one of the better histo--, 
ries of the state of Oklahoma~ ·· -The· firs·t volume of· · 
this w:ork was used extensively in laying a.firm founda= 
tion of background information •. - It has been updated to 
some extent by Thoburn and Wright, Oklahoma: .. A His:tory 
of!!!: State and, Its People, pul,lished in four volumes in 
1929., , . 
Thopurn, Joseph B., and Muriel H. Wrighto; Oklahoma: A 
His~or:ft· of.~ State and. Its Peop'lle~.' 4 vols,,, New· York: 
Lew1.:s 1.s to;r1.cal, Publ~shing Company, Inc. ~ : 192.9. · : 
This, st~ndard,. multi .... volumed bist_ory of, Oklahoma 
is the . best available today •. · Though published in 1929, • 
the.sectipns on the Civil War are- as aiecurate; and fn .. 
forma_tiye as· any available,. , This reference was use:q. 
. extensively to. give the writer aµe,quate background and 
balanced scope for the entire Civil War period in, 
Indian Terr:ito;ry. This. book. is 'essential ,for anyone 
writing on the Civil War. in Indian Territory. : 
Wardell, Morris-L.,A Political History of the.Cherokee 
Nation 1838-1907. · Norman~ University~· Oklahoma 
·· Press, 1938. · 
This piece of·wr:iting is the.most authoritative 
source for the Cher.okee Nati,on vs int,rnal politics.;: It 
contains.} little· information dealing wi,th. military 
events, but: is invF1luable for information on, the pol it'." · 
ical activity of. the Cherokees. during the ·Civil War .. ·· 
This. is. one of t!ie · better trJ .. bal st.udies by' an .expert.·. 
on the subject. -
Warner;; .. ·Ezra ~ o Gene.rals in,·fgs~·~ , . Ba top. Rouge:. Louisiana . 
. ·· Stat:e. Un1.v.ers1.ty Pre_ss, _ •. · 
This work is a laborously' compiled series of cap~ . 
. sule sketch~s · of all Confederate general grade. officerso 
It was used in providing the writer, with an acc.urate; 
list:of general,officers in the Trans~Mississippi areao 
The· biog.raphical material. on .each entry is well=written, 
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and helpful in gaining insight into the personalities 
of these Confederate commanders. 
Woodward, Grace Steele. The Cherokees. Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 19o3. 
This accurate study emphasizes Cherokee social and 
political institutions, and was used to give background 
for the Confederate-Cherokee treaties of 1861. 
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